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HOW DO BELIEFS ABOUT THE GENDER WAGE GAP AFFECT THE DEMNAD FOR PUBLIC POLICY?

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How Do Beliefs about the Gender Wage Gap Affect the Demand for Public Policy? *

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Abstract

I conduct a pre-registered online survey experiment with a representative sample of the US population to study the relationship between people's beliefs about the size of the gender wage gap and their demand for policies aimed at mitigating it. While the correlation between beliefs and policy demand is strong, the corresponding causal effect accounts for a minor share of the differences in policy demand across the political spectrum and by gender. Instead, correlational evidence suggests a larger role for deeply-rooted world views and preferences. I document that selective information acquisition may sustain individual beliefs in line with these preferences.

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1   Introduction

Women across the developed world continue to receive lower wages than men on average (Our World in Data, 2018). A considerable part of this gender wage gap (GWG) is accounted for by gender differences in industry and occupation (Blau and Kahn, 2017), work force interruptions and working hours (Goldin, 2014). With women representing close to half of the workforce, governments have started to implement, to varying degrees, policies such as equal pay legislation, wage transparency and reporting requirements for firms (World Economic Forum, 2018). In many countries, such as the US, the adequate degree of government intervention aimed at closing the GWG remains a highly controversial topic at the center of the political discussion, with strong disagreement in views across the political spectrum and by gender (see e.g. Gallup Social & Policy Issues (2016)). However, the origins of this polarization are not well understood.

If people have a distaste for inequality (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), beliefs about the degree of gender-related wage inequality should determine the demand for government intervention aimed at mitigating this inequality. Indeed, the size of the GWG is at the core of the public policy discussion (Moore, 2014; Umoh, 2016). Expressed beliefs about the GWG differ substantially across the political spectrum (Pew Research Center, 2017) and by gender (Gallup Social & Policy Issues, 2016) and politicians as well as political activists regularly cite statistics about gender differences in wages.[1] This could point to an important

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[1]See, e.g. President Obama stating in 2016: "The typical woman who works full time still earns 79 cents for every dollar that the typical man does. The gap is even wider for women of color. The typical black working woman makes only 60 cents. The typical Latino woman makes only 55 cents for every dollar a white man earns. And that's not right. So today, we're taking one more step in the right direction. We are proposing to collect and report pay data by race, ethnicity, and gender from businesses." (`https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/29/remarks-president-advancing-equal-pay`.)

role for beliefs about the extent of gender wage differences in shaping policy demand. Alternatively, people might express beliefs to justify their policy views, which are driven by other concerns.

In this paper, I ask the following questions: First, what beliefs do people express about the size of the GWG when they are incentivized to reveal their honest opinion? Second, do these beliefs causally influence individuals' demand for policies aimed at supporting women in the labor market? And third, to what extent are differences in policy demand across the political spectrum and by gender driven by beliefs about the GWG as compared to other concerns?

To answer these questions, I run a pre-registered online survey experiment with a sample of 4,065 individuals that is representative of the US population aged 18 to 65 in terms of observables. I first elicit people's (prior) beliefs about a well-defined measure of females' relative wages, namely a woman's average income for every $100 made by a man when both are 45-year-old employees, hold a Bachelor's degree and work 40 hours per week on average. Beliefs are incentivized for about half of the respondents in order to mitigate politically motivated bias in reported beliefs (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et al., 2015).

Next, I create exogenous variation in the respondents' beliefs about the size of the GWG via two randomly assigned information treatments, based on recent data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and from the Current Population Survey (CPS), respectively. The two surveys yield different estimates of the above wage statistic based on sampling variation and procedural differences. Specifically, participants exposed to a "high wage gap" ("low wage gap") treatment learn that according to recent data from the ACS (CPS) a female's wage amounts to 74% (94%) of a male's wage, on average, when both hold the previously described characteristics.

Post-treatment, I elicit the respondents' demand for policies that may be

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seen as supportive of women in the labor market, using self-reported as well as costly behavioral measures. As the only difference between the two information treatments is the value of the wage statistic, this experimental design allows for a clean identification of the causal effect of people's perceived level of gender-related wage inequality on their policy demand.[2]

I start by documenting that people's incentivized prior beliefs about women's relative wages are highly dispersed, with Republicans (men) holding more optimistic beliefs than Democrats (women). Moreover, in a control group that does not receive any information, women, Democrats and individuals who believe that the GWG is larger are more in favor of policies aimed at supporting women in the labor market. But are these correlations driven by a causal effect of people's beliefs?

I estimate the causal effect of interest by comparing individuals who received the "high wage gap" to those who received the "low wage gap" treatment. There is a 0.6 standard deviation (differential) treatment effect in the expected direction on people's posterior beliefs about females' relative wages, a 0.4 standard deviation effect on perceptions of whether the GWG is a problem and a still considerable effect of a 0.2 standard deviation on support for government intervention to mitigate the GWG in general.

How does this shift in general support for government intervention translate into demand for specific policies? I find a 0.1 standard deviation treatment effect on self-reported demand for stricter equal pay legislation and for statutory affirmative action programs for women. The demand for gender quotas, wage transparency within companies and public subsidies to child care, how-

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[2]Similar to designs by Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2017) and Roth and Wohlfart (2019) in other contexts, and in contrast to commonly used treatment-control designs, concerns about side-effects of information provision are minimized and I do not rely on variation in prior beliefs for identification, which arguably increases the external validity of my findings.

ever, is largely inelastic to information about the size of the GWG. The overall finding of a meaningful but nuanced treatment effect is reflected in a number of behavioral outcome measures: Individuals previously exposed to the "high wage gap" as compared to the "low wage gap" treatment are significantly more (less) likely to sign a petition that calls for an increase (decrease) in gender-related reporting requirements for companies, but do not differ significantly in donations to an NGO that lobbies for policies aimed at supporting women in the labor market. The treatment effect on policy demand generally persists in an obfuscated follow-up survey conducted around two weeks after the main survey, suggesting that it is driven by an actual updating of beliefs about the GWG, as compared to experimenter demand effects or short-lived emotional responses to the treatment.

To what extent can beliefs about the GWG causally explain the large differences in policy demand between Democrats and Republicans and by gender? Differences in prior beliefs across groups and the estimated causal effect of beliefs on policy demand imply that at most 6 percent (7 percent) of the partisan (gender) gap in policy demand can be explained by different perceptions of the level of the GWG. This implies that a convergence in beliefs would hardly generate a convergence in policy demand.

There are several potential explanations for the limited causal role of people's beliefs about the GWG in accounting for differences in policy demand across groups. First, people could attribute the GWG to arguably "fair" reasons such as gender differences in preferences or ambitions (Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010). I find, however, that survey respondents attribute the information they receive mostly to gender-based discrimination in labor markets – an arguably "unfair" source of inequality. Similarly, the information does not lead to a simultaneous updating of beliefs about the effectiveness of policies, which

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could otherwise lead to a muted elasticity of policy demand.

Alternatively, people's policy demand may be subject to more deeply-rooted preferences and world views, which might simply leave little room for information about the size of the GWG to change minds. Consistent with this idea, correlational evidence suggests that proxies of people's world views, such as the perceived importance of gender equality in labor market outcomes and beliefs about a reverse discrimination of men through policies that support women in the labor market, account for a substantial share of the differences in policy demand across the political spectrum and by gender.

Motivated by the fact that the correlation between beliefs about the GWG and policy demand is stronger than the corresponding causal link, I examine whether people's beliefs about the size of the GWG are, at least to some extent, endogeneous to their policy preferences. I find that men's (women's) reported beliefs about the size of the GWG are higher (lower) when incentivized as compared to unincentivized, which is consistent with politically motivated bias in reported beliefs (Prior et al., 2015). In addition, the respondents' willingness to pay for additional information from sources with a clearly described stance on women in the labor market differs systematically by gender and political orientation, in line with differences in policy demand. These patterns are consistent with previous evidence showing that differences in beliefs that are in line with people's political preferences can persist even when the same information is publicly available to everybody (Bakshy et al., 2015; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010).

I contribute to a literature that uses information experiments to study the effect of beliefs about different types of inequality on related policy demand. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that focuses on beliefs about the extent of gender differences in wages. Whereas existing literature suggests

that information on low social mobility (Alesina et al., 2017), rising income inequality (Kuziemko et al., 2015) or racial discrimination (Haaland and Roth, 2019)[3] has a nuanced or limited effect on people's demand for related government intervention, gender-related wage inequality has some features that ex-ante suggest a potentially higher elasticity of policy demand to information: First, there is no segregation between men and women, which might facilitate a larger treatment response of the advantaged group than in other contexts.[4] Second, the drivers of gender-related wage inequality are unique and might call for policy intervention. Namely, educational attainment has ceased to account for the GWG in the United States (Goldin et al., 2006) and instead there is growing evidence of a child penalty for working women (Kleven et al., 2019). Third, the female half of the population will arguably interpret a signal about a larger (smaller) GWG as a negative (positive) signal about their own relative wage and wage prospects, potentially causing a high elasticity of policy demand based on self-interest.[5] My findings suggest that people's policy demand may indeed be more elastic to beliefs about the size of the GWG than, for example, to beliefs about racial discrimination (Haaland and Roth, 2019). Nevertheless, more deeply-rooted world views seem to be the main driver of the substantial disagreement in the population concerning the optimal degree of policy intervention to close the GWG.

My paper complements existing laboratory evidence (Cappelen et al., 2007,

[3]Other survey experiments study the role of information on relevant facts for people's support for government spending (Lergetporer et al., 2018) and redistribution (Alesina et al., 2018) and for policy-making by political leaders (Hjort et al., 2019). Alesina and Giuliano (2011) provide an excellent overview of the literature on preferences for redistribution.

[4]For an excellent summary of the evidence on racial, ethnic, religious and national ingroup concerns in preferences for redistribution, see Stichnoth and Van der Straeten (2013).

[5]This conjecture is supported by the finding that people's perceived own relative position in the income distribution causally affects their demand for redistribution (Cruces et al., 2013; Karadja et al., 2017).

2010) by investigating, in a field setting, the role of perceived personal vs. impersonal causes of inequality in shaping policy demand. My evidence on how people interpret an abstract statistic and update their beliefs about the prevalence of underlying drivers highlights that the elasticity of people's policy demand to perceived inequality may be muted by other concerns, even when inequality is causally attributed to impersonal factors.

Finally, I contribute to a literature on the role of labor markets for the political gender gap, i.e., the fact that women have become more "left-wing" than men (Edlund and Pande, 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006; Newman, 2016). This paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to isolate the effect of beliefs about the size of the GWG. My findings suggest that part of the political gender gap is causally driven by gender differences in beliefs about the GWG, but other concerns that also differ by gender play a larger role.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design and the data. Section 3 provides descriptive evidence on beliefs about the size of the GWG and the correlation between these beliefs and people's demand for policy intervention. Section 4 presents the corresponding causal evidence. Section 5 sheds light on underlying mechanisms, presents correlational evidence on the role of more deeply-rooted world views in driving the political disagreement and studies the endogeneity of people's beliefs about the GWG to these world views. Section 6 concludes.

2   Experimental Design and Data

This section describes the survey administration, presents the experimental design and summarizes the content of the survey experiment and the data.

2.1 Timeline and overview

Data collection took place in two waves, denoted "wave A" and "wave B" in the following, between August 2018 and January 2019.[6] Each wave consists of a main survey and an obfuscated follow-up survey around two weeks later. I cooperated with an online data provider who recruited respondents through generic invitations by email. Figure 1 outlines the survey structure: First, I elicit the respondents' beliefs about females' relative wages. Next, I generate exogenous variation in these beliefs by means of two differential information treatments based on two different household surveys conducted by the US Census Bureau. Subsequently, I elicit the respondents' demand for government intervention aimed at supporting women in the labor market, using self-reported measures as well as proxies of actual political behavior. In the follow-up survey, the participants do not receive new information but are again interviewed about their demand for government intervention. An interactive version of the main survey is available online.[7]

2.2 Main survey

Treatment assignment and prior belief elicitation First, I elicit the respondents' prior beliefs about a female's relative wage for every $100 received by a man in the group of 45 year-old employees in the US who hold a Bachelor's degree and work 40 hours per week on average. This measure has a range of desirable features: First, compared to qualitative measures commonly used in

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[6]Wave A was conducted between August 31st and October 9th, 2018 and Wave B between November 21st, 2018 and January 2nd, 2019. In the original pre-analysis-plan as of August 31st, 2018 I specified one wave with N=2500. In an addendum to the PAP published on November 21st, 2018 I specified the collection of an additional sample with N=1500. Online appendix E.2 shows the main results separately by wave.

[7]Go to `https://limesurvey.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/lime/index.php/736385?lang=en&panelID=PAP` to take the main survey (wave A). Online appendix B.3 contains additional survey links. For the survey instructions, see `https://www.dropbox.com/s/merwo5j8823fq1x/Instructions_Gender_PolPref.pdf?dl=0`.

opinion polls, it is straightforward and unambiguous. Second, it can easily be compared to objective benchmarks. Third, while some important determinants of wages, namely education, age and working hours, are held constant, I do not condition on occupation and industry. Thus, there is room for interpretation by the respondents, which I use later in the survey to examine whether they attribute changes in their perceived level of the GWG to gender differences in ambitions or preferences, which could be reflected in career choices.

Prior beliefs are incentivized on a random basis for roughly half of the respondents, in order to mitigate politically motivated bias in reported beliefs (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et al., 2015). For this purpose, each respondent is, already at this point, randomly assigned to one of two treatment arms (T^{74} or T^{94}) or to a pure control group.[8] Incentivized subjects in T^{74} (T^{94}) learn that they will receive a bonus of \$2 if their estimate deviates by less than \$2 from the objective value of the wage statistic based on the most recent American Community Survey (ACS) (Current Population Survey (CPS)) as of the beginning of 2018. For control group respondents in the incentivized condition one of the two household surveys is randomly chosen as the objective benchmark. A comparison of incentivized and unincentivized beliefs allows me to test for the presence of politically motivated bias in reported beliefs for different political interest groups (Prior et al., 2015).

Information treatment Subsequently, subjects in T^{74} (T^{94}) are informed that, according to recent ACS (CPS) data, the objective value of the described wage statistic corresponds to a relative wage of female employees of \$74 (\$94). The difference between these two values is the result of sampling variation and procedural differences between the two underlying surveys, e.g. sampling

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[8]Table 1 shows the probabilities with which subjects were assigned to the six different experimental conditions.

frame.[9] The information treatment is illustrated by a bar chart that contrasts the prior estimate of the respondent with the objective treatment value (see Figure A.5 in the online appendix). Control group respondents do not receive any information at this stage but are reminded of their own prior estimate.

Self-reported policy demand Post-treatment, a "manipulation check" captures opinions on whether the GWG is large, on whether it is a problem and on whether the government should do more to promote wage equality between men and women. Subsequently, I elicit the respondents' demand for the following specific policies: i) Gender quotas for leading positions; ii) Affirmative action programs for women, such as training and outreach programs; iii) Equal pay legislation iv) Public subsidies to child care; v) Wage transparency within companies and vi) A website on which gender-related wage statistics of large companies are published. For each policy, I provide a short briefing on the status quo in order to enable respondents to meaningfully express their support for the corresponding intervention on a five-point-scale.

Costly measures of policy demand Experimenter demand effects and social desirability bias are commonly raised concerns about information experiments. Even though recent evidence shows that these concerns are of little empirical relevance (de Quidt et al., 2018; Mummolo and Peterson, 2018), I validate the self-reported survey responses by employing costly behavioral outcome measures.

First, following Grigorieff et al. (2018), survey participants can choose whether to sign one of two real online petitions on the official White House

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[9]The approach of exploiting variation in a statistic by relying on sampling variation is similar to a recent field experiment on income comparisons by Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2017). In online appendix B.1 I give a detailed exposition of how I derive the two treatment values.

Petition Website, `https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/`.[10] "Petition I" demands stricter requirements for large companies to report salary-related information by employee gender, whereas "Petition II" demands that the existing reporting requirements should be abolished. Respondents who express their willingness to sign one of the two petitions are forwarded to different but identical looking versions of their preferred petition, depending on their gender, political orientation and treatment group. This set-up allows me to infer the proportion of signatures for both petitions at the group level even though individual signatures are unobserved. Signing a petition on the White House Petition Website has potential real-world implications and is costly in terms of time since one has to provide a name and email address and confirm any signature via a link received per email.

Second, survey participants get an opportunity to either increase their individual payoff from the survey or to make a donation to the American Association of University Women (AAUW), an NGO that lobbies for policy making to support women in the labor market. Similar to Alesina et al. (2018), respondents learn that they have been enrolled in a lottery to win $300. Before the winner is drawn, they are asked to commit to a donation amount between $0 and $300 for the NGO under the condition that every dollar donated will be subsidized by another $0.5 through the experimenter. Subsequently, respondents may support the same NGO via a Facebook "like".[11]

Mechanisms Post-treatment, I also elicit the extent to which respondents believe that a number of factors, which may potentially be seen as drivers of the GWG, currently prevail in the US. Moreover, I elicit beliefs about the

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[10]See Figure A.6 in the online appendix for screenshots of the two petitions.

[11]Online appendix B.2 explains technical details on the implementation of the behavioral outcome measures.

effectiveness of government intervention, the individually perceived fairness of the respondent's own wage and of women's wages in general.

Additional outcomes I employ multiple price lists to elicit people's willingness to pay for additional information that is relevant for the debate about the GWG, either from a more progressive, or from a more conservative, source of information. For each of these two sources of information, each respondent is exposed to three decision scenarios in which she has to choose between receiving additional information or receiving a monetary reward that increases across scenarios. Respondents are informed that with a probability of five percent, one of these scenarios will randomly be selected and implemented. In the control group, I also elicit a range of additional self-reported beliefs and "world views", such as beliefs about (non-)monetary costs of government intervention, gender role attitudes and beliefs in meritocracy in the gender context.

