Competition in Soccer Leagues

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Dokumenter

  • 0731

    Forlagets udgivne version, 203 KB, PDF-dokument

  • Bodil Olai Hansen
  • Mich Tvede
In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings on deadline day in european soccer
OriginalsprogEngelsk
UdgiverDepartment of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Antal sider10
StatusUdgivet - 2007

Bibliografisk note

JEL Classification: C72, D21, L83

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