Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection

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Standard

Choosing a public-spirited leader : An experimental investigation of political selection. / Markussen, Thomas; Tyran, Jean-robert.

I: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Bind 144, 01.12.2017, s. 204-218.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Markussen, T & Tyran, J 2017, 'Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, bind 144, s. 204-218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.006

APA

Markussen, T., & Tyran, J. (2017). Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 144, 204-218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.006

Vancouver

Markussen T, Tyran J. Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2017 dec 1;144:204-218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.006

Author

Markussen, Thomas ; Tyran, Jean-robert. / Choosing a public-spirited leader : An experimental investigation of political selection. I: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2017 ; Bind 144. s. 204-218.

Bibtex

@article{9e787f6fb1ae46bd8c32a5c71be35940,
title = "Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection",
abstract = "In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates⿿ pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Political selection, Pro-social behavior, Social dilemma, Corruption, Voting, C92, C91, D03, D72, H41",
author = "Thomas Markussen and Jean-robert Tyran",
year = "2017",
month = "12",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.006",
language = "English",
volume = "144",
pages = "204--218",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Choosing a public-spirited leader

T2 - An experimental investigation of political selection

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Tyran, Jean-robert

PY - 2017/12/1

Y1 - 2017/12/1

N2 - In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates⿿ pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.

AB - In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates⿿ pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Political selection

KW - Pro-social behavior

KW - Social dilemma

KW - Corruption

KW - Voting

KW - C92

KW - C91

KW - D03

KW - D72

KW - H41

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.006

M3 - Journal article

VL - 144

SP - 204

EP - 218

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

SN - 0167-2681

ER -

ID: 186156349