Posterior belief elicitation To capture posterior beliefs about females' relative wages, I elicit beliefs about one out of five different wage statistics that differ from the prior belief statistic (referring to 45-year-olds with a Bachelor's degree) in one randomly selected demographic aspect. For instance, one of the five statistics refers to 25- instead of 45-year-old employees. As before, an accuracy incentive is offered, whenever an objective benchmark is available in the ACS (CPS). By varying the relevant wage statistic compared to the prior belief statistic, I am able to i) capture posterior beliefs, as compared to testing the respondents' short-term memory, even in the presence of the accuracy incentive, ii) document whether individuals extrapolate from the information they received to related statistics and iii) gain insights into people's perceptions of factors that account for the GWG.

2.3 Follow-up survey

I conduct a five-minute obfuscated follow-up survey (Haaland and Roth, 2017) among the previously treated respondents to test for the persistence of the main treatment effect in a setting where concerns about experimenter demand effects, short-lived emotional responses and numerical anchoring of posterior beliefs are mitigated (Cavallo et al., 2017; de Quidt et al., 2018). For this purpose, I do not provide new information but again elicit the respondents' demand for government intervention aimed at closing the GWG.

Generic invitations are sent out roughly two weeks after the main survey, so most respondents take the follow-up between two and three weeks after the main survey, with the average time lapse being 16 days.[12] To further obfuscate the connection to the main survey while still ensuring a smooth survey flow, at the beginning and throughout the follow-up survey, I ask questions that are unrelated to the GWG but related to work. Also, I change the survey layout, title, URL, consent form and contact details. (See online appendix B.4 for screenshots illustrating the obfuscation.)

2.4 Discussion of the experimental design

While my treatment-treatment design allows to compare respondents who have received different pieces of information, an alternative treatment-control design would compare a treatment group that has received information to a pure control group that has not received information. My design offers important advantages for estimating the causal effect of beliefs about the GWG on policy demand.

First, a treatment-control design would be based on a post-treatment com-

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[12]Given that in the subject pool for Wave A (Wave B) active individuals take, on average, around 5 (8) surveys per month, the average follow-up respondent has taken at least two surveys since the main survey.

parison of outcomes between individuals whose beliefs have been shifted by information and individuals who were not exposed to new information and therefore still hold their (noisily measured) prior beliefs. The treatment effect in this alternative design would be estimated off of individuals with prior beliefs that differ from the treatment value ex-ante and are then "corrected" by the treatment. In my design, however, the treatment effect stems from the difference between the two treatment values, which is orthogonal to prior beliefs and to respondent characteristics in general. Consequently, my design generates variation in beliefs among a broader set of individuals and regardless of prior beliefs, which arguably increases the external validity of my findings.

Second, and related, since in a treatment-control design the treatment intensity is correlated with the level of the prior belief, heterogeneous effects across groups would conflate differences in prior beliefs and a differential effect of information about the GWG on policy demand. My design, in contrast, allows for a clean analysis of heterogeneous effects of beliefs on policy demand given that the treatment intensity is orthogonal to prior beliefs.

Lastly, information may not only shift the level of individuals' beliefs but may potentially affect policy demand through "side-effects" such as reduced uncertainty about one's beliefs or increased salience of the GWG. In my design, the only difference between the two treatment arms is the value of the information, whereas side-effects are arguably held as constant as possible.

2.5   Data

Summary Statistics and representativeness of the sample In collaboration with an online survey company, I collected a total sample of 4,065 respondents that is representative of the US population aged 18 to 65 in terms of gender, age, census region, employment status, political orientation and

household income (see online appendix B.5). Similar to the population, 50 percent of the sample is female[13], the average age is 42, 70 percent of the respondents are employed and close to 40 percent have a household income of less than \$50,000.[14] Moreover, 33% are self-reported Democrats, 27% Republicans and 39% Independents.[15] A remaining concern could be that my sample is, by definition, selected from the online population. Grewenig et al. (2018), however, find the online and the offline population to behave similarly in survey experiments on political opinions, once demographic characteristics are controlled for. The median time to complete the survey was 15 minutes, 80 percent of the sample spent between eight and 28 minutes.

Standardization of outcomes I standardize qualitative outcome measures based on the mean and standard deviation in the pure control group. For the follow-up sample, which is restricted to the treatment groups, I z-score outcomes based on the full follow-up sample.

Attrition and integrity of randomization The sample is globally balanced across the full list of pre-specified observables i) between treated and untreated respondents, ii) between the two treatment groups and iii) between respondents with incentivized and non-incentivized prior beliefs (see Table B.3 in the online appendix). The follow-up sample consists of 1,105 observations across both waves, corresponding to a recall rate of 33%. Attrition between surveys is

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[13]To correct for an accidental minor oversampling of women in two age groups by the survey company, I use probability weights. See online appendix E for more information.

[14]While the mean household income in my sample (\$74,697) is lower than that of the US population (\$88,362), the median household income in the sample (\$61,275) is close to the median household income in the population (\$65,000).

[15]The 39% Independents include respondents who self-reported to be "Independent leaning Democrat" or "Independent leaning Republican". In the analysis, following the pre-analysis plan, I am going to distinguish between Democrats (including Independents leaning Democrat), Republicans (including Independents leaning Republican), the remaining Independents and those who reported "other" as their political orientation.

common in online panels and increases with the time distance. Reassuringly, however, participation in the follow-up is orthogonal to the treatment group and the resulting sample is globally balanced between the two treatment groups (see Table B.4 in the online appendix). Controlling for the full set of covariates will correct for minor imbalances in individual covariates.

3   Beliefs about the Gender Wage Gap

What (incentivized) beliefs do people hold about the size of the GWG? Are there systematic predictors of these beliefs? And to what extent do they correlate with policy demand? My first main result answers these questions.

Result 1. *People's beliefs about the size of the GWG vary systematically by gender and political orientation. Similarly, both unspecific and specific policy demand correlate strongly with gender, political orientation and with individual beliefs about the size of the GWG.*

Distribution of prior beliefs about the GWG There is a large degree of dispersion in people's incentivized beliefs about females' relative wages. (See Figure A.9 in the online appendix for a histogram.) On average, respondents believe that a 45-year-old full-time employed woman with a Bachelor's degree receives $83 for every $100 received by a man with the same characteristics. 23 percent of the respondents hold a prior belief below the ACS-based value of $74, roughly 20 percent hold a belief above the CPS-based value of $94 while the remaining respondents hold prior beliefs between the two treatment values.

Predictors of prior beliefs about the GWG Even when incentivized to provide their honest opinion, men (Republicans) express significantly higher beliefs about females' relative wages than women (Democrats). The interac-

tion effect between gender and political orientation is small and insignificant, suggesting that the two dimensions act independently in predicting beliefs (Table 2).[16]

A comparison of beliefs across slightly different wage statistics allows for insights into the role people attribute to different factors in accounting for the GWG. The evidence suggests that people underestimate the role of occupation and the widening of the GWG with age (see Figure A.11 in the online appendix). Moreover, they seem to perceive mere educational attainment as a remedy for the GWG (see Figure A.12 in the online appendix), whereas in fact gender differences in wages are higher among the highly educated (Blau and Kahn, 2017).

Demand for government intervention How do people's views related to the GWG and their policy demand vary with personal characteristics? Democrats (women) in the control group are between 60 and 80 percent (15 and 25 percent) of a standard deviation more likely than Republicans (men) to think that the GWG is large, that it is a problem and that the government should generally do more to promote gender wage equality (see Table C.1 in the online appendix). In line with these general concerns, the Democrat-Republican (gender) difference in demand for specific policies, namely gender quotas for leading positions, affirmative action programs, equal pay legislation, wage transparency, a reporting website and public subsidies to child care, corresponds to almost 70% (30%) of a standard deviation (Table 3, Panel A). These differences are also reflected in politically relevant behavior: Women's propensity to sign Petition I in favor of increasing the reporting requirements for companies (Petition II in favor of abolishing the reporting requirements)

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[16]Employed individuals are more optimistic about females' relative wages (Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2) whereas education does not matter significantly (Columns 7 and 8).

is 60% higher (66% lower) than that of men, and Democrats' propensity to sign Petition I (Petition II) is a striking 140% higher (80% lower) than Non-Democrats' (See Figure A.14 in the online appendix). In the donation decision, women, perhaps surprisingly, donate less to the supportive NGO than men. However, Democrats donate, on average, 30% more than Republicans, suggesting that the donation decision indeed captures an important element of policy demand. Decisions to give a Facebook "like" to the same NGO, in contrast, do not vary across the political spectrum nor by gender and, therefore, turn out to be an inadequate measure of support for government intervention. Thus, in the remainder of the paper I focus on the petition and the donation decisions.

Not surprisingly, I find a large negative correlation between people's (prior) beliefs about women's relative wages and their general views on whether the GWG is large, a problem, and should be subject to government intervention at a general level (see Table C.1, Panel B in the online appendix). The correlational link between beliefs and self-reported demand for specific policies is an order of magnitude smaller, but still considerable and precisely measured (Table 3, Panel B).[17] On average across the different specific policies referred to in the survey, a one standard deviation higher belief about females' relative wages is associated with a 0.3 standard deviation higher demand for specific policies. When controlling for gender and political orientation in addition to prior beliefs (Panel C of Table 3), the estimated correlation between prior beliefs about the GWG and policy demand drops by one third, on average. One potential explanation is that omitted variables, such as people's preferences

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[17]For the correlational analysis I deviate from the pre-analysis plan and drop observations below the 5th and above the 95th percentile of the prior belief distribution to account for extreme outliers. The results are similar when I use the 3rd and 97th percentile as the cut-offs. Correlations are weaker in the full sample due to the high sensitivity of OLS to outliers. For further details and the pre-specified analysis based on the full sample, see online appendix E.

and world views, correlate with the measure of beliefs about the GWG and also differ across the political spectrum and by gender. Also, measurement error could be larger for beliefs about the GWG than for gender and political orientation. The experimental evidence presented in the following Section 4 relies on variation in beliefs that is orthogonal to measurement error in prior beliefs.

4 Beliefs and Policy Demand: Experimental Evidence

4.1 Main empirical specification

To study the effect of the information treatment on policy demand, I restrict the sample to the two treatment groups and estimate regressions of the following form:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i^{74} + \Theta^T X_i + u_i \tag{1}$$

Y_i represents the outcome variable of interest, for instance, demand for a specific policy. T_i^{74} is a dummy that takes the value one if individual i is randomly exposed to the information that female employees receive 74 percent of male employees' wages and zero otherwise. X_i is the set of pre-specified control variables, which, by design, are orthogonal to the treatment group.[18] I report robust standard errors throughout the paper and apply probability weights to all regressions (see online appendix E for details). To adjust for

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[18]The vector X_i includes controls for survey wave, gender, prior belief, census region of residence, five age categories, has children, log of household income, has at least a 2-year college degree, full-time employed, part-time employed, self-employed, unemployed, student, out of the labor force (incl. retired), Democrat (incl. Independent leaning Democrat), Republican (incl. Independent leaning Republican), Independent and other political orientation.

multiple inference, I follow Anderson (2008) in applying family-wise error rate (FWER) control to summary indices over the three main families of outcomes capturing i) people's sense of concern about the GWG, ii) their demand for specific policies and iii) their beliefs about the prevalence of impersonal factors that may be seen as drivers of the GWG. In addition, I use false discovery rate (FDR) control for more detailed outcomes within these families. (See online appendix D.1 for details.)

4.2   Average treatment effect

How do people's beliefs about the size of the GWG affect their general perception of the topic and their demand for government intervention?

Result 2. *Beliefs about the size of the GWG have a strong causal effect on people's sense of concern and unspecific policy demand. The corresponding effect on demand for concrete policies is meaningful but more nuanced, i.e., it depends on the specific policy. Differences in beliefs about the GWG across the political spectrum (by gender) can causally explain at most 6 percent (7 percent) of the partisan (gender) difference in demand for specific policies.*

Posterior belief about the GWG and general perceptions Post-treatment, the respondents' beliefs about the size of the GWG differ by around $13 between the two treatment arms (Figure 2). The effect size is similar across the different wage statistics employed for the posterior belief elicitation, which differ from the baseline wage statistic according to the relevant age group, educational attainment group, occupation or parental status. This indicates that respondents extrapolate to a large degree from the information received to different measures of the GWG. The estimated treatment effects on posterior beliefs are very similar across the political spectrum and genders (see Table D.4 in the online appendix).

Does the updating of beliefs about the size of the GWG translate into an effect on people's general perceptions and sense of concern about the topic? Individuals exposed to T^{74} as compared to T^{94} are substantially more likely to believe that gender differences in wages are large, are a problem and should generally be subject to government intervention (Table 4).[19] Interestingly, as the outcome becomes more and more concrete and normative (going from Column 1 to Column 3 in Table 4), the size of the treatment effect decreases from 0.6 to 0.2 standard deviations. At the same time, the polarization between Democrats and Republicans increases, maybe because factors that are correlated with political orientation have an increasing weight and leave less room for information about the size of the GWG to affect people's views.

Self-reported specific policy demand Does the substantial "first-stage" treatment effect translate into demand for specific policies? I find that people's elasticity of demand for specific policies is meaningful, but nuanced (Table 5). The information treatment has a 0.1 standard deviation effect on respondents' demand for affirmative action programs and for equal pay legislation. There is a similarly large but more noisily measured effect on demand for a website that makes large companies' gender-related wage statistics public, similar to a policy that was recently implemented in the UK.[20] Conversely, people's de-

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[19]These effects are robust to adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing (Anderson, 2008): First, the treatment effect on the summary index over the family of outcomes is precisely measured (Column 4 of Table 4) and robust to FWER-adjustment (see online appendix D.1). Second, the treatment effect on the detailed outcomes is robust to FDR-correction, i.e. the sharpened q-values in Table 4 indicate that when rejecting the null-hypothesis for any of the three outcomes, the family-wide share of Type I errors is < 0.01.

[20]The treatment effect on demand for affirmative action programs and equal pay legislation is highly significant and robust to FDR-adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing (sharpened q-values <0.01). The effect on demand for a public website is not significant. However, the regression is naturally less powered because the sample is based on wave B only. The treatment effect on the summary index is significant at the 95% confidence level (Column 7 of Table 5) and robust to FWER-correction (see online appendix D.1).

mand for other regularly discussed policies, namely for gender quotas, wage transparency within companies and public subsidies to child care, is inelastic to the treatment, on average. Demand for these policies must either be driven by concerns other than beliefs about the GWG, or fairness concerns are offset by opposing concerns, resulting in a very small overall elasticity. Taken together, the findings described so far suggest that people are generally more in favor of measures to mitigate the GWG when they perceive it to be higher but there is no consensus on the specific policy that should be applied.

Proxies of political behavior Individuals in T^{74} are significantly more likely to sign the real online petition in favor of increasing the gender-related reporting requirements of large companies (Petition I) and less likely to sign the petition that claims that existing requirements should be abolished (Petition II) (Figure 3). The effect on Petition II should be interpreted cautiously given that the overall number of signatures is small. That said, the average treatment effect for Petition I (Petition II) corresponds to 13% (50%) of the control group mean (p-value 0.04 (0.01)). Conversely, the average elasticity of people's donations to the NGO that lobbies for policies aimed at supporting women in the labor market is small and noisily measured (Column 3 of Table D.6 in the online appendix). Overall, the elasticity of people's behavior mirrors that of self-reported policy demand: A higher perceived GWG increases support for government intervention but the magnitude of the treatment response depends on the specific measure.

The causal role of beliefs in explaining disagreement in policy demand The treatment effect on people's demand for affirmative action programs, equal pay legislation and a public website is considerable, corresponding in size to half of the gender difference or to around one sixth of the Democrat-

Republican difference in policy demand. However, one has to keep in mind that the treatment is powerful, i.e., the treatment effect on people's beliefs about the size of the GWG corresponds to two to three times the gender or partisan difference in untreated beliefs. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the causal effect of differences in beliefs about the size of the GWG between Democrats and Republicans (between men and women) can explain at most 6 percent (7 percent) of the difference in policy demand between these groups (see online appendix D.2). Similarly, the estimated causal effect of beliefs about the GWG on policy demand is substantially smaller in size than the corresponding correlation between beliefs and policy demand.[21] In sum, the effect of people's beliefs about the size of the GWG on policy demand is meaningful, but even if people agreed on the size of the GWG, they would not converge in terms of their demand for concrete policies.

4.3 Heterogeneity in the treatment effect

The experimental design based on two treatment groups allows for a clean estimation of heterogeneous treatment effects. I estimate equations of the following form:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 H_i + \beta_2 T_i^{74} + \beta_3 T_i^{74} H_i + \Theta^T X_i + u_i \tag{2}$$

where H_i indicates the dimension of heterogeneity of interest, i.e., $T_i^{74} H_i$ captures the differential elasticity of group H's policy demand to the information treatment.

Given that the updating of beliefs about the GWG in response to the treatment is similar for females and males as well as for Democrats, Republicans

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[21]This is illustrated in the bottom two lines of Table 5, where I scale the estimated correlation between beliefs and policy demand such that it corresponds to a similar change in beliefs to the one induced by the information treatment.

and Independents (see Table D.4 in the online appendix), this reduced form specification sheds light on differential effects of beliefs about the GWG on policy demand across groups.

Heterogeneity by gender Arguably, based on self-interest, one may expect the treatment effect to differ by gender. An individual who learns about the size of the GWG may update her beliefs about the effect of her gender on her wage and, consequently, about the potential effect of government intervention on her wage (prospects). Thus, self-interest or in-group concerns would imply a positive treatment effect for women and a zero or backfiring effect for men.

