A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

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A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies. / Andersson, Ola; Wengström, Erik Roland.

I: Economics Letters, Bind 95, Nr. 3, 2007, s. 398-401.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Andersson, O & Wengström, ER 2007, 'A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies', Economics Letters, bind 95, nr. 3, s. 398-401. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014

APA

Andersson, O., & Wengström, E. R. (2007). A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies. Economics Letters, 95(3), 398-401. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014

Vancouver

Andersson O, Wengström ER. A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies. Economics Letters. 2007;95(3):398-401. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014

Author

Andersson, Ola ; Wengström, Erik Roland. / A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies. I: Economics Letters. 2007 ; Bind 95, Nr. 3. s. 398-401.

Bibtex

@article{0d04c600dad811dcbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies",
abstract = "Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WRP) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, noncooperative game theory, weak renegotiation-proofness, repeated Bertrand games",
author = "Ola Andersson and Wengstr{\"o}m, {Erik Roland}",
note = "JEL classification: C72, D43",
year = "2007",
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014",
language = "English",
volume = "95",
pages = "398--401",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

AU - Andersson, Ola

AU - Wengström, Erik Roland

N1 - JEL classification: C72, D43

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WRP) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome

AB - Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WRP) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - noncooperative game theory

KW - weak renegotiation-proofness

KW - repeated Bertrand games

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.014

M3 - Journal article

VL - 95

SP - 398

EP - 401

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 2736855