Behavioral Dishonesty in the Public Sector

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Behavioral Dishonesty in the Public Sector. / Olsen, Asmus Leth; Hjorth, Frederik; Harmon, Nikolaj; Barfort, Sebastian.

I: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Bind 29, Nr. 4, 17.10.2019, s. 572-590.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Olsen, AL, Hjorth, F, Harmon, N & Barfort, S 2019, 'Behavioral Dishonesty in the Public Sector', Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, bind 29, nr. 4, s. 572-590. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muy058

APA

Olsen, A. L., Hjorth, F., Harmon, N., & Barfort, S. (2019). Behavioral Dishonesty in the Public Sector. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 29(4), 572-590. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muy058

Vancouver

Olsen AL, Hjorth F, Harmon N, Barfort S. Behavioral Dishonesty in the Public Sector. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 2019 okt. 17;29(4):572-590. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muy058

Author

Olsen, Asmus Leth ; Hjorth, Frederik ; Harmon, Nikolaj ; Barfort, Sebastian. / Behavioral Dishonesty in the Public Sector. I: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 2019 ; Bind 29, Nr. 4. s. 572-590.

Bibtex

@article{879f21dfebb346ad99e4dfbd58ef4c91,
title = "Behavioral Dishonesty in the Public Sector",
abstract = "We investigate the usefulness of the dice game paradigm to public administration as a standardized way of measuring (dis)honesty among individuals, groups, and societies. Measures of dishonesty are key for the field's progress in understanding individual, organizational, and societal differences in unethical behavior and corruption. We first describe the dice game paradigm and its advantages and then discuss a range of considerations for how to implement it. Next, we highlight the potential of the dice game paradigm across two diverse studies: prospective public employees in Denmark (n = 441) and prospective public employees in 10 different countries with very different levels of corruption (n = 1,091). In the first study, we show how individual-level behavioral dishonesty is very strongly negatively correlated with public service motivation. In the second study, we find that widely used country-level indicators of corruption are strongly correlated with the average behavioral dishonesty among prospective public employees. The results illustrate the importance of the validated dice game paradigm to shed light on core questions that link micro-and macro-level dynamics of dishonesty and corruption in the public sector.",
author = "Olsen, {Asmus Leth} and Frederik Hjorth and Nikolaj Harmon and Sebastian Barfort",
year = "2019",
month = oct,
day = "17",
doi = "10.1093/jopart/muy058",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "572--590",
journal = "Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory",
issn = "1053-1858",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Behavioral Dishonesty in the Public Sector

AU - Olsen, Asmus Leth

AU - Hjorth, Frederik

AU - Harmon, Nikolaj

AU - Barfort, Sebastian

PY - 2019/10/17

Y1 - 2019/10/17

N2 - We investigate the usefulness of the dice game paradigm to public administration as a standardized way of measuring (dis)honesty among individuals, groups, and societies. Measures of dishonesty are key for the field's progress in understanding individual, organizational, and societal differences in unethical behavior and corruption. We first describe the dice game paradigm and its advantages and then discuss a range of considerations for how to implement it. Next, we highlight the potential of the dice game paradigm across two diverse studies: prospective public employees in Denmark (n = 441) and prospective public employees in 10 different countries with very different levels of corruption (n = 1,091). In the first study, we show how individual-level behavioral dishonesty is very strongly negatively correlated with public service motivation. In the second study, we find that widely used country-level indicators of corruption are strongly correlated with the average behavioral dishonesty among prospective public employees. The results illustrate the importance of the validated dice game paradigm to shed light on core questions that link micro-and macro-level dynamics of dishonesty and corruption in the public sector.

AB - We investigate the usefulness of the dice game paradigm to public administration as a standardized way of measuring (dis)honesty among individuals, groups, and societies. Measures of dishonesty are key for the field's progress in understanding individual, organizational, and societal differences in unethical behavior and corruption. We first describe the dice game paradigm and its advantages and then discuss a range of considerations for how to implement it. Next, we highlight the potential of the dice game paradigm across two diverse studies: prospective public employees in Denmark (n = 441) and prospective public employees in 10 different countries with very different levels of corruption (n = 1,091). In the first study, we show how individual-level behavioral dishonesty is very strongly negatively correlated with public service motivation. In the second study, we find that widely used country-level indicators of corruption are strongly correlated with the average behavioral dishonesty among prospective public employees. The results illustrate the importance of the validated dice game paradigm to shed light on core questions that link micro-and macro-level dynamics of dishonesty and corruption in the public sector.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064137775&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/jopart/muy058

DO - 10.1093/jopart/muy058

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85064137775

VL - 29

SP - 572

EP - 590

JO - Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

JF - Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

SN - 1053-1858

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 235073692