Perhaps surprisingly, I find no evidence of a differential elasticity of policy demand to information by gender (Panel B of Table 6). However, by breaking down the analysis by gender and age group in a not pre-specified analysis, I find that the treatment effect on specific policy demand follows a u-shape over age for women and an inverted u-shape for men (Figure 5). In the youngest age group, 18- to 24-year-olds, the treatment effect for women corresponds to a 0.3 standard deviation, while men's policy demand is inelastic to the information (p-value of the difference <0.001). This result is consistent with a role of self-interest and the idea that young individuals still face the most uncertainty about their lifetime income and thus have most to gain or lose from government intervention. With increasing age, the elasticity of women's policy demand first decreases, whereas that of men increases until at age 35-44 the treatment effect reaches 0.24 for men and zero for women (p-value of the gender difference 0.016). The patterns for the oldest age group, 55- to 65-year-olds, are again qualitatively similar to those of the youngest age group, but the overall support for policies is smaller and the gender difference in elasticities is less pronounced, though precisely measured (p-value 0.016).

Heterogeneity by political orientation How does people's elasticity of policy demand to beliefs about the size of the GWG differ across the political spectrum? The average estimated elasticity of policy demand to the information treatment is zero for Republicans, whereas it is significantly positive for Democrats and Independents, even though the differences are noisily measured (Table 6, Panel B, Column 7).[22] This overall pattern is similar to findings of Alesina et al. (2017) and Haaland and Roth (2019) in the context of social mobility and racial discrimination. Notably, the elasticities of people's demand for both equal pay legislation (Column 3) and public subsidies to child care (Column 6) differ significantly between Republicans on the one hand and Democrats and Independents on the other. For Republicans the treatment has no effect on demand for equal pay legislation and backfires on demand for public child care (p-value 0.06). Independents have a large and significantly positive elasticity to the information treatment for both outcomes and Democrats only for equal pay legislation.

Potential explanations for the higher elasticity of Democrats as compared to Republicans could be differences in equality preferences (Cappelen et al., 2019) or, as suggested by Alesina et al. (2017), the fact that Republicans have worse views of the government and do not see it as a solution to inequality.[23,24]

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[22]I had pre-specified to consider Democrats vs. Non-Democrats for the analysis of heterogeneity by political orientation. This turned out to be less informative than my now preferred, more disaggregated, specification.

[23]See online appendix D.4 for evidence that Democrats have the most optimistic beliefs about the effectiveness of government intervention aimed at supporting women in the labor market. The higher elasticity of policy demand of Independents may be driven by similar factors as that of Democrats. In addition, Independents are arguably less influenced by their party affiliation or political identity (Barber and Pope, 2019; Grewenig et al., 2019).

[24]In unreported regressions I examine people's prior beliefs about the GWG as another source of heterogeneity. I find that the treatment effect on people's policy demand is driven by individuals with prior beliefs about females' relative wages between $74 and $94, i.e., roughly between the 25th and the 75th percentile of the prior belief distribution. Potential reasons for this heterogeneity could be that individuals with moderate beliefs may be less

4.4 Persistence of the treatment effect

In an obfuscated follow-up survey (Haaland and Roth, 2017), I find a strong persistent treatment effect on beliefs about the baseline wage statistic referring to 45-year-olds who hold a Bachelor's degree and work 40 hours per week. The effect size corresponds to around $10, i.e. to 50% of the difference in the treatment information the respondents had received around two weeks earlier (Table 7, Panel A, Column 1). Moreover, the treatment effect on people's perceptions of whether the GWG constitutes a problem (Columns 2 - 4) and on the perceived fairness of women's wages (Column 5) persists at a level that is comparable in size to the initial treatment response. The same holds true for unspecific policy demand (Panel B, Column 1), demand for policies aimed at compensating disadvantages women may have due to family responsibilities (Columns 3) and, to some extent, demand for anti-discrimination policies (Column 2), but the latter effect is noisily measured.

In the follow-up survey of wave B, I also elicit support for the two specific policies for which the immediate treatment effect was largest in wave A. Given the smaller sample, these regressions are naturally less powered.[25] While I find no persistent effect on support for affirmative action programs (Panel B, Column 5), the estimated effect of the information treatment on demand for equal pay legislation (Column 4) persists at a level that is similar to the immediate effect in the main survey, but it is imprecisely measured.

If the obfuscation of the link between the main and the follow-up survey did not work and experimenter demand effects were a concern, this could im-

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"dogmatic" than those with more extreme beliefs to start with or that for individuals with moderate beliefs the treatments are not only quantitatively but also qualitatively different compared to their prior beliefs.

[25]With the given $N = 606$ the minimum detectable effect size is 0.23 at a significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$ and with a power of 0.8.

ply that respondents try to guess the political orientation of the experimenter based on the treatment information received during the main survey and answer accordingly in the follow-up survey. Reassuringly, however, respondents in the two treatment groups express similar views on a range of placebo outcomes concerning the wage inequality between high- and low-skilled workers (online appendix D.5). Overall, the results from the follow-up survey strongly suggest that the treatment effect on policy demand is driven by an updating of respondents' beliefs about the size of the GWG, as compared to experimenter demand effects and short-lived emotional responses.

5 Beliefs about Statistics and World Views

The experimental evidence suggests that people's beliefs about the size of the GWG have a meaningful effect on their policy demand, but they cannot account for the disagreement about government intervention across the political spectrum and by gender.

There are at least two types of potential explanations for why beliefs about the GWG do not play a more dominant role. The first type relates to the way in which people interpret the GWG. For instance, people might attribute a larger perceived GWG to a higher prevalence of "fair" underlying reasons or to a lower effectiveness of government intervention, both of which could mitigate the effect of people's beliefs about the GWG on their policy demand. The second type of explanation relates to the possibility that people may have deeply-rooted concerns or preferences that determine their policy demand, leaving little scope for beliefs about the GWG to affect policy views.

In the remainder of this chapter I shed light on the role of these two types of explanations (Sections 5.1 and 5.2) and on potential endogeneity of people's beliefs about the GWG to their more deeply-rooted world views (Section 5.3).

5.1 Mechanisms

The wage statistic provided in the information treatment deliberately leaves scope for interpretation, for instance regarding the underlying reasons for the GWG and the effectiveness of policy intervention. It is similar to information one might encounter in the media. My next main result provides insight into how people interpret such information.

Result 3. *In response to information about the size of the GWG, the respondents strongly update their beliefs about the prevalence of gender-based discrimination in labor markets. By contrast, beliefs about women's and men's preferences, ambitions and talents as well as beliefs about the effectiveness of government intervention are inelastic to the information.*

Beliefs about underlying reasons for the GWG and fairness concerns First, I examine people's beliefs about the prevalence of factors that may be seen as underlying reasons for the GWG. Existing research based on laboratory experiments shows that inequality caused by impersonal, as compared to personal factors, tends to be perceived as unfair and increases demand for redistribution (Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010). Around 75% of my control group respondents believe in the prevalence of impersonal factors, namely gender-based discrimination in labor markets, society making it difficult for women to combine work and family, and differential upbringing and encouragement of men and women to pursue ambitious careers (see Figure A.13 in the online appendix). Regarding personal factors, few see a role for gender differences in ambitions or talents, whereas disagreement is highest about the role of gender differences in preferences. Overall, women and Democrats are more (less) likely to believe in the prevalence of impersonal (personal) factors than men and Republicans (see Table C.2 in the online appendix).

How elastic are these beliefs to changes in the perceived size of the GWG? The information treatment has a 0.2 standard deviation effect on beliefs about the extent of gender-based discrimination in labor markets (Table 8), which corresponds in size to one third of the Democrat-Republican difference in this belief. The updating is reflected in a similarly strong updating of beliefs about the fairness of women's wages (Table D.8 in the online appendix).[26] The elasticity of beliefs about the prevalence of personal factors, in contrast, is close to zero, perhaps because people have received many signals about women's and men's ambitions, talents and preferences prior to their participation in the survey experiment. In sum, the limited causal role of beliefs about the size of the GWG in accounting for differences in policy demand across groups is not the result of people's attribution of the GWG to fair underlying factors.

Perceived effectiveness of government intervention A respondent who learns that the GWG is higher (lower) than she previously thought might attribute this update to a lower (higher) perceived effectiveness of policy intervention, in line with findings of Kuziemko et al. (2015) in the context of redistributive policies to mitigate overall income inequality. Such updating could, at least to some extent, act as a mitigating mechanism by offsetting the expected effect on policy demand working through, e.g., fairness concerns. However, in the context of the GWG, I find no effect of information about the extent of wage inequality on the respondents' beliefs about the effectiveness of anti-discrimination policies, affirmative action policies and policies that help women combine work and family responsibilities, nor trust in the government (see Table D.9 in the online appendix).[27]

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[26]Neither women nor men, however, update their beliefs about the fairness of their own current or most recent wage (Table D.8 in the online appendix, Columns 4-5), potentially because private information receives a very high weight in this rating.

[27]Even though respondents' beliefs about the effectiveness of policy intervention are not

5.2 The role of deeply-rooted world views

Next, I examine the role of people's deeply-rooted world views in accounting for differences in policy demand. If those world views play a large role, they may leave little room for beliefs about the GWG to influence policy demand. My next main finding suggests that this is the case.

Result 4. *Correlational evidence points to a larger role for more deeply-rooted world views and preferences than for beliefs about the GWG in accounting for differences in policy demand by gender and across the political spectrum.*

Using the summary index of self-reported demand for specific policies as the outcome of interest, I start by documenting that Democrats (females) in the control group are, on average, 0.6 (0.3) of a standard deviation more in favor of specific government intervention to support women in the labor market than Republicans (men) (Table 9, Column 1). People's prior beliefs about the GWG account for a mere 3% of the political and 10% of the gender difference in policy demand (Column 2). Adding a summary index of perceived monetary costs of government intervention, perceived costs in terms of bureaucracy and perceived costs in terms of distortions caused in the labor market reduces the partisan (gender) difference in policy demand to 67% (73%) of its initial value (Column 3). Finally, I add a summary measure of people's world views, including the individually perceived importance of gender-equality in wages, beliefs in meritocracy in the gender context and beliefs about whether policies

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affected by the information treatment, low baseline beliefs in policy effectiveness could reduce the elasticity of policy demand to beliefs about the size of the GWG. In unreported regressions I find that the treatment effects seem to be stronger for individuals with more optimistic beliefs about policy effectiveness. However, the results of this exercise should be interpreted cautiously, given that i) these beliefs are available only for the smaller wave B sample, leading to reduced power; and that ii) perceptions of policy effectiveness are measured post-treatment.

that support women in the labor market lead to a reverse discrimination of men (Column 4). This reduces the unaccounted partisan (gender) difference to 35% (47%) of its original value.[28]

This evidence should be interpreted cautiously given that it is based on correlations of self-reported measures. Also, it does not imply that individuals do not take the extent of gender-based wage inequality into account. In fact, the causal evidence presented in Section 4 illustrates that there is a meaningful and statistically significant role of beliefs about the GWG in shaping people's demand for some policies. That said, the correlational evidence is consistent with a world in which people's deeply-rooted preferences and world views are more important than their beliefs about the GWG in shaping their demand for specific government intervention. This finding is in line with concurrent evidence on a dominant role of preferences over equality-efficiency trade-offs in the political disagreement on redistribution (Cappelen et al., 2019) and with evidence on an important role for stable "cultural" values in shaping people's policy views (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).

5.3 Endogeneity of beliefs about the gender wage gap

Given that people's beliefs about the GWG do not seem to explain the political disagreement about government intervention, one might wonder what is driving the strong correlation between expressed beliefs about the GWG and policy demand in the public discussion and in my data. I explore two possible channels through which beliefs about the size of the GWG could be endogeneous to an individual's world views and preferences: i) Reported beliefs about the GWG are subject to politically motivated bias, i.e. reported beliefs differ from actual beliefs in a way that supports the individual's under-

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[28]Table C.4 in the online appendix shows disaggregated correlational results on the role of the individual proxies of people's world views.

lying preferences for government intervention and ii) people selectively acquire information that is in line with their world views, ultimately sustaining beliefs about the size of the GWG that support their policy demand. My last main result sheds light on these two channels.

Result 5. *I find some evidence consistent with politically motivated bias in reported beliefs about the size of the GWG, but only by gender. However, there are strong patterns of selective information acquisition in line with policy preferences. These patterns may explain persistent differences in beliefs about the GWG, despite the availability of the same public information to everybody.*

Politically motivated bias in reported beliefs First, I study the possibility that respondents, knowingly or subconsciously, misreport their beliefs about women's relative wages, in order to justify their policy views. In the survey, I incentivize prior beliefs about the GWG for approximately half of the respondents. Using gender as well as political orientation as proxies for people's underlying policy preferences, a monetary incentive is expected to lead to more pessimistic (optimistic) reported estimates of women's relative wages by men and Republicans (women and Democrats) in the presence of politically motivated bias in reported beliefs (Prior et al., 2015). In line with this conjecture, I find that men's estimates of females' relative wages are 2.4 percentage points or 10% of a standard deviation lower when incentivized, whereas women's estimates are 1.7 percentage points or 7% of a standard deviation higher (Figure 6).[29] Conversely, there is no difference between incentivized and unincentivized

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[29]An alternative explanation could be that women and men use simple heuristics subject to, e.g., recall bias. For instance, women (men) might spontaneously recall cues in line with a larger (smaller) GWG, which could be mitigated in the incentivized condition. I believe that a pure "effort"-channel is unlikely to be important. Even though respondents in the incentivized condition spent an average of 15 seconds more on the prior belief elicitation (p-value <0.001), the gender-patterns described above are unaffected by controlling for response time (interacted with gender) as a proxy for effort (see Table D.13 in the online appendix).

beliefs between Republicans and Democrats, suggesting that differences in self-reported beliefs along this spectrum are less likely to reflect motivated beliefs in my context. Instead, it seems that differences in reported beliefs between Democrats and Republicans reflect differences in deep-seated beliefs, potentially resulting from exposure to different sources of information.

Demand for information Next, I explore the extent to which respondents with different political preferences systematically draw information related to the GWG from different sources. For this purpose, I elicit the respondents' demand for additional information from two sources with a clearly described stance towards working women by using two multiple price lists that trade off information against a small bonus of $0.01/$0.30/$0.50. For both a "progressive" source, described as supportive of government intervention to reduce the GWG and a more "traditional" source opposed to such intervention, the outcome variable of interest is the (z-scored) number of times the respondent chooses information over money. I find that Democrats (women) in the control group have a 40 percent (15 percent) of a standard deviation higher willingness to pay for additional information from the progressive source, whereas Republicans (men) have a 20 percent (10 percent) of a standard deviation higher willingness to pay for information from the traditional source.[30] Even conditional on gender and political orientation, individuals with a higher demand for government intervention show a higher (lower) willingness to pay for information from the progressive (traditional) source of information (see online appendix C.4).[31] These patterns are consistent with a selective choice of infor-

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[30]For both the progressive and the traditional source of information, respectively, 92% of the respondents have a unique switching point in their willingness to pay. The estimated effects are highly similar when I restrict the sample to these respondents.

[31]The same is true for individuals with less optimistic beliefs about females' relative wages.

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mation sources that support one's political preferences (Bakshy et al., 2015; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Haaland and Roth, 2019) and might explain how (incentivized) beliefs about the size of the GWG can differ systematically across different groups, without eventually converging, despite the same publicly available information to everybody.

6 Conclusion

Using an information experiment conducted with a large and representative online sample from the US, I document that people's beliefs about the gender wage gap (GWG) have a strong causal effect on their sense of concern about the topic. The effect of these beliefs on demand for specific policies aimed at closing the GWG is meaningful but more nuanced. Instead, correlational evidence suggests that people's deeply-rooted world views and preferences play a more important role than beliefs about the GWG in explaining the political polarization about the optimal degree of government intervention to support women in the labor market. Moreover, I find that people systematically select pieces of information that are in line with their deeply-rooted world views, which might explain both the persistence of systematic differences in beliefs about the GWG as well as the fact that the correlation between beliefs and policy demand is stronger than the underlying causal effect.

Moreover, my results suggest that people misperceive educational attainment as a remedy for the GWG and underestimate the role of choice of occupation and of the child penalty. By actively "correcting" these perceptions through randomized information treatments, future research may generate additional insights into i) which sources of inequality individuals consider as "fair" or "unfair" and ii) how beliefs about the prevalence of different sources of inequality affect policy demand (Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010).

In addition, I find that Democrats' policy demand is not only higher at baseline but also more elastic to beliefs about the size of the GWG than that of Republicans. This finding is in line with evidence by Alesina et al. (2017) and Haaland and Roth (2019) in other contexts. Potential reasons include more pessimistic beliefs among Republicans about whether the government can or will mitigate inequality at all (Alesina et al., 2017) and a stronger inequality aversion among Democrats (Cappelen et al., 2019). Future research could examine how beliefs about the level of inequality and world views interact in shaping people's demand for policies aimed at supporting women in the labor market.

Finally, particularly young women seem to have a high demand for government intervention to mitigate the GWG and this demand is highly elastic to information about the GWG, suggesting a role for the lifecyle in shaping both levels and the elasticity of policy demand. At the same time, previous evidence indicates that important life events such as becoming a parent (Kuziemko et al., 2018) or getting divorced (Edlund and Pande, 2002) shape women's (policy) preferences. Future research in the context of gender differences in labor market outcomes could study how personal experiences affect not only levels of policy demand (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2013; Roth and Wohlfart, 2018) but also people's disposition to interpret new information in a certain way, with important consequences for their elasticity of policy demand to information about the extent of inequality. In sum, my findings call for more detailed research on how and under which circumstances beliefs about the extent of inequality and other concerns interact in shaping people's policy demand.

