Costly renegotiation in repeated Bertand games

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Costly renegotiation in repeated Bertand games. / Andersson, Ola; Wengström, Erik Roland.

I: Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Bind 10, Nr. 1, 2010, s. Article 51.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Andersson, O & Wengström, ER 2010, 'Costly renegotiation in repeated Bertand games', Contributions to Theoretical Economics, bind 10, nr. 1, s. Article 51. https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1719

APA

Andersson, O., & Wengström, E. R. (2010). Costly renegotiation in repeated Bertand games. Contributions to Theoretical Economics, 10(1), Article 51. https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1719

Vancouver

Andersson O, Wengström ER. Costly renegotiation in repeated Bertand games. Contributions to Theoretical Economics. 2010;10(1):Article 51. https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1719

Author

Andersson, Ola ; Wengström, Erik Roland. / Costly renegotiation in repeated Bertand games. I: Contributions to Theoretical Economics. 2010 ; Bind 10, Nr. 1. s. Article 51.

Bibtex

@article{64dc3d765a8445f2a28c9f554612f12a,
title = "Costly renegotiation in repeated Bertand games",
abstract = "This paper extends the concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRP) to allow for costly renegotiation and shows that even small renegotiation costs can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria. More specifically, the paper analyzes the infinitely repeated Bertrand game. It is shown that for every level of renegotiation cost, there exists a discount factor such that any collusive profit can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. Hence, any arbitrary small renegotiation cost will suffice to facilitate collusive outcomes for sufficiently patient firms. This result stands in stark contrast to the unique pure strategy WRP equilibrium without renegotiation costs, which implies marginal-cost pricing in every period. Moreover, in comparison to the findings of McCutcheon (1997), who states that renegotiation costs have to be substantial to facilitate collusion, this result points to a quite different conclusion.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences",
author = "Ola Andersson and Wengstr{\"o}m, {Erik Roland}",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.2202/1935-1704.1719",
language = "English",
volume = "10",
pages = "Article 51",
journal = "Contributions to Theoretical Economics",
issn = "1534-5971",
publisher = "B E Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Costly renegotiation in repeated Bertand games

AU - Andersson, Ola

AU - Wengström, Erik Roland

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - This paper extends the concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRP) to allow for costly renegotiation and shows that even small renegotiation costs can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria. More specifically, the paper analyzes the infinitely repeated Bertrand game. It is shown that for every level of renegotiation cost, there exists a discount factor such that any collusive profit can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. Hence, any arbitrary small renegotiation cost will suffice to facilitate collusive outcomes for sufficiently patient firms. This result stands in stark contrast to the unique pure strategy WRP equilibrium without renegotiation costs, which implies marginal-cost pricing in every period. Moreover, in comparison to the findings of McCutcheon (1997), who states that renegotiation costs have to be substantial to facilitate collusion, this result points to a quite different conclusion.

AB - This paper extends the concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRP) to allow for costly renegotiation and shows that even small renegotiation costs can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria. More specifically, the paper analyzes the infinitely repeated Bertrand game. It is shown that for every level of renegotiation cost, there exists a discount factor such that any collusive profit can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. Hence, any arbitrary small renegotiation cost will suffice to facilitate collusive outcomes for sufficiently patient firms. This result stands in stark contrast to the unique pure strategy WRP equilibrium without renegotiation costs, which implies marginal-cost pricing in every period. Moreover, in comparison to the findings of McCutcheon (1997), who states that renegotiation costs have to be substantial to facilitate collusion, this result points to a quite different conclusion.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

U2 - 10.2202/1935-1704.1719

DO - 10.2202/1935-1704.1719

M3 - Journal article

VL - 10

SP - Article 51

JO - Contributions to Theoretical Economics

JF - Contributions to Theoretical Economics

SN - 1534-5971

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 32305489