Choosing a Public-Spirited Leader. An experimental investigation of political selection

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Choosing a Public-Spirited Leader. An experimental investigation of political selection. / Markussen, Thomas; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl.

2017.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Markussen, T & Tyran, J-RK 2017 'Choosing a Public-Spirited Leader. An experimental investigation of political selection'. <https://www.economics.ku.dk/research/publications/wp/dp_2017/1704.pdf>

APA

Markussen, T., & Tyran, J-R. K. (2017). Choosing a Public-Spirited Leader. An experimental investigation of political selection. University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online) Nr. 17-04 https://www.economics.ku.dk/research/publications/wp/dp_2017/1704.pdf

Vancouver

Markussen T, Tyran J-RK. Choosing a Public-Spirited Leader. An experimental investigation of political selection. 2017.

Author

Markussen, Thomas ; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl. / Choosing a Public-Spirited Leader. An experimental investigation of political selection. 2017. (University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online); Nr. 17-04).

Bibtex

@techreport{572358c47d23454a86d7a00f49051bd6,
title = "Choosing a Public-Spirited Leader. An experimental investigation of political selection",
abstract = "In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates{\textquoteright} pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Political selection, pro-social behavior, social dilemma, corruption, voting, C91, C92, D03, D72, H41, political selection, pro-social behavior, social dilemma, corruption, voting",
author = "Thomas Markussen and Tyran, {Jean-Robert Karl}",
year = "2017",
language = "English",
series = "University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)",
number = "17-04",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Choosing a Public-Spirited Leader. An experimental investigation of political selection

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates’ pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.

AB - In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates’ pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Political selection

KW - pro-social behavior

KW - social dilemma

KW - corruption

KW - voting

KW - C91

KW - C92

KW - D03

KW - D72

KW - H41

KW - political selection

KW - pro-social behavior

KW - social dilemma

KW - corruption

KW - voting

M3 - Working paper

T3 - University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)

BT - Choosing a Public-Spirited Leader. An experimental investigation of political selection

ER -

ID: 178282245