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Main Figures

Figure 1: Outline of main survey and follow-up survey

Figure 2: Treatment effect on mean posterior beliefs about the GWG

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both survey waves. Posterior beliefs range between 0 and 200. The relevant wage statistic for the posterior belief differs in one element compared to the baseline statistic used in the prior belief elicitation. The variations are i) age group 25 (N=670, wave A), ii) High school degree (N=676, wave A), iii) working in the same occupation group (N=657, wave A), iv) parent (N=496, wave B), v) working in the same job for the same company (N=523, wave B, not incentivized). Whiskers show 95% confidence bands from regressions of posterior beliefs on the indicator for T^{94}.

(a) Signatures Petition I (Increase reporting requirements)

(b) Signatures Petition II (Decrease reporting requirements)

Figure 3: Signatures on real online petitions

Notes: Data base: Count data on the number of actual signatures of real online petitions made by respondents in either of the two treatment groups. The height of the bars represents the fraction of respondents per group that signed Petition I (Petition II) in favor of increasing (decreasing) requirements for companies to report employee wages by gender to a public authority. Whiskers show the 95% confidence intervals around the estimated fractions. Results for the full sample (N=3,031) for men (N=1,467) and for women (N=1,564) are based on both wave A and wave B. Results for Democrats (including Independents leaning Democrat) (N=897) and Non-Democrats (N=1,115) are based on wave A only. P-values refer to one-sided petition-specific proportion tests with the alternative hypothesis corresponding to the expected treatment effect.

Figure 4: Donation Decisions

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. The graph shows, by treatment group, the mean amounts donated to an NGO that lobbies for policies to support women in the labor market. Donations range between 0 and 300. Whiskers show the 95% confidence interval calculated from a regression of the outcome on an indicator for T^{94} using robust standard errors and controlling for survey wave, prior belief, census region, age group, parental status, log of household income, associate degree or more, full-time, part-time, self-, and unemployed, student and, when possible, gender and political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat.

Figure 5: Heterogeneity in policy demand by gender x age

Notes: Data base: All observations, wave A and B. Left panel: male respondents; right panel: female respondents. The bars represent control group means and the point estimates represent treatment effects, including 90% confidence intervals. Dependent variable: Summary index over self-reported demand for specific policies.

Figure 6: Incentivized vs. non-incentivized prior beliefs.

Notes: Data base: Full sample. For graphs by political orientation, the sample is restricted to Democrats and Republicans, including Independents leaning Democrat (Republican). The graph compares mean prior beliefs about females' relative wages in the incentivized and the unincentivized condition. Beliefs range between 0 and 200. Whiskers show the 95% confidence intervals calculated from a regression of beliefs on an indicator for incentivized beliefs using robust standard errors. Additional controls: survey wave, census region, age group, parental status, log of household income, associate degree or more, full-time, part-time, self-, and unemployed, student and, when applicable, gender and political orientation.

Figure 7: Willingness to pay for additional information.

Notes: Data base: Control group, wave A. For the graphs on political orientation only Republicans and Democrats are considered, including Independents leaning Republican or Democrat. Willingness to pay (WTP) for new information takes on values between 0 and 3. Whiskers show the 95% confidence interval calculated from a regression of WTP for the respective information on an indicator for male/Republican using robust standard errors.

Main Tables

Table 1: Experimental design

	T^{74} (ACS)	T^{94} (CPS)	Control	Total
Incentivized prior belief	0.1875	0.1875	0.1875	0.5625
Unincentivized prior belief	0.1875	0.1875	0.0625	0.4375
Total	0.375	0.375	0.25	1.0

Notes: This table shows the probabilities with which respondents were assigned to the incentivized vs. unincentivized prior belief elicitation (rows) and to either of the treatment groups or the pure control group (columns).

Table 2: Correlates of prior beliefs about gender differences in wages

	Outcome variable: (Incentivized) prior belief							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Female	-4.603***		-4.406***	-4.280***	-4.179***	-3.300**	-2.919**	-2.276
	(0.891)		(0.886)	(1.595)	(0.888)	(1.300)	(1.418)	(1.607)
Democrat		-4.633***	-4.392***	-4.710***	-4.434***	-4.409***	-4.374***	-4.396***
		(1.038)	(1.034)	(1.490)	(1.033)	(1.031)	(1.035)	(1.033)
Independent		-1.992*	-1.789	-1.124	-1.726	-1.703	-1.625	-1.605
		(1.195)	(1.184)	(1.696)	(1.183)	(1.180)	(1.189)	(1.186)
Female x Democrat				0.600				
				(2.066)				
Female x Indep.				-1.314				
				(2.366)				
Employee					1.922**	2.657**		2.253*
					(0.872)	(1.266)		(1.260)
Female x Employee						-1.383		-0.802
						(1.753)		(1.791)
Associate Degree +							2.162	1.649
							(1.316)	(1.316)
Female x Ass. +							-2.324	-2.239
							(1.816)	(1.859)
Constant	85.675***	85.916***	87.960***	87.901***	86.632***	86.108***	86.528***	85.302***
	(0.644)	(0.803)	(0.921)	(1.138)	(1.050)	(1.158)	(1.240)	(1.383)
Observations	2293	2293	2293	2293	2293	2293	2293	2293

Notes: Data base: All observations with incentivized prior beliefs, wave A and B. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Columns 2 - 8 control for political orientation "other" in addition to the variables shown. Column 7 in addition controls for female interacted with "other" political orientation. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table 3: Correlates of demand for specific policies

	Introduce gender quotas	Statutory affirmative action	Stricter equal pay legislation	Wage transparency within companies	Introduce reporting website	Increase public subsidies to child care	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Gender and political orientation							
Democrat	0.688***	0.760***	0.685***	0.694***	0.542***	0.635***	0.670***
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.073)	(0.051)
Female	0.254***	0.176***	0.338***	0.378***	0.467***	0.225***	0.290***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.063)	(0.043)
Observations	921	921	921	443	478	921	921
Panel B: Prior belief about GWG							
Prior (z-scored)	-0.235***	-0.365***	-0.294***	-0.396***	-0.296***	-0.302***	-0.302***
	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.102)	(0.097)	(0.070)	(0.053)
Observations	921	921	921	443	478	921	921
Panel C: Prior, gender, pol. orientation							
Prior (z-scored)	-0.122*	-0.260***	-0.186***	-0.285***	-0.183**	-0.205***	-0.195***
	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.069)	(0.048)
Democrat	0.672***	0.727***	0.661***	0.649***	0.523***	0.609***	0.644***
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.073)	(0.051)
Female	0.241***	0.149**	0.319***	0.358***	0.442***	0.204***	0.270***
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.063)	(0.043)
Observations	921	921	921	443	478	921	921
Panel D: Full set of controls							
Prior (z-scored)	-0.122*	-0.266***	-0.185***	-0.324***	-0.184**	-0.226***	-0.205***
	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.069)	(0.049)
Democrat	0.659***	0.699***	0.671***	0.645***	0.476***	0.574***	0.627***
	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.104)	(0.102)	(0.074)	(0.051)
Female	0.239***	0.142**	0.324***	0.359***	0.460***	0.199***	0.270***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.066)	(0.045)
Observations	921	921	921	443	478	921	921

Notes: Data base: Pure control group, wave A and B, restricted to observations with prior beliefs between the 5th and the 95th percentile of the distribution. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 6 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 7 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1 - 6. All specifications include a dummy for wave B of data collection. Panels A, C and D control for political orientation Independent and "other" in addition to the coefficients that are shown in the table. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. In Panel D, additional controls are: census region, age group, parental status, log of household income, associate degree or more, full-time, part-time, self-, and unemployed, student. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table 4: Treatment effect on views related to gender differences in wages

	Gender diff. in wages are large	Gender diff. in wages are a problem	Government should promote gender wage equality	Perception Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
T^{74}	0.597***	0.422***	0.243***	0.417***
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.032)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	
Female	0.235***	0.297***	0.309***	0.277***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Democrat	0.525***	0.656***	0.803***	0.665***
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Observations	3031	3031	3031	3031

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 4 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1 - 3. T^{74} is a dummy that takes on value one for those who received the high wage gap-treatment and zero otherwise. Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, survey wave, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Sharpened q-values in Columns 1 - 3 are based on FDR-adjustment.

Table 5: Treatment effect on the demand for specific policies

	Introduce gender quotas	Statutory affirmative action	Stricter equal pay legislation	Wage transparency within companies	Introduce reporting website	Increase public subsidies to child care	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
T^{74}	0.056	0.112***	0.115***	-0.015	0.098	0.003	0.056**
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.063)	(0.035)	(0.025)
Sharpened q-value	[0.136]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.413]	[0.136]	[0.455]	
Female	0.254***	0.179***	0.237***	0.197***	0.310***	0.112***	0.203***
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.036)	(0.026)
Democrat	0.559***	0.669***	0.618***	0.565***	0.596***	0.578***	0.594***
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.074)	(0.040)	(0.029)
Observations	3031	3031	3031	2012	1019	3031	3031
Corr. prior belief (lower bound)	0.064	0.141	0.098	0.172	0.098	0.120	0.109
Corr. prior belief (upper bound)	0.113	0.247	0.172	0.301	0.171	0.210	0.191
P-value corr. prior belief	0.068	<0.001	0.007	0.001	0.046	0.001	<0.001

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 6 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 7 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1 - 6. T^{74} is a dummy that takes on the value one for those who received the high wage gap-treatment and zero otherwise. Additional controls: survey wave, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. In the bottom rows, the correlation between beliefs about the GWG and policy demand estimated in Panel D of Table 3 is scaled to correspond to a similar change in beliefs as the one induced by the information treatment. The upper bound assumes that people fully update towards the provided wage statistic and the lower bound is based on the updating about the posterior belief with the smallest updating. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Sharpened q-values in Columns 1 - 6 are based on FDR-adjustment.

Table 6: Treatment effect on the demand for specific policies: Heterogeneity

	Introduce gender quotas	Statutory affirmative action	Stricter equal pay legislation	Wage transpareny within companies	Introduce reporting website	Increase subsidies to child care	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Het. by gender							
T^{74}	0.114**	0.112**	0.113**	-0.004	0.098	-0.015	0.066*
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.098)	(0.050)	(0.038)
T^{74} x Female	-0.119*	0.003	0.009	-0.016	0.010	0.037	-0.017
	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.085)	(0.125)	(0.069)	(0.050)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x female]	0.914	0.010	0.008	0.721	0.164	0.652	0.139
Female	0.315***	0.177***	0.234***	0.201***	0.303***	0.094*	0.212***
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.060)	(0.090)	(0.050)	(0.036)
Democrat	0.550***	0.664***	0.595***	0.559***	0.593***	0.566***	0.583***
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.072)	(0.039)	(0.028)
Observations	3031	3031	3031	2012	1019	3031	3031
Panel B: Het. by pol. orientation							
T^{74}	0.107*	0.075	-0.027	-0.028	0.121	-0.114*	0.008
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.074)	(0.114)	(0.061)	(0.045)
T^{74} x Democrat	-0.056	0.050	0.250***	-0.005	-0.008	0.146*	0.075
	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.142)	(0.078)	(0.057)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Dem.]	0.315	0.009	0.000	0.580	0.180	0.509	0.015
T^{94} x Independent	-0.133	0.078	0.204**	0.097	0.009	0.291***	0.101
	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.100)	(0.126)	(0.187)	(0.103)	(0.076)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Indep.]	0.770	0.067	0.028	0.502	0.382	0.032	0.072
Female	0.252***	0.173***	0.233***	0.195***	0.299***	0.107***	0.199***
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.036)	(0.026)
Democrat	0.587***	0.646***	0.495***	0.570***	0.609***	0.506***	0.558***
	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.107)	(0.056)	(0.040)
Independent	0.225***	0.216***	0.133*	0.191**	0.247*	-0.039	0.141**
	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.094)	(0.135)	(0.075)	(0.056)
Observations	2974	2974	2974	1974	1000	2974	2974

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. Panel B excludes respondents with "other" political orientation. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 6 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 7 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1 - 6. T^{74} is a dummy that takes on the value one for those who received the high wage gap-treatment and zero otherwise. Additional controls in Panel A: Independent and "other" political orientation. Additional controls in Panels A and B: survey wave, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, prior belief. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table 7: Persistence of the treatment effect after 2-3 weeks

	Posterior belief about size of GWG	GWG is a problem	GWG is a prob. among high-skilled	GWG is a prob. among low-skilled	Women's wages are fair
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Perception of the GWG					
T^{74}	-10.668***	0.186***	0.124**	0.139**	-0.122**
	(1.177)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.055)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.028]	[0.018]	[0.023]
Female	-2.292*	0.272***	0.188***	0.197***	-0.155***
	(1.248)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.057)
Democrat	0.554	0.547***	0.506***	0.392***	-0.459***
	(1.319)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Observations	1089	1105	1105	1105	1105

	Demand for gvmt. intervention	Demand for anti-disc. policy	Demand for supportive policy	Demand for equal pay legis	Demand for affirmative action
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel B: Demand for gov. policy					
T^{74}	0.183***	0.094*	0.152***	0.096	0.009
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.079)	(0.078)
Sharpened q-value	[0.003]	[0.047]	[0.011]	[0.210]	[0.059]
Female	0.174***	0.221***	0.188***	0.197**	0.150*
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.083)	(0.080)
Democrat	0.686***	0.678***	0.675***	0.642***	0.583***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Observations	1105	1105	1105	606	606

Notes: Data base: Follow-up sample, both waves. In Panel B, Columns 4 and 5, the sample is based on wave B only. All outcomes are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the follow-up sample. Additional controls: survey wave, prior belief, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed and unemployed, student, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Sharpened q-values are based on FDR-adjustment.

Table 8: Treatment effect on beliefs about underlying factors

	Impersonal Factors				Personal Factors			
	(1) Discrimination	(2) Socialization	(3) Work-Family	(4) Index	(5) Ambitions	(6) Talent	(7) Preferences	(8) Index
T^{74}	0.227***	0.014	0.076*	0.111***	0.032	0.016	0.050	0.035
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.036)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.973]	[0.311]		[0.917]	[0.973]	[0.490]	
Female	0.240***	0.268***	0.247***	0.251***	-0.467***	-0.419***	-0.378***	-0.418***
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.038)
Democrat	0.693***	0.413***	0.219***	0.442***	-0.276***	-0.281***	-0.431***	-0.340***
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.041)
Observations	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, wave A. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 and 5 - 7 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 4 (Column 8) is a summary index over the dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 (Columns 5 - 7). Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Sharpened q-values are based on FDR-adjustment.

Table 9: Importance of other "world views"

	Policy Demand (Index)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	0.605***	0.584***	0.408***	0.211***
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.068)
Female	0.304***	0.273***	0.221***	0.142***
	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.052)
Prior (z-scored)		-0.203***	-0.191***	-0.132**
		(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.058)
Perceived costs (z-scored index)			-0.255***	-0.047
			(0.037)	(0.043)
World views (z-scored index)				-0.364***
				(0.042)
R^2	0.21	0.23	0.33	0.44
Observations	474	474	474	474

Notes: Data base: Wave B, pure control group. The sample is restricted to respondents with prior beliefs about female's relative wages between the 5th and the 95th percentile of the distribution. The outcome variable is a standardized summary index over the six self-reported measures of demand for specific policies. Additional controls: Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. The measure of perceived costs is a z-scored summary index of beliefs about i) monetary costs, ii) distortions and iii) bureaucracy caused by government intervention. The measure of world views is a z-scored summary index of beliefs about i) the negative impact an advancement of women in the labor market has on men, ii) the appropriate role of the government, iii) the importance of gender equality in wages, iv) whether policies that support women in the labor market lead to a reverse discrimination of men, v) beliefs in meritocracy in the gender context, and vi) gender role attitudes. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Appendix for online publication to "How do beliefs about the gender wage gap affect the demand for public policy?"

Sonja Settele[1]

A   Summary of the online appendix

The online appendix is structured as follows: **Section B** shows additional information on the design and implementation of the survey experiment and on the data. It describes the calculation of the treatment values based on the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS) (Section B.1) and provides details on the implementation of the donation decision and the Facebook "like" - button (Section B.2). Moreover, it contains links to the actual surveys as they were employed for data collection (Section B.3) and screenshots of important survey elements (Section B.4). Lastly, it shows summary statistics and demonstrates the integrity of randomization (Section B.5).

Section C presents additional correlational evidence on people's beliefs about the gender wage gap (GWG), their general perception of the topic and on beliefs about underlying reasons of the GWG (Section C.1). It also presents correlational evidence on the behavioral outcome measures (Section C.2), on the role of individual proxies of people's "world views" in accounting for disagreement about policy views (Section C.3) and on people's willingness to pay for additional information that is relevant to the policy discussion (Section C.4).

Section D presents additional causal evidence. It demonstrates the robustness of the main treatment effect to FWER - adjustment (Section D.1), presents the back-of-the envelope calculation referred to in Section 4.2 of the main paper (Section D.2), shows additional results on the main treatment effect of interest (Section D.3), on mechanisms (Section D.4) and on the persistence of the main treatment effect in the follow-up survey (Section D.5). Moreover, it shows additional evidence on incentivized vs. unincentivized beliefs and on the propensity to acquire additional information in response to the information treatment (Section D.6).

Section E refers to the pre-analysis plan (PAP). It first documents minor deviations from the PAP (Section E.1), then presents the main results separately for wave A and B of data collection (Section E.2) and finally shows pre-specified regressions where the main paper deviates from the PAP (Section E.3).

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B Survey design and implementation

B.1 Calculation of the treatment values

I obtained the objective values of females' relative wages for the information treatment in T^{74} (T^{94}) from the most recent available data of the American Community Survey (Current Population Survey) as of the beginning of 2018 (Flood et al., 2018; Ruggles et al., 2018). The ACS is published on a yearly level and the CPS on a monthly level. In January 2018 the most recent available sample was the ACS of 2016 and the CPS of October 2017, respectively. Whereas in the ACS all survey respondents answer wage-related questions, in the CPS a sub-sample of around one fourth, the "Outgoing Rotation Group" or "Earner Study"-sample, receives questions on wages.

In the ACS, wage income is defined as each respondent's total pre-tax wage and salary income - that is, money received as an employee - for the previous calendar year. In the CPS I use weekly earnings, which is a variable that takes on the maximum of the following two values: 1) the respondent's answer to the question "How much do you usually earn per week at this job before deductions?", which refers to the individual's current job; and 2) the reported number of hours the respondent usually worked at the job, multiplied by the hourly wage rate. Due to the self-reported nature, the resulting variables in both surveys are subject to measurement error. Moreover, there is top coding, which differs between the two samples. Namely, in the ACS wage income above the 99.5th percentile in the state of residence is coded as the state mean of values above the top code value for the specific census year. In the CPS, weekly income is top-coded at $2885.

I restrict both samples to individuals working 40 hours per week on average. For the ACS sample, I do so based on the number of hours per week that the respondent usually worked if she worked during the previous calendar year. The reference period for usual hours worked is the 12 months preceding the interview. In the CPS, I use a variable capturing the usual number of hours per week the respondent reports being at their main job. There is no concrete reference period specified. Lastly, I restrict both samples to those aged 45 who are employees and hold a Bachelor's degree, based on similar variables in both samples.

B.2 Technical details on the behavioral outcome measures

Donation decision: Respondents learn that they have been enrolled in a lottery to win $300. Before they find out whether they won or not, they are asked to commit to an amount between $0 and $300 they want to donate to an NGO that supports women in the labor market under the condition that every dollar donated will be subsidized by another $0.5 through the experimenter. (Without the subsidy, respondents would have no incentive to make the donation instantly but might instead decide to keep the full amount for themselves and make a donation privately after the survey has ended.) As soon as the participant enters an amount, a note appears summarizing the amount entered, the corresponding increase in

payoff for the respondent and the total donation (including the 50 percent subsidy) that will be made in case the participant wins the lottery. The respondent has the option to adjust her choice as many times as she likes before confirming it.

Facebook like button: Facebook offers "like"-buttons as easily implementable plug-ins which e.g. external users can integrate in their websites. As of 2018, Facebook does not allow external users to capture clicks on "like"-buttons. My aim was to construct a measure which proxies the respondent's actual decision to give a Facebook-"like" as closely as possible. At the same time I wanted to protect the individual respondent's data from facebook in case she was not interested in giving a "like".[2] In order to achieve both objectives, I implemented the following workaround: On the relevant page, survey respondents are told that if they want to give a "like" to the American Association of University Women (AAUW) on facebook, they should click on a button that says "Give facebook like to AAUW". There is also a notification that when clicking on the button, Facebook will link the respondent to her Facebook profile and will likely draw data such as her IP-address. When a respondent clicks on the square, two things happen: First, the click is captured in my data and second, the Facebook plug-in, i.e. the actual "like"-button is loaded and displayed. At the same time, the respondent is notified that one additional click on the newly appeared "like"-button is necessary in order to complete the "like".

The cost of this behavioral measure in terms of time and effort is comparatively low, it just takes two clicks to express one's support. The idea was to capture a different dimension of political behavior than the preceding donation decision or the petition before: Due to the "like" being visible to one's social network on Facebook, at least when standard settings are chosen, respondents' motivation to give a "like" may be to raise awareness and to motivate others in their social networks to follow their own opinion, thereby supporting the NGO's mission in a non-financial way (Brandtzaeg and Haugstveit, 2014).

B.3   Links to online surveys

The main survey and the follow-up survey used in Wave A may be accessed via the following links respectively:

https://limesurvey.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/lime/index.php/736385?lang=en&panelID=PAP

https://worklifesurvey.eu/lime/index.php/247726?lang=en&panelID=PAP.

For Wave B the main survey and the follow-up survey respectively can be accessed at:

https://limesurvey.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/lime/index.php/918833?lang=en&panelID=PAP

https://worklifesurvey.eu/lime/index.php/344617?lang=en&panelID=PAP.

The survey instructions can be accessed under the following link:

https://www.dropbox.com/s/merwo5j8823fq1x/Instructions_Gender_PolPref.pdf?dl=0.

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[2]It is possible that the Facebook plug-in already captures user data at the moment it is loaded, i.e. without a user clicking on it. This is legal in the US as of 2018. Nevertheless, I wanted to inform survey participants so that they could make a voluntary decision knowing that they might share data with facebook.

B.4   Screenshots of Survey Elements

Figure A.1:   Welcome page of main survey

Figure A.2:   Matrix question in main survey

Figure A.3: Welcome page of follow-up survey

Figure A.4: Matrix question in follow-up survey

Figure A.5: Screenshots of survey screen.

Notes: The screenshots show the prior belief elicitation (left panel) and the information treatment (right panel). Both correspond to the incentivized condition and to the "high wage gap"-treatment (T^{74}).

Left panel text:

The topic of this question is (**pre-tax**) **wages of men and women in the United States.** This question is **not** about how you think **things should be** but **how you think they actually are.**

Please think of all individuals in the U.S., men and women, who are **45 years old**, hold a **Bachelor degree** and **work 40 hours per week** as **full-time employees.** How many dollars, do you think, does **a woman with these characteristics** make on average for every $100 made by a man with the **same characteristics?**

If your estimate deviates by less than $2 from the value found by the most recent American Community Survey as of the beginning of 2018 you will receive a bonus of $2.

Please use the slider at the bottom of this page to communicate your estimate.

Wages in the US

Men 100$ · Women 83$

Right panel text:

Here is the true value for the wage difference you have just estimated:

In fact, for every **$100** earned by a **male**, a **female** earned **$74** when both are 45 years old, hold a Bachelor degree and work 40 hours per week as employees.

Wages in the U.S.

Men — actual value: 100$
Women — your estimate: 83$, actual value: 74$

Thank you for your estimate!

The actual value is based on the most recent available wage statistics from the American Community Survey as of January 2018. The American Community Survey is regularly conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau among households in the United States.

Left panel:

WE THE PEOPLE ASK THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE AN EXISTING ADMINISTRATION POLICY:

Revise employer information report "EEO-1": Add information on wages by gender and job category.

Created by S.S. on August 29, 2018

We request that employers with 100 or more employees report information about W-2 earnings and hours worked of their employees, organized by income category, gender and ethnicity in their annual reports to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). So far, these reports have to include information on demographics of employees, but not on their earnings and hours worked.

The objective of the change we request is to better position federal agencies to enforce pay discrimination laws, while respecting concerns about confidentiality and minimizing employers' data collection burden.

ECONOMY & JOBS

Sign This Petition

Needs **99,979 signatures** by **September 28, 2018** to get a response from the White House

21 SIGNED   100,000 GOAL

First Name *

Last Name *

Email Address *

☑ THE WHITE HOUSE MAY SEND ME EMAILS ABOUT THIS AND OTHER ISSUES.

Sign Now

BY SIGNING THIS PETITION YOU AGREE TO THE TERMS OF PARTICIPATION AND

Right panel:

WE THE PEOPLE ASK THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE AN EXISTING ADMINISTRATION POLICY:

Decrease reporting requirements for companies: Abolish annual employer information report "EEO-1".

Created by S.S. on August 29, 2018

We request that employers with 100 or more employees no longer have to report information about number of employees, organized by income category, gender and ethnicity.

The annual reports to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") pose an undue burden for employers. By reducing this burden, companies can invest their resources into more productive activities.

ECONOMY & JOBS

Sign This Petition

Needs **99,979 signatures** by **September 28, 2018** to get a response from the White House

21 SIGNED   100,000 GOAL

First Name *

Last Name *

Email Address *

☑ THE WHITE HOUSE MAY SEND ME EMAILS ABOUT THIS AND OTHER ISSUES.

Sign Now

BY SIGNING THIS PETITION YOU AGREE TO THE TERMS OF PARTICIPATION AND

Figure A.6: Screenshots of real online petitions on the White House Petition Website: Petition I (left panel) and Petition II (right panel).

Notes: The screenshots show the real online petitions on the White House Petition Website.

B.5 Summary statistics, sample balance and attrition

Table B.1: Representativeness of the sample in terms of targeted variables

	Mean: Sample	Mean: U.S. population age 18-65
Northeast	0.18	0.18
Midwest	0.21	0.21
South	0.37	0.38
West	0.24	0.24
Age	42.03	41.05
Female	0.50	0.50
Male	0.50	0.50
Employed (full- or part-time or self-emp.)	0.71	0.71
Not employed (unempl., student, out of labor force)	0.29	0.29
Household inc < $50,000	0.39	0.39
Household inc. > $50,000	0.61	0.61
Democrat	0.33	0.33
Republican	0.27	0.26
Independent (including Indep. leaning Dem. or Rep.)	0.39	0.37

Notes: Sample size for the left-hand column: N = 4,065 (full sample). The right-hand column is based on 18-65-year-old individuals in the ACS 2016 except for political orientation which is based on Pew Research Center (2018).

Figure A.7: Duration of survey

Table B.2: Representativeness of sample in terms of more detailed variables

	Mean: Sample	Mean: U.S. population age 18-65
Full- or part-time employee	0.64	0.65
Self-employed	0.08	0.06
Unemployed	0.06	0.04
Out of LF (incl. student and retired)	0.23	0.25
Age 18-24	0.11	0.15
Age 25-34	0.25	0.22
Age 35-44	0.21	0.20
Age 45-54	0.21	0.21
Age 55-65	0.22	0.22
8th degree	0.00	0.04
Some HS	0.02	0.08
HS	0.16	0.33
Some college	0.22	0.24
2-year college	0.12	0.08
4-year college	0.32	0.19
Master	0.13	0.07
PhD	0.02	0.01
Prof. Degree (JD, MD, MBA)	0.02	0.02
Yearly household inc. < $15,000	0.07	0.11
Yearly household inc. $15,000 - $25,000	0.08	0.08
Yearly household inc. $25,000 - $50,000	0.23	0.20
Yearly household inc. $50,000 - $75,000	0.22	0.17
Yearly household inc. $75,000 - $100,000	0.16	0.13
Yearly household inc. $100,000 - $150,000	0.15	0.16
Yearly household inc. $150,000 - $200,000	0.05	0.07
Yearly household inc. > $200,000	0.03	0.08
Single	0.38	0.36
Married	0.50	0.51
Divorced	0.09	0.11
Widowed	0.02	0.18
Has children	0.53	0.40
White/Caucasian	0.83	0.72
Black/African American	0.09	0.13
Asian American	0.06	0.06
Other race	0.03	0.09
Hispanic or latino origin	0.08	0.17
Republican	0.27	0.26
Indep. leaning Republican	0.09	0.16
Independent	0.18	0.04
Indep. leaning Democrat	0.12	0.17
Democrat	0.33	0.33
Other pol. orientation	0.02	0.04

Notes: Sample size for the left-hand column: N=4,065. The right-hand column is based on 18-65-year-old individuals in the ACS 2016 except for political orientation which is based on Pew Research Center (2018).

Table B.3: Main survey: Integrity of randomization

	Main survey									
	(1) Full Sample	(2) Treatment Groups	(3) Control Group	(4) T^{74}	(5) T^{94}	(6) Prior incentivized	(7) Prior not incentivized	(8) p-value (2) = (3)	(9) p-value (4) = (5)	(10) p-value (6) = (7)
Female	0.52	0.52	0.53	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.574	0.561	0.463
Democrat	0.44	0.44	0.46	0.45	0.44	0.45	0.44	0.431	0.625	0.394
Republican	0.36	0.36	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.414	0.698	0.846
Independent	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.858	0.943	0.419
Other pol. orientation	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.619	0.832	0.132
Prior belief	83.36	83.38	83.30	83.34	83.43	83.25	83.51	0.918	0.915	0.704
Northeast	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.731	0.689	0.776
Midwest	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.948	0.295	0.275
South	0.37	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.37	0.38	0.37	0.649	0.694	0.486
West	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.884	0.844	0.610
Age 18-24	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.11	0.012	0.710	0.068
Age 25-34	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.734	0.883	0.810
Age 35-44	0.21	0.22	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.058	0.766	0.405
Age 45-54	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.420	0.538	0.606
Age 55-65	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.606	0.862	0.738
Has children	0.53	0.54	0.51	0.53	0.54	0.53	0.53	0.123	0.594	0.779
Log household income	10.90	10.91	10.88	10.89	10.93	10.90	10.90	0.323	0.118	0.884
Associate degree or more	0.61	0.61	0.60	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.601	0.940	0.995
Full-time employee	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.51	0.55	0.51	0.55	0.822	0.040	0.005
Part-time employee	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.09	0.12	0.09	0.852	0.012	0.001
Self-employed	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.346	0.904	0.160
Unemployed	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.850	0.282	0.933
Student	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.561	0.026	0.353
Out of labor force	0.19	0.19	0.17	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.352	0.994	0.756
Observations	4065	3031	1034	1531	1500	2294	1771			

Notes: Columns 1 to 8 show sample means for the denoted subgroups. Column 8 shows p-values from t-tests comparing the mean of each variable between subjects that received any information treatment to those that received none. A joint F-test based on regressing a dummy that takes on value one for respondents in T^{74} or T^{94} on all covariates gives a p-value of 0.87. Column 9 shows p-values from t-tests comparing the mean of each variable between subjects that were in T^{74} as compared to those in T^{94}. The p-value of a joint F-test when regressing a dummy for T^{74} on all covariates, omitting the pure control group is 0.35. Column 10 shows p-values from t-tests comparing the mean of each variable between subjects who received an incentive for a correct (prior) estimate of the size of the GWG to those who did not receive any incentive. The p-value of a joint F-test when regressing the dummy for incentivized prior beliefs on all covariates is 0.15.

Table B.4: Follow-up survey: Attrition and integrity of randomization

	Follow-up survey (Eligible respondents only)					
	(1) In Stage II sample	(2) Not in Stage II sample	(3) T^{74} (Stage II sample)	(4) T^{94} (Stage II sample)	(5) p-value (1) = (2)	(6) p-value (3) = (4)
Female	0.50	0.53	0.51	0.49	0.110	0.489
Democrat	0.42	0.45	0.41	0.43	0.061	0.419
Republican	0.38	0.35	0.39	0.37	0.106	0.584
Independent	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.777	0.727
Other pol. orientation	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.735	0.990
Prior belief	83.80	83.15	83.94	83.65	0.430	0.834
Northeast	0.19	0.17	0.20	0.19	0.129	0.736
Midwest	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.20	0.929	0.692
South	0.35	0.38	0.35	0.36	0.097	0.657
West	0.24	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.548	0.848
Age 18-24	0.05	0.14	0.05	0.05	0.000	0.906
Age 25-34	0.20	0.27	0.20	0.20	0.000	0.976
Age 35-44	0.20	0.23	0.20	0.21	0.094	0.569
Age 45-54	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.20	0.316	0.493
Age 55-65	0.34	0.16	0.33	0.34	0.000	0.848
Has children	0.58	0.51	0.58	0.58	0.000	0.867
Log household income	10.92	10.90	10.91	10.94	0.460	0.499
Associate degree or more	0.61	0.62	0.60	0.62	0.588	0.467
Full-time employee	0.50	0.55	0.49	0.51	0.016	0.452
Part-time employee	0.10	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.591	0.014
Self-employed	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.058	0.294
Unemployed	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.927	0.427
Student	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.000	0.643
Out of labor force	0.24	0.16	0.22	0.25	0.000	0.332
Observations	1105	1926	554	551		

Notes: Overall, around 36% of eligible respondents participated in the follow-up survey. Columns 1 to 4 show sample means for the denoted subgroups. Column 5 shows p-values from t-tests comparing the mean of each variable between subjects who took part in the follow-up survey to those who were eligible but did not. The p-value of a joint F-test when regressing a dummy for participation in the follow-up survey on all covariates, omitting the pure control group, is <0.01. Column 6 shows p-values from t-tests comparing the mean of each variable between follow-up subjects that were in T^{74} as compared to those in T^{94}. The p-value of a joint F-test when regressing a dummy for T^{74} on all covariates in the follow-up sample is 0.92.

Figure A.8: Time elapsed between completion of main survey and follow-up survey.

C Additional correlational evidence

C.1 People's beliefs about the GWG and underlying reasons

Figure A.9: Distribution of prior beliefs about women's relative wages

Notes: Data base: Observations with incentivized prior beliefs, wave A and B. Graph shows the distribution of respondents' prior beliefs about the baseline wage statistic (women's average wage for every \$100 made by a man when both are 45 years old, hold a Bachelor degree and work 40 hours per week as full-time employees). Mean: 83.4; St.dev.: 21.3.

Figure A.10: Predictors of incentivized prior beliefs

Notes: Data base: Observations with incentivized prior beliefs, wave A and B. Graph shows coefficient estimates including 95% confidence intervals for the full set of pre-specified predictors of prior beliefs about the baseline wage statistic. A positive coefficient stands for a higher belief about females' relative wages. A constant and a dummy for "other" political orientation are included in the specification but not shown in the graph. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Omitted categories in the case of dummy variables are: male, Republican (including Independents leaning Republican), less than a 2-year College degree, Northeast, Age 55-65, no children, full-time employed.

12

Figure A.11: Beliefs about different wage statistics

Notes: Data base for the left bar: All respondents with incentivized (prior) beliefs. Data base for the remaining bars: Pure control group (All beliefs incentivized, except for the rightmost bar). The left bar represents people's beliefs about the baseline wage statistic, i.e. women's relative wages in the group of 45-year-olds who work 40 hours per week on average as employees and hold a Bachelor's degree. The remaining bars correspond to wage statistics which differ according to the following characteristic, while all remaining characteristics are the same as in the baseline wage statistic: i) high school degree i) age 25, iii) restriction to parents, iv) working in the same occupation group, and v) individuals working in the same job for the same employer.

Figure A.11 illustrates people's beliefs about the GWG prevailing in groups with varying demographic characteristics. The evidence is consistent with the possibility that respondents underestimate the role of the choice of occupation (Blau and Kahn, 2017) and the widening of the GWG with age[3] (Goldin et al., 2017). Also, respondents on average report a significantly higher perceived GWG for individuals with a high school degree as compared to the baseline statistic, which is suggestive of a mis-perceived role of pure educational attainment as a remedy for the GWG (Blau and Kahn, 2017; Goldin et al., 2006). This interpretation is supported by evidence from the two treatment groups (Figure A.12): Regardless of the treatment group, respondents on average believe that among those with a high school degree the GWG is higher than among those with a Bachelor degree.

Table C.1 illustrates the strong correlation between people's beliefs about the size of the GWG and their related perceptions, such as whether they perceive the GWG to be large or a problem and whether they would like to see more government intervention. Regarding

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[3]The wage statistic about 25-year-olds of course asks not only about a different age group but also about a different cohort than the baseline wage statistic. However, given that the GWG has generally been decreasing over time (Blau and Kahn, 2017), the respondents should definitely report a lower perceived GWG for 25-year-olds nowadays than for 45-year-olds nowadays.

Figure A.12: The perceived role of educational attainment in driving the GWG

Notes: The blue line indicates the mean prior belief about the baseline wage statistic, which refers to females' relative wages in the group of Bachelor graduates who are 45 years old and work 40 hours per week as employees. The red and the green line show the treatment values in T^{74} and T^{94}, respectively. The three bars indicate the mean beliefs in the control group, in T^{74} and T^{94}, about the wage statistic referring to the relative earnings of women in the group of High School graduates who are 45 years old and work 40 hours per week as employees.

the deep underlying reasons of the GWG, Table C.2 shows that Republicans as well as men are relatively more likely to perceive personal and less likely to perceive impersonal factors. Political orientation (gender) is the strongest predictor of people's beliefs about impersonal reasons (personal reasons) (Panel A). Individuals who believe female wages to be higher are less likely to perceive external reasons, especially gender-based discrimination and at the same time more likely to perceive personal reasons (Panel B).

Table C.1: Correlates of views related to gender differences in wages

	Gender diff. in wages are large	Gender diff. in wages are a problem	Government should promote gender wage equality	Perception Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

Panel A: Gender and political orientation

Democrat	0.577***	0.683***	0.803***	0.691***
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.066)
Female	0.173***	0.264***	0.153**	0.181***
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.057)
Observations	921	921	921	921

Panel B: Prior belief about GWG

Prior (z-scored)	-0.815***	-0.849***	-0.595***	-0.729***
	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.065)
Observations	921	921	921	921

Panel C: Prior, gender, pol. orientation

Prior (z-scored)	-0.742***	-0.757***	-0.498***	-0.643***
	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.062)
Democrat	0.482***	0.586***	0.739***	0.609***
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.061)
Female	0.096	0.186***	0.102*	0.115**
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.053)
Observations	921	921	921	921

Panel D: Full set of controls

Prior (z-scored)	-0.739***	-0.760***	-0.509***	-0.647***
	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.062)
Democrat	0.513***	0.600***	0.730***	0.620***
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.072)	(0.063)
Female	0.115*	0.209***	0.115*	0.132**
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.053)
Observations	921	921	921	921

Notes: Data base: Pure control group, both waves, restricted to respondents with prior beliefs between the 5th and the 95th percentile of the distribution. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 4 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1 - 3. The variable "prior" is z-scored as well, based on the mean and standard deviation in the full sample. All specifications include a dummy for wave B of data collection. Panels A, C and D control for political orientation "Independent" and "other" in addition to the coefficients shown in the table. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. In Panel D, additional controls are included for census region, age group, parental status, log of total household income, two-year college degree or more, full-time employee, part-time employee, self-employed, unemployed, student. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Figure A.13: Distribution of perceived underlying factors

Notes: Graphs are based on the control group, Wave A. Histograms are based on survey items capturing respondents' (dis-)agreement with six different statements referring to the prevalence of factors that may potentially be seen as drivers of the GWG. Answers are measured on 5-point-scales ranging from "completely disagree" to "completely agree". The top panel shows respondents' perceived prevalence of external factors, namely i) gender-based discrimination in labor markets, ii) society making it more difficult for women than for men to combine work and family iii) a differential encouragement of men and women to pursue ambitious careers. The bottom panel shows perceptions of personal factors, namely i) ambitions, ii) talents and iii) preferences.

Table C.2: Correlates of perceived reasons

	Impersonal Factors				Personal Factors			
	(1) Discrimination	(2) Socialization	(3) Work-Family	(4) Index	(5) Ambitions	(6) Talents	(7) Preferences	(8) Index
Panel A: Gender and political orientation								
Democrat	0.765***	0.419***	0.049	0.409***	-0.326***	-0.396***	-0.430***	-0.387***
	(0.099)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.072)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.082)
Female	0.193**	0.275***	0.095	0.182***	-0.450***	-0.498***	-0.447***	-0.462***
	(0.088)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.063)	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.090)	(0.071)
Observations	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443
Panel B: Prior belief about GWG								
Prior (z-scored)	-0.643***	-0.301***	-0.100	-0.349***	0.330***	0.305***	0.452***	0.373***
	(0.095)	(0.101)	(0.097)	(0.071)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.085)	(0.077)
Observations	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443
Panel C: Prior, gender, pol. orientation								
Prior (z-scored)	-0.516***	-0.213**	-0.074	-0.270***	0.262***	0.217**	0.367***	0.292***
	(0.094)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.069)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.084)	(0.074)
Democrat	0.684***	0.386***	0.038	0.367***	-0.285***	-0.362***	-0.373***	-0.342***
	(0.097)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.072)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.082)
Female	0.156*	0.260***	0.090	0.164***	-0.432***	-0.483***	-0.421***	-0.441***
	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.062)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.071)
Observations	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443
Panel D: Full set of controls								
Prior (z-scored)	-0.535***	-0.267***	-0.066	-0.289***	0.271***	0.218**	0.391***	0.305***
	(0.093)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.069)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.084)	(0.073)
Democrat	0.681***	0.356***	0.010	0.347***	-0.303***	-0.372***	-0.400***	-0.361***
	(0.099)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.074)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.086)
Female	0.180**	0.260***	0.091	0.172***	-0.428***	-0.492***	-0.447***	-0.453***
	(0.087)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.064)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.074)
Observations	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443

Notes: The sample is restricted to the pure control group of wave A with prior beliefs between the 5th and the 95th percentile of the distribution. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 and 5 - 7 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 4 (Column 8) is a summary index over the dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 (Columns 5 - 7). The variable "prior" is z-scored as well, based on the mean and standard deviation in the full sample. All specifications include a dummy for wave B of data collection. Panels A, C and D control for political orientation "Independent" and "other" in addition to the coefficients shown in the table. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. In Panel D, additional controls are included for census region, age group, parental status, log of total household income, two-year college degree or more, full-time employee, part-time employee, self-employed, unemployed, student. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

C.2 Correlates of behavioral measures of policy demand

Figure A.14: Propensity to sign a petition: Petition-specific proportion tests

Notes: This graph is based on the number of actual signatures of online petitions made by control group respondents. The bars on gender are based on wave A and wave B. The bars on political orientation are based on wave A only. Democrats include self-identified Democrats as well as Independents leaning Democrat. Non-Democrats refers to all remaining respondents, i.e. Independents, Republicans and Independents leaning Republican. The height of the bars represents the fraction of respondents per group that signed the respective petition. Whiskers show the 95% confidence intervals around the estimated mean fractions. P-values are based on two-sided petition-specific proportion tests.

Table C.3: Correlates of behavioral proxies of demand for government intervention

	Intention to sign Petition I	Intention to sign Petition II	Amount donated to supportive NGO	Facebook Like
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Gender and political orientation				
Democrat	0.297***	-0.118***	21.375***	0.018
	(0.036)	(0.023)	(6.788)	(0.030)
Female	0.046	-0.068***	-11.384*	-0.005
	(0.032)	(0.019)	(5.990)	(0.026)
Panel B: Prior belief about GWG				
Prior (z-scored)	-0.145***	0.087***	-2.337	-0.044
	(0.032)	(0.022)	(6.045)	(0.027)
Panel C: Prior, gender, pol. orientation				
Prior (z-scored)	-0.103***	0.072***	-0.778	-0.042
	(0.032)	(0.021)	(6.058)	(0.028)
Democrat	0.284***	-0.109***	21.275***	0.013
	(0.036)	(0.023)	(6.815)	(0.030)
Female	0.036	-0.061***	-11.464*	-0.009
	(0.032)	(0.019)	(5.996)	(0.027)
Panel D: Full set of controls				
Prior (z-scored)	-0.111***	0.077***	-1.159	-0.035
	(0.033)	(0.021)	(6.097)	(0.029)
Democrat	0.280***	-0.099***	22.567***	0.030
	(0.037)	(0.023)	(6.998)	(0.030)
Female	0.042	-0.062***	-9.393	-0.019
	(0.033)	(0.019)	(6.248)	(0.027)
Mean outcome (control group)	0.52	0.10	82.02	0.14
Observations	921	921	921	707

Notes: Data base: Pure control group. In Column 4 the sample is restricted to respondents who self-report to have a Facebook account. The dependent variable in Column 1 (Column 2) is a dummy taking on value 1 for respondents who expressed their intention to sign Petition I (Petition II) in the survey. The dependent variable in Column 3 is the respondent's donation decision, ranging from $0 to $300. Column 4 looks at respondents' clicks on a Facebook "like"-button. Additional controls are included for census region, age group, parental status, log of total household income, two-year college degree or more, full-time employee, part-time employee, self-employed, unemployed, student, political orientation "other" and Independent. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

C.3 The role of people's "world views"

Table C.4: World views individually

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				Policy Demand (Index)			
Democrat	0.402***	0.399***	0.388***	0.324***	0.310***	0.228***	0.211***
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.068)
Female	0.218***	0.214***	0.213***	0.179***	0.148***	0.243***	0.142***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.052)
WV proxy	-0.025	-0.045	-0.056*	-0.215***	-0.243***	-0.315***	-0.364***
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.042)
R^2	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.39	0.39	0.49	0.44
Observations	474	474	474	474	474	474	474
WV proxy	Zero-sum game	Gender roles	Meritocracy	Role of gov.	Reverse disc.	Importance	Index

Notes: Data base: Wave B, pure control group, respondents with prior beliefs about the GWG between the 5th and the 95th percentile of the distribution. Dependent variables are z-scored measures of world views: i) beliefs about the negative impact woman's advancement in the labor market has on men, ii) gender role attitudes, iii) beliefs in meritocracy in the gender context, iv) beliefs about whether the government should generally mitigate inequality, v) beliefs about whether policies that support women lead to a reverse discrimination of men, vi) perceived importance of gender wage equality, vii) summary index. Additional control for political orientation "independent" and "other" as well as for perceived costs of government intervention (summary index) are included. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

C.4 Willingness to pay for additional information

Table C.5: Correlates of propensity to acquire additional information

	Willingness to pay for progressive info				Willingness to pay for traditional info			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democrat	0.417***	0.377***	0.124	0.115	-0.209*	-0.195*	-0.147	-0.143
	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.124)	(0.123)
Female	0.157	0.142	0.052	0.049	-0.111	-0.105	-0.089	-0.087
	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Prior		-0.244**		-0.143		0.086		0.066
		(0.096)		(0.095)		(0.110)		(0.115)
Policy Demand (Index)			0.410***	0.390***			-0.086	-0.077
			(0.067)	(0.069)			(0.081)	(0.084)
Observations	443	443	443	443	443	443	443	443

Notes: Data base: Wave A, pure control group, respondents with prior beliefs about the GWG between the 5th and the 95th percentile of the distribution. The outcome variables are coded as the number of times respondents choose information over money, originally ranging between 0 and 3, and then standardized. Prior beliefs are standardized as well. The policy demand index corresponds to a summary index over the six measures of demand for specific policies. Additional control variables in all regressions: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

D Additional causal evidence

D.1 Correction for multiple hypothesis testing

To adjust for multiple inference, I follow Anderson (2008) in applying a combined approach: First, I group the main outcome variables of interest into families and test for an overall treatment effect in a highly conservative way. Second, I test for a treatment effect on disaggregated outcomes within each family, allowing for more power in exchange for a small number of Type I errors. In the remainder of this section I describe the implementation of this combined approach and the intuition behind it.

For the first step, I start by reducing the number of outcomes by creating summary indices for the three main pre-specified families of outcomes: i) people's general perceptions related to the GWG ("manipulation check"), ii) self-reported demand for specific policies and iii) beliefs about the prevalence of external factors that may be seen as drivers of the GWG. When constructing an index, I weight its inputs by the inverse of the covariance matrix of the standardized outcomes such that outcomes that are highly correlated with each other receive less weight, while outcomes that are uncorrelated, and thus contain new information, receive more weight. Even though the set of outcomes is now reduced, I am still testing multiple hypothesis. I adjust for this fact by applying the highly conservative method of **family-wise error rate (FWER)** control. Its idea is to fix the probability of *any* Type I error. The corresponding FWER-adjusted p-values (see Table D.1) are calculated using the free step-down resampling methodology of Westfall and Young (1993). They can be interpreted similar to standard p-values except that they stand for the probability that *at least one* true null hypothesis is rejected across the three regressions, when the corresponding null-hypothesis is rejected. As Table D.1 illustrates, the overall treatment effect is robust to FWER-adjustment.

Second, for larger sets of more disaggregated outcomes, I control for the **false discovery rate (FDR)** or the *proportion* of rejections in the family of outcomes that are "false discoveries", i.e. Type I errors (Benjamini et al., 2006). Compared to the highly conservative FWER-control, this method allows a small number of Type I errors in exchange for more power. I present "sharpened q-values" for all tests of a treatment effect on the disaggregated variables within each of the three main families of outcomes. The corresponding results are reported in Tables 4, 5 and 8 in the main paper. The "sharpened q-values" reflect the proportion of Type I errors as a share of all rejections of null hypothesis in the family that has to be allowed, such that the respective null hypothesis can still be rejected.

Table D.1: Robustness of main treatment effect to FWER control

	Index		
	(1) General Perceptions	(2) Spec. Policy Demand	(3) Perceived Imp. Reasons
T^{74}	0.417***	0.056**	0.111***
Standard p-value	(0.000)	(0.025)	(0.001)
FWER-adjusted p-value	[0.000]	[0.013]	[0.002]
Female	0.277***	0.203***	0.251***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Democrat	0.665***	0.594***	0.442***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	3031	3031	2012

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. Column 3 is based on wave A only. The table demonstrates the robustness of the overall treatment effect on the pre-specified main sets of outcomes to family-wise error rate (FWER)-control (Anderson, 2008). I apply FWER control to the following summary indices: i) general perceptions of gender differences in wages ("manipulation check") (Column 1), ii) self-reported demand for specific policies (Column 2) and iii) the perceived prevalence of impersonal reasons that potentially drive the GWG (Column 3). Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed and unemployed, student, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust p-values are in parenthesis and FWER-adjusted p-values are in squared brackets.

D.2 Back-of-the-envelope calculation

In a back-of-the-envelope calculation, I estimate the share of the Democrat-Republican difference and the gender difference in policy demand that can be explained by the causal effect of differences in (prior) beliefs about the size of the GWG between these groups. Based on pure control group and on the four measures of the GWG for which beliefs were incentivized, I find that the average Democrat-Republican gap in these beliefs corresponds to $4.5 and the average gender gap corresponds to $1.8 (Table D.2, Panel A). The treatment effect on the same four beliefs amounts to $13.36 (Panel B) on average.

Table D.3 illustrates the actual back-of-the-envelope calculation based on the two measures of specific policy demand for which the estimated treatment effect is significant, namely demand for affirmative action programsa and for equal pay legislation. For each of the two measures, I scale the treatment effect such that it corresponds in size to the difference in beliefs between Democrats and Republicans (females and males). Subsequently, I compare the resulting causal effect to the difference in policy demand in the control group between Democrats and Republicans (females and males). I find that the causal effect of Democrat-Republican (female-male) differences in beliefs about the size of the GWG can account for between 5% and 6% of the Democrat-Republican (4% and 9% of the female-male) difference in policy demand, depending on the specific policy. Note that these shares correspond to upper bounds and that in the case of demand for wage transparency, public subsidies for child care and gender quotas the causal effect of beliefs about the GWG plays an even smaller

Table D.2: Correlates of beliefs and treatment effect on beliefs about the GWG

| | Outcome: (Incentivized) beliefs about the size of the GWG | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
	Age 25	HS degree	Same occu.	Parent	Average
Panel A: Correlations					
Female	-0.973	-0.202	-5.134	-0.899	1.802
	(3.531)	(4.710)	(2.748)	(2.734)	
Democrat	-5.015	-5.894	-3.106	-4.017	4.508
	(3.609)	(5.394)	(3.363)	(3.137)	
Observations	164	149	181	269	763
Panel B: Treatment effect					
T^{74}	-11.386	-12.993	-13.699	-15.354	13.358
	(1.148)	(1.404)	(1.148)	(1.341)	
Observations	670	676	657	496	3022

Notes: Sample for Panel A: Pure control group. Sample for Panel B: Treatment groups. Columns 1 to 3 are based on wave A, columns 4 and 5 on wave B. Additional controls in Panel A: Independent and "other" pol. orientation. Additional controls in Panel B: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, Democrat, Independent and "other" pol. orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

role in explaining differences in policy demand across the political spectrum and between genders.

Table D.3: Back-of-the-envelope calculations

	Affirmative Action	Equal Pay Legislation	Average
Treatment effect T^{74}	0.112	0.115	0.11
Dem. - Rep. difference in policy demand (control group)	0.760	0.685	0.72
Predicted causal effect of Dem. - Rep. difference in prior belief about the GWG	4.51/13.36 * 0.112 = 0.038	4.51/13.36 * 0.115 = 0.039	0.04
Share of Dem. - Rep. difference in policy demand that is explained by causal effect of Dem. - Rep. diff. in prior	0.038 / 0.760 = 0.05	0.039/0.685 = 0.06	**0.06**
Gender difference in policy demand (control group)	0.176	0.338	0.26
Predicted causal effect of gender difference in prior belief about the GWG	1.80/13.36 * 0.112 = 0.015	1.80/13.36 * 0.115 = 0.015	0.02
Share of gender difference in policy demand that is explained by causal effect of gender diff. in prior belief	0.015/0.176= 0.09	0.015/0.338= 0.04	**0.07**

Notes: The block titled "Treatment effect T^{74}" replicates the effect of the information treatment on the three self-reported measures of demand for specific government intervention with the largest estimated treatment effects. In the remaining two blocks, I conduct the following steps separately for the political and the gender dimension: First, I list the raw difference in policy demand, based on the control group. In the subsequent row, I calculate the predicted causal effect on policy demand resulting from the raw difference in beliefs about the GWG. Finally, I calculate the share of the raw difference in policy demand that is accounted for by the predicted causal effect of the raw difference in prior beliefs about the GWG.

D.3 Additional evidence on the main treatment effect

Table D.4: Treatment effect on posterior beliefs

	High school Degree	Age 25	Same occupation	Parent	Same job	Posterior (pooled)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Avg. Treatment Effect						
T^{74}	-12.993***	-11.386***	-13.699***	-11.882***	-15.354***	-12.879***
	(1.404)	(1.148)	(1.148)	(1.535)	(1.341)	(0.584)
Female	-1.787	-2.046*	0.451	-1.403	-4.240***	-1.629***
	(1.533)	(1.207)	(1.278)	(1.419)	(1.309)	(0.603)
Democrat	-0.076	0.534	0.824	-0.598	-0.907	0.054
	(1.725)	(1.411)	(1.292)	(1.659)	(1.752)	(0.692)
Prior	0.414***	0.379***	0.439***	0.228***	0.417***	0.381***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.030)
Observations	676	670	657	523	496	3022
Panel B: Het by Gender						
T^{74}	-12.951***	-9.746***	-14.276***	-9.943***	-14.583***	-12.076***
	(1.945)	(1.711)	(1.717)	(2.104)	(2.347)	(0.868)
T^{74} * Female	-0.085	-3.366	1.118	-3.966	-1.550	-1.607
	(2.804)	(2.329)	(2.461)	(2.912)	(2.923)	(1.193)
p-value [$T^{74} + T^{74}$ x Female]	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Female	-1.744	-0.300	-0.071	0.647	-3.458*	-0.823
	(1.912)	(1.472)	(1.554)	(2.019)	(1.938)	(0.783)
Observations	676	670	657	523	496	3022
Panel C: Het by pol. attitude						
T^{74}	-14.182***	-10.803***	-17.548***	-9.643***	-15.860***	-13.755***
	(2.380)	(1.828)	(1.812)	(2.057)	(2.693)	(0.962)
T^{74} * Democrat	3.129	0.480	5.978**	-5.061	0.123	1.610
	(3.183)	(2.649)	(2.410)	(3.142)	(3.379)	(1.313)
p-value [$T^{74} + T^{74}$ x Democrat]	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Democrat	-1.730	0.318	-1.867	2.097	-1.085	-0.744
	(2.081)	(1.725)	(1.515)	(2.452)	(2.414)	(0.876)
T^{74} * Independent	-1.472	-4.626	8.617**	0.886	1.274	1.327
	(4.284)	(3.141)	(3.597)	(4.028)	(3.783)	(1.634)
p-value [$T^{74} + T^{74}$ x Independent]	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.014	0.000	0.000
Independent	1.805	2.460	-3.613**	0.305	-0.513	-0.297
	(3.206)	(2.360)	(1.803)	(2.620)	(2.682)	(1.122)
Observations	662	660	643	513	487	2965

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. In Panel C, respondents with "other" political orientation are excluded. The dependent variables correspond to beliefs about the five different wage statistics employed in the posterior belief elicitation. Beliefs take on values between 0 and 200. Columns 1 - 3 (4 - 5) are based on wave A (wave B) whereas Column 6 pools observations from Columns 1 to 5 and includes dummies to control for the specific wage statistic. Additional controls: survey wave, prior belief, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table D.5: Heterogeneous treatment effect on views related to the GWG

	Gender diff. in wages are large	Gender diff. in wages are a problem	Government should promote gender wage equality	Perception Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Het. by gender				
T^{74}	0.630***	0.427***	0.201***	0.413***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.050)
T^{74} x Female	-0.066	-0.011	0.084	0.007
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.064)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Female]	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Female	0.268***	0.302***	0.266***	0.274***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.049)
Democrat	0.526***	0.656***	0.802***	0.665***
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Observations	3031	3031	3031	3031
Panel B: Het. by pol. orientation				
T^{74}	0.602***	0.389***	0.177**	0.385***
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.062)
T^{74} x Democrat	-0.029	0.004	0.058	0.014
	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.073)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Democrat]	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
T^{74} x Independent	0.074	0.184*	0.257**	0.171*
	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.101)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Indep.]	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Female	0.230***	0.295***	0.304***	0.273***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Democrat	0.539***	0.653***	0.774***	0.659***
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.055)
Independent	0.165**	0.159*	0.170**	0.166**
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.079)
Observations	2974	2974	2974	2974

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. In Panel B, respondents with "other" political orientation were excluded. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 4 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1 - 3. T^{74} is a dummy that takes on value one for those who received the high wage gap-treatment and zero otherwise. Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, survey wave, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table D.6: Treatment effect on behavioral outcome measures

	Intention to sign Petition I	Intention to sign Petition II	Amount donated to supportive NGO	Facebook Like
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Avg. Treatment Effect				
T^{74}	0.028	-0.003	2.393	0.012
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(3.404)	(0.015)
Sharpened q-value	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Female	0.013	-0.075***	-10.478***	0.009
	(0.018)	(0.011)	(3.525)	(0.015)
Democrat	0.271***	-0.099***	28.802***	0.045***
	(0.020)	(0.013)	(3.848)	(0.017)
Mean dep. var	0.52	0.09	88.30	0.15
Observations	3031	3031	3031	2297
Panel B: Het by Gender				
T^{74}	0.028	-0.013	8.479*	0.015
	(0.025)	(0.018)	(4.967)	(0.021)
T^{74} * Female	-0.001	0.021	-12.166*	-0.007
	(0.035)	(0.021)	(6.788)	(0.030)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Female]	0.267	0.468	0.427	0.684
Female	0.014	-0.086***	-4.384	0.013
	(0.025)	(0.015)	(4.890)	(0.021)
Observations	3031	3031	3031	2297
Panel C: Het by pol. attitude				
T^{74}	0.023	0.001	-3.894	0.009
	(0.029)	(0.022)	(5.443)	(0.023)
T^{74} * Democrat	0.008	-0.005	11.350	-0.016
	(0.039)	(0.025)	(7.552)	(0.033)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Democrat]	0.239	0.744	0.155	0.765
Democrat	0.267***	-0.096***	23.386***	0.054**
	(0.028)	(0.018)	(5.429)	(0.024)
T^{74} * Independent	-0.002	-0.018	7.626	0.065
	(0.052)	(0.031)	(9.884)	(0.041)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Indep.]	0.618	0.447	0.650	0.032
Independent	0.067*	-0.062***	8.447	-0.045*
	(0.037)	(0.023)	(7.286)	(0.027)
Observations	2974	2974	2974	2262

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. In Panel C observations with "other" political orientation were excluded from the sample. The outcomes in columns 1,2 and 4 are dummies, the donation decision in column 3 takes on values between 0 and 300. Means at the bottom of Panel A are based on the treated sample, i.e. excluding the control group. Additional controls in all panels: survey wave, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, out of labor force, unemployed, prior belief Independent and, when applicable, "other" political orientation. Panel B in addition controls for Democrat and Panel C in addition controls for gender. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

D.4 Additional evidence on mechanisms

Table D.7: Heterogeneous treatment effect on beliefs about underlying factors

	Impersonal Factors				Personal Factors			
	(1) Discrimination	(2) Socialization	(3) Work-Family	(4) Index	(5) Ambitions	(6) Talent	(7) Preferences	(8) Index
Panel A: Het by Gender								
T^{74}	0.240***	0.017	-0.023	0.081*	0.001	-0.010	0.010	0.002
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.047)	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.053)
T^{74} * Female	-0.024	-0.006	0.198**	0.060	0.060	0.053	0.080	0.066
	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.064)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.072)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Female]	0.000	0.862	0.006	0.001	0.294	0.460	0.147	0.167
Female	0.252***	0.271***	0.148**	0.221***	-0.497***	-0.445***	-0.418***	-0.451***
	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.046)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.052)
Observations	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012	2012
Panel B: Het by pol. attitude								
T^{74}	0.307***	-0.013	0.059	0.125**	0.053	0.068	0.138*	0.092
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.075)	(0.059)	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.058)
T^{74} * Democrat	-0.132	-0.022	-0.027	-0.062	-0.049	-0.089	-0.155	-0.103
	(0.095)	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.073)	(0.100)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.081)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Democrat]	0.001	0.583	0.626	0.152	0.955	0.736	0.806	0.841
T^{74} * Independent	-0.060	0.180	0.085	0.062	-0.010	-0.070	-0.141	-0.080
	(0.129)	(0.137)	(0.131)	(0.097)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.105)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Independent]	0.014	0.134	0.180	0.015	0.692	0.980	0.981	0.890
Democrat	0.758***	0.423***	0.234***	0.473***	-0.249***	-0.234***	-0.354***	-0.288***
	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.052)	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.055)
Independent	0.437***	0.087	-0.058	0.158**	0.014	-0.012	-0.121	-0.048
	(0.096)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.072)	(0.094)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.075)
Observations	1974	1974	1974	1974	1974	1974	1974	1974

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, wave A. In Panel C, respondents with "other" political orientation were excluded. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 and 5 - 7 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group.The dependent variable in Column 4 (Column 8) is a summary index over the dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 (Columns 5 - 7). Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Panel A also controls for Democrat and Panel B for gender, in addition to the variables shown in the Table. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table D.8: Treatment effect on perceived fairness of women's wages

	Perceived fairness of women's wages			Perceived fairness of own wage	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
T^{74}	-0.304***	-0.201***	-0.284***	-0.056	-0.053
	(0.034)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.050)
T^{74} x female		-0.205***			-0.007
		(0.069)			(0.071)
p-value $[T^{74} + T^{74}$ x female]		0.000			0.233
T^{74} x Democrat			-0.046		
			(0.069)		
p-value $[T^{74} + T^{74}$ x Democrat]			0.000		
Female	-0.342***	-0.239***	-0.342***	-0.221***	-0.217***
	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.050)
Democrat	-0.435***	-0.433***	-0.412***	-0.156***	-0.156***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Observations	3031	3031	3031	2946	2946

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. In columns 4 and 5 the sample is restricted to individuals who are working or have ever worked. The outcome variables are based on subjective fairness ratings of women's wages (one's personal wage), elicited on a 5-point scale and z-scored based on the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Additional controls: survey wave, census region, age group, parenthood, log of total household income, at least a two-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table D.9: Treatment effect on beliefs about the effectiveness of policies

	Effectiveness of anti-disc. policy	Effectiveness of affirmative action	Effectiveness of work-family policy	Trust in government
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
T^{74}	0.022	0.052	-0.014	0.019
	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.072)
Sharpened q-value	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]	[1.000]
Female	0.105	0.040	0.031	-0.179**
	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.073)
Democrat	0.245***	0.217***	0.213***	-0.072
	(0.076)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.086)
Observations	1019	1019	1019	1019

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, wave B. All dependent variables are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Sharpened q-values are based on FDR-adjustment.

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Table D.10: Future plans to work: No treatment effect

	Future plans to work					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
T^{74}	-0.038	-0.042	-0.065	0.000	-0.045	-0.059
	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.076)	(0.057)
T^{74} x male	-0.014	-0.022	0.015	-0.063	-0.039	0.023
	(0.050)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.077)	(0.097)	(0.086)
p-value $[T^{74} + T^{74}$ x male]	0.140	0.195	0.326	0.237	0.174	0.580
Female	-0.038	-0.066	0.003	-0.042	-0.035	-0.033
	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.064)
Observations	3031	1446	1482	1301	1301	1730
Sample	All	unmarried	married	below 35	35-55	older than 55

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. The outcome variable is self-reported future plans to work, taking on three values: out of the labor force, part-time working and full-time working. It is standardized based on the pure control group, higher values stand for a higher chance to work (full-time). Additional controls: gender, Democrat, Republican, Independent, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed and unemployed, student, prior belief. Democrats (Republicans) include Independents leaning Democrat (Republican). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

D.5 Additional evidence from the follow-up survey

Table D.11: Follow-up survey: No treatment effect on placebo outcomes

	Wage differences btw high- and low-skilled are a prob.	Low skilled workers's wages are fair	Government should support low-skilled workers more
	(1)	(2)	(3)
T^{74}	-0.031	-0.045	0.042
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.057)
Female	0.199***	-0.062	0.066
	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.059)
Democrat	0.411***	-0.360***	0.597***
	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.066)
Observations	1105	1105	1105

Notes: Data base: Follow-up sample (treatment groups only), both waves. Outcomes are based on ratings of agreement with three statements on wage differences between high- and low-skilled employees. They are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation of the full follow-up sample. Additional controls: survey wave, census region, age group, parenthood, log of total household income, at least a two-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table D.12: Follow-up survey: No role for attrition

	Posterior belief	GWG is a problem	Women's wages are fair	Demand for gvmt. intervention	Demand for affirm. action	Demand for equal pay legislation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)

Panel A: Main results

T^{74}	-12.955***	0.425***	-0.306***	0.245***	0.112***	0.115***
	(0.594)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Female	-1.623***	0.301***	-0.345***	0.311***	0.179***	0.237***
	(0.615)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Democrat	0.048	0.664***	-0.440***	0.810***	0.665***	0.618***
	(0.705)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Observations	3022	3031	3031	3031	3031	3031

Panel B: Main results (follow-up sample)

T^{74}	-13.044***	0.415***	-0.350***	0.234***	0.157***	0.098
	(1.085)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.060)
Female	-1.934*	0.223***	-0.208***	0.278***	0.174***	0.243***
	(1.107)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.061)
Democrat	0.447	0.710***	-0.481***	0.820***	0.741***	0.626***
	(1.239)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Observations	1102	1105	1105	1105	606	606

Panel C: Follow-up results

T^{74}	-10.668***	0.186***	-0.122**	0.183***	0.009	0.096
	(1.177)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Female	-2.292*	0.272***	-0.155***	0.174***	0.150*	0.197**
	(1.248)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.080)	(0.083)
Democrat	0.554	0.547***	-0.459***	0.686***	0.583***	0.642***
	(1.319)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Observations	1089	1105	1105	1105	606	606

Notes: This table shows that there is no systematic selection into the follow-up survey based on the treatment response in the main survey. The sample in Panel A is based on the main survey, treatment groups, both waves. Panel B shows results from the main survey, but the sample is restricted to those who participated in the follow-up. Panel C the results from the follow-up survey based on the follow-up sample. Outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group in Panels A and B and using the mean and standard deviation of the full follow-up sample in Panel C. Additional controls: survey wave, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, student, self-employed and unemployed, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Missing observations in Column 1 are due to a bug in the survey software that inhibited the recording of the beliefs in a few cases. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

D.6 Additional results on beliefs and their origins

Table D.13: Incentivized vs. unincentivized beliefs about the GWG

	Outcome variable: Prior belief about gender wage gap					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Incentive	-0.384	1.596*	-0.505	1.853*	1.612*	1.891*
	(0.689)	(0.908)	(1.010)	(1.111)	(0.912)	(1.114)
Incentive x male		-3.974***		-5.107***	-3.866***	-4.977***
		(1.357)		(1.660)	(1.365)	(1.665)
Incentive x Republican			0.478	-0.762		-0.912
			(1.549)	(1.902)		(1.914)
Inc. x male x Republican				3.034		3.062
				(2.868)		(2.889)
Male	6.615***	8.847***	5.510***	9.487***	9.279***	9.907***
	(0.815)	(1.142)	(0.981)	(1.281)	(1.196)	(1.344)
Republican	2.398**	2.376**	4.468***	2.801*	2.334**	
	(1.183)	(1.181)	(1.328)	(1.559)	(1.181)	
Male x Republican	-1.660	-1.659	-0.548	-3.383	-1.665	-3.135
	(1.431)	(1.431)	(1.547)	(2.153)	(1.431)	(2.344)
Constant	69.507***	68.358***	67.309***	68.197***	68.726***	70.742***
	(5.379)	(5.396)	(6.197)	(5.422)	(5.412)	(5.516)
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for response time x gender	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Control for resp. time x (Repub. and gender x Repub.)	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	4065	4065	4065	4065	4065	4065

Notes: Data base: Full sample, both waves. The dependent variable is the prior belief about females' relative wages, ranging between 0 and 200 (mean=83,5; median=81). Baseline controls are survey wave, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, student, self-employed and unemployed, Independent and "other" political orientation. Republicans include Independents leaning Republican. The additional control for response time in Columns 5 and 6 is based on the time, in seconds, the respondent spent on the prior belief elicitation during the survey (5th percentile corresponds to 18 seconds, 95th percentile corresponds to 3 minutes, the maximum is 46 minutes). In Column 5, this measure is interacted with the male-dummy, in Column 6 with the male-dummy, the Republican-dummy, and the interaction of the male and the Republican dummy. The results are robust to using a winzorized measure (top 5%) of response time. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Incentivized and non-incentivized prior beliefs

Figure A.15: Incentivized vs. non-incentivized prior beliefs by gender x political affiliation
Notes: Data base: All observations with political orientation Democrat or Republican (including Independents leaning Democrat or Republican) (N=3,258), i.e. Independents and those with "other" political orientation are excluded. Beliefs take on values between 0 and 200. Whiskers show the 95% confidence interval calculated from a regression of the outcome on an indicator for incentivized beliefs using robust standard errors and controlling for survey wave, census region, age group, parental status, log of household income, associate degree or more, student, full-time, part-time, self-, and unemployed.

Table D.14: Propensity to acquire additional information in response to the treatment

	Willingness to pay for progressive info				Willingness to pay for traditional info		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)	(6)
T^{94}	0.001	-0.051	-0.016	T^{74}	-0.088**	-0.116**	-0.119***
	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.048)		(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.043)
T^{94} x female		0.103		T^{74} x male		0.055	
		(0.071)				(0.071)	
T^{94} x Democrat			0.038	T^{74} x Republican			0.083
			(0.071)				(0.076)
Female	0.034	-0.018	0.034	Male	0.217***	0.189***	0.216***
	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.037)		(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.037)
Democrat	0.319***	0.317***	0.300***	Republican	0.212***	0.210***	0.170***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.062)		(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.065)
Observations	3031	3031	3031	Observations	3031	3031	3031

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. Columns 1 - 3 test whether Democrats' (women's) willingness to pay for information from a "progressive" source increases when exposed to T^{94} more than that of Republicans (men). Similarly, Columns 4 - 6 test whether Republicans' (men's) willingness to pay for information from a "traditional" institution increases when exposed to T^{74} more than that of Democrats (women). The dependent variables correspond to the number of times the respondent chose information over a monetary bonus, ranging from 0 to 3 and z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Additional controls are: census region, wave, prior belief, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

E Compliance with the pre-analysis-plan

E.1 Description of minor deviations from the pre-analysis-plan

- **Additional data collection:** In the pre-analysis-plan (PAP) as of 31st of August 2018 I had pre-specified a follow-up response rate of at least 50%. Due to internal problems at the survey company I collaborated with, only 25% were achieved. The survey company offered to collect a second wave of data through a partner company in compensation, which I accepted. In an addendum to the PAP as of 21st of November 2018 I set out the details. The results replicate remarkably well. **Tables E.1 and E.2** show the main treatment effect on general perceptions and self-reported policy demand separately by wave. **Tables E.4 and E.5** show the numbers of signatures on real online petitions and **Table E.3** replicates the main results based on the follow-up survey by wave. Further results by wave are available on request.

- **Oversampling of women, adjustment through probability weights:** In wave B, the age group 18-24 was accidentally filled by female respondents to a large degree. Sticking to the pre-specified quotas would have implied a gender imbalance across age groups. I decided to allow for a minor increase in the sample size to boost the number of young males. The youngest age group in wave B consists of 181 women and 78 men, and I use probability weights of 0.6298 and 1.4615, respectively, to account for the fact that 114 observations per gender were pre-specified. A similar but smaller imbalance occurred in the age group 55-65, resulting in a final 191 female and 163 male observations and probability weights of 0.8691 and 1.0184, respectively.

- **Outliers excluded from correlational analysis:** I exclude individuals with prior beliefs below the 5th and above the 95th percentile of the distribution from the correlational analysis in Section 3 of the paper. The cutoffs correspond to a relative wage of female employees of 50 and 116 percent of male wages, respectively. **Tables E.6, E.7 and E.8** replicate the correlational analysis based on the pre-specified full sample. Bin scatter plots in Figure A.16 illustrate how outliers lead to considerable attenuation, given the sensitivity of OLS to outliers.

- **Heterogeneity by political orientation:** In had pre-specified to report heterogeneity in the treatment effect by comparing Democrats to Non-Democrats. It turned out that the treatment response of Independents is quite different from that of Republicans, making Non-Democrats a heterogeneous group. In the paper I therefore use a more differentiated specification, based on Republicans as the baseline group, and report separate differential effects for Democrats and Independents, dropping those with "other" political orientation from the sample. The pre-specified, more aggregated regression results are available upon request.

E.2 Main results separately for wave A and wave B

Table E.1: Treatment effect on views related to the GWG (by wave)

	Gender diff. in wages are large	Gender diff. in wages are a problem	Government should promote gender wage equality	Perception Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Both waves				
T^{74}	0.597***	0.422***	0.243***	0.417***
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.032)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	
Democrat	0.525***	0.656***	0.803***	0.665***
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Female	0.235***	0.297***	0.309***	0.277***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Observations	3031	3031	3031	3031
Panel B: Wave A				
T^{74}	0.585***	0.383***	0.228***	0.399***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.039)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	
Democrat	0.506***	0.660***	0.814***	0.663***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.045)
Female	0.213***	0.316***	0.319***	0.276***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.040)
Observations	2012	2012	2012	2012
Panel C: Wave B				
T^{74}	0.628***	0.504***	0.280***	0.460***
	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.057)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	
Democrat	0.540***	0.630***	0.754***	0.646***
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.064)
Female	0.280***	0.266***	0.299***	0.286***
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.057)
Observations	1019	1019	1019	1019

Notes: Data base: treatment groups. Panel A pools the two waves, Panel B is restricted to wave A and Panel C to wave B. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 4 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1 - 3. T^{74} is a dummy that takes on value one for those who received the high wage gap-treatment and zero otherwise. Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, survey wave, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Sharpened q-values in Columns 1 - 3 are based on FDR-adjustment.

Table E.2: Treatment effect on demand for specific policies (by wave)

	Introduce gender quotas	Statutory affirmative action	Stricter equal pay legislation	Wage transparency within companies	Introduce reporting website	Increase public subsidies to child care	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Both waves							
T^{74}	0.056	0.112***	0.115***	-0.015	0.098	0.003	0.056**
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.063)	(0.035)	(0.025)
Sharpened q-value	[0.133]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.413]	[0.085]	[0.455]	
Female	0.254***	0.179***	0.237***	0.197***	0.310***	0.112***	0.203***
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.036)	(0.026)
Democrat	0.559***	0.669***	0.618***	0.565***	0.596***	0.578***	0.594***
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.074)	(0.040)	(0.029)
Observations	3031	3031	3031	2012	1019	3031	3031
Panel B: Wave A							
T^{74}	0.044	0.129***	0.098**	-0.015		0.011	0.046
	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)		(0.042)	(0.030)
Sharpened q-value	[0.440]	[0.008]	[0.038]	[0.926]		[0.926]	
Female	0.251***	0.169***	0.224***	0.197***		0.120***	0.193***
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)		(0.045)	(0.031)
Democrat	0.556***	0.678***	0.644***	0.565***		0.580***	0.597***
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)		(0.048)	(0.035)
Observations	2012	2012	2012	2012		2012	2012
Panel C: Wave B							
T^{74}	0.076	0.071	0.156**		0.098	-0.018	0.075
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.064)		(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.046)
Sharpened q-value	[0.327]	[0.327]	[0.080]		[0.315]	[0.445]	
Female	0.266***	0.221***	0.285***		0.310***	0.098	0.235***
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.065)		(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.046)
Democrat	0.554***	0.640***	0.557***		0.596***	0.580***	0.581***
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.073)		(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.053)
Observations	1019	1019	1019		1019	1019	1019

Notes: Data base: treatment groups. Panel A pools the two waves, Panel B is restricted to wave A and Panel C to wave B. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 6 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 7 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1 - 6. T^{74} is a dummy that takes on the value one for those who received the high wage gap-treatment and zero otherwise. Additional controls: survey wave, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Sharpened q-values in Columns 1 - 6 are based on FDR-adjustment.

Table E.3: Persistence of first stage treatment effect after 2-4 weeks (by wave)

	Posterior	GWG is a problem	GWG is a prob. among high-skilled	GWG is a prob among low-skilled	Women's wages are fair	Demand for more gvmt. intervention	Demand for more anti-disc. policy	Demand for more Supportive policy	Demand for more AA	Demand for more equal pay legislation
Panel A: Wave A										
T^{74}	-10.121***	0.196**	0.144*	0.210**	-0.139**	0.282***	0.114	0.241***		
	(1.851)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.070)	(0.082)	(0.089)	(0.085)		
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.022]	[0.042]	[0.022]	[0.035]	[0.002]	[0.069]	[0.009]		
Female	-0.956	0.180**	0.075	0.063	0.066	0.191**	0.240***	0.178**		
	(1.972)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.073)	(0.085)	(0.090)	(0.088)		
Democrat	2.125	0.551***	0.482***	0.456***	-0.409***	0.693***	0.640***	0.753***		
	(2.102)	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.095)		
Observations	494	499	499	499	499	499	499	499		
Panel B: Wave B										
T^{74}	-11.178***	0.187**	0.114	0.113	-0.102	0.093	0.074	0.078	0.013	0.109
	(1.518)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.079]	[0.357]	[0.357]	[0.357]	[0.357]	[0.402]	[0.402]	[0.491]	[0.357]
Female	-3.183**	0.340***	0.291***	0.317***	-0.317***	0.184**	0.228***	0.206***	0.150*	0.193**
	(1.556)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.083)
Democrat	-0.397	0.554***	0.531***	0.367***	-0.524***	0.698***	0.739***	0.627***	0.586***	0.630***
	(1.709)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.098)	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.091)	(0.090)
Observations	595	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606

Notes: Data base: Follow-up sample (treatment groups). Panel A is restricted to wave A and Panel B to wave B. The dependent variable in Column 1 ranges between 0 and 200. The remaining outcomes in Columns 2 - 10 are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the full follow-up sample. T^{74} is a dummy that takes on the value one for those who received the high wage gap-treatment and zero otherwise. Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Sharpened q-values are based on FDR-adjustment for Panel A and B separately.

	Male	Female	p-value (diff)
Petition I	23/248	51/250	<0.001
Petition II	7/248	3/250	0.20
	Non-Democrat	Democrat	p-value (diff)
Petition I	24/268	50/230	<0.001
Petition II	8/268	2/230	0.09

(a) Wave a

	Male	Female	p-value (diff)
Petition I	35/242	50/294	0.42
Petition II	10/242	0/294	<0.001

(b) Wave b

Table E.4: Signatures on petitions by survey wave, control group

Notes: Data base: Count data on actual numbers of signatures in the control group. Table a) is based on wave A, Table b) is based on wave B. Both tables show the ratio between numbers of signatures and the number of respondents by petition and gender/self-reported political orientation. The column denoted "p-value (diff)" shows p-values from two-sided proportion tests comparing the shares of signatures between male and female (Non-Democrat and Democrat) respondents.

	T^{74}	T^{94}	p-value ($T^{74} = T^{94}$)	p-value ($T^{74} \lessgtr T^{94}$)
Overall				
Petition I	169/1005	159/1007	0.53	0.27
Petition II	13/1005	20/1007	0.22	0.11
Men				
Petition I	63/499	58/503	0.60	0.30
Petition II	8/499	11/503	0.50	0.25
Women				
Petition I	106/506	101/504	0.72	0.36
Petition II	5/506	9/504	0.28	0.14
Democrats				
Petition I	106/447	99/450	0.54	0.27
Petition II	3/447	2/450	0.65	0.68
Non-Democrats				
Petition I	63/558	60/557	0.78	0.39
Petition II	10/558	18/557	0.12	0.06

(a) Wave a

	T^{74}	T^{94}	p-value ($T^{74} = T^{94}$)	p-value ($T^{74} \lessgtr T^{94}$)
Overall				
Petition I	90/526	61/493	0.03	0.02
Petition II	6/526	15/493	0.03	0.02
Men				
Petition I	35/234	28/231	0.37	0.19
Petition II	5/234	8/231	0.39	0.19
Women				
Petition I	55/292	33/262	0.04	0.02
Petition II	1/292	7/262	0.02	0.01

(b) Wave b

Table E.5: Signatures on petitions by survey wave, treatment effect

Notes: Data base: Count data on actual numbers of signatures in the treatment groups. Table a) is based on wave A, Table b) is based on wave B. The columns denoted T^{74} (T^{94}) show the number of signatures divided by the number of respondents in the high wage gap (low wage gap)-treatment group. The upper block in each table, denoted "Overall", shows aggregate numbers of signatures, whereas subsequent blocks show disaggregated numbers by gender and by self-reported political orientation. The columns denoted "p-value ($T^{74}=T^{94}$)" reports p-values from two-sided proportion tests comparing the shares of signatures between the treatment group. The final column denoted "p-value ($T^{74} \lessgtr T^{94}$)" reports p-values from one-sided proportion tests with the alternative hypothesis corresponding to the expected result, i.e. $T^{74} > T^{94}$ for Petition I and $T^{94} > T^{74}$ for Petition II.

E.3 Correlational analysis including outliers

Table E.6: Correlates of views related to the GWG (including outliers)

	Gender diff. in wages are large	Gender diff. in wages are a problem	Government should promote gender wage equality	Perception Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Priors only				
Prior (z-scored)	-0.166***	-0.188***	-0.117***	-0.150***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Observations	1034	1034	1034	1034
Panel B: Additional controls				
Prior (z-scored)	-0.137***	-0.154***	-0.082**	-0.117***
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Female	0.162***	0.233***	0.175***	0.181***
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.053)
Democrat	0.532***	0.618***	0.729***	0.630***
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.061)
Independent	1034	1034	1034	1034

Notes: Data base: Pure control group, both waves. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 4 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1 - 3. The variable "prior" is z-scored as well, based on the full distribution of prior beliefs. Both panels include a dummy for wave B of data collection. Additional controls in Panel B: census region, age group, parental status, log of total household income, two-year college degree or more, full-time employee, part-time employee, self-employed, unemployed, student, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table E.7: Correlates of specific policy demand (including outliers)

	Introduce gender quotas	Statutory affirmative action	Stricter equal pay legislation	Wage transparency within companies	Introduce reporting website	Increase public subsidies to child care	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Priors only							
Prior (z-scored)	-0.061*	-0.105***	-0.055	-0.186***	-0.096*	-0.049	-0.080***
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.029)
Observations	1034	1034	1034	498	536	1034	1034
Panel B: Prior, gender, pol. orient.							
Prior (z-scored)	-0.024	-0.070*	-0.018	-0.134***	-0.068	-0.015	-0.044*
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.035)	(0.026)
Female	0.238***	0.165***	0.304***	0.392***	0.404***	0.241***	0.277***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.060)	(0.041)
Democrat	0.675***	0.708***	0.641***	0.616***	0.525***	0.619***	0.638***
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.069)	(0.048)
Observations	1034	1034	1034	498	536	1034	1034

Notes: Data base: Pure control group, both waves. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 6 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 7 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1 - 6. The variable "prior" is z-scored as well, based on the full distribution of prior beliefs. Both panels include a dummy for wave B of data collection. Additional controls in Panel B: census region, age group, parental status, log of total household income, two-year college degree or more, full-time employee, part-time employee, self-employed, unemployed, student, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Table E.8: Correlates of beliefs about underlying reasons (including outliers)

	Impersonal Factors				Personal Factors			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Discrimination	Socialization	Work-Family	Index	Ambitions	Talents	Preferences	Index
Panel A: Priors only								
Prior (z-scored)	-0.182***	-0.087*	-0.010	-0.093**	0.144***	0.144***	0.148***	0.146***
	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.046)
Observations	498	498	498	498	498	498	498	498
Panel B: Prior, gender, pol. orient.								
Prior (z-scored)	-0.129***	-0.050	0.003	-0.059	0.108**	0.102*	0.108**	0.106**
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.048)
Female	0.195**	0.275***	0.099	0.185***	-0.482***	-0.471***	-0.403***	-0.447***
	(0.083)	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.060)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.071)
Democrat	0.709***	0.413***	0.149	0.423***	-0.232**	-0.339***	-0.375***	-0.319***
	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.070)	(0.099)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.084)
Observations	498	498	498	498	498	498	498	498

Notes: Data base: Pure control group, wave A. The dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 and 5 - 7 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 4 (Column 8) is a summary index over the dependent variables in Columns 1 - 3 (Columns 5 - 7). The variable "prior" is z-scored as well, based on the mean and standard deviation in the full sample. Both panels include a dummy for wave B of data collection. Additional controls in Panel B: census region, age group, parental status, log of total household income, two-year college degree or more, full-time employee, part-time employee, self-employed, unemployed, student, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.

Figure A.16: Non-linearity in correlation between beliefs about the GWG and outcomes

Notes: Data base: Control group, both waves. The graph shows bin scatter plots on the correlation between prior beliefs about the GWG and the main outcome variables of interest. The dependent variables in the top row are people's perception of whether the GWG is large, whether it is a problem and their unspecific demand for government intervention. In the remaining two rows, the dependent variables are the six measures of demand for specific policy intervention. Each scatter plot contains a linear fit which allows for a discontinuity at the 5th and the 95th percentile of the prior belief distribution.

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