The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Standard

The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples. / Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen; Kreiner, Claus Thustrup; Saez, Emmanuel.

I: Econometrica, Bind 77, Nr. 2, 2009, s. 537-560.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Kleven, HJ, Kreiner, CT & Saez, E 2009, 'The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples', Econometrica, bind 77, nr. 2, s. 537-560. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA7343

APA

Kleven, H. J., Kreiner, C. T., & Saez, E. (2009). The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples. Econometrica, 77(2), 537-560. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA7343

Vancouver

Kleven HJ, Kreiner CT, Saez E. The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples. Econometrica. 2009;77(2):537-560. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA7343

Author

Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen ; Kreiner, Claus Thustrup ; Saez, Emmanuel. / The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples. I: Econometrica. 2009 ; Bind 77, Nr. 2. s. 537-560.

Bibtex

@article{bab1e3e00d8711de8478000ea68e967b,
title = "The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples",
abstract = "This paper analyzes the general nonlinear optimal income tax for couples, a multidimensional screening problem. Each couple consists of a primary earner who always participates in the labor market, but makes an hours-of-work choice, and a secondary earner who chooses whether or not to work. If second-earner participation is a signal of the couple being better (worse) off, we prove that optimal tax schemes display a positive tax (subsidy) on secondary earnings and that the tax (subsidy) on secondary earnings decreases with primary earnings and converges to zero asymptotically. We present calibrated microsimulations for the United Kingdom showing that decreasing tax rates on secondary earnings is quantitatively significant and consistent with actual income tax and transfer programs.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, multidimensional screening",
author = "Kleven, {Henrik Jacobsen} and Kreiner, {Claus Thustrup} and Emmanuel Saez",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.3982/ECTA7343",
language = "English",
volume = "77",
pages = "537--560",
journal = "Econometrica",
issn = "0012-9682",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples

AU - Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen

AU - Kreiner, Claus Thustrup

AU - Saez, Emmanuel

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - This paper analyzes the general nonlinear optimal income tax for couples, a multidimensional screening problem. Each couple consists of a primary earner who always participates in the labor market, but makes an hours-of-work choice, and a secondary earner who chooses whether or not to work. If second-earner participation is a signal of the couple being better (worse) off, we prove that optimal tax schemes display a positive tax (subsidy) on secondary earnings and that the tax (subsidy) on secondary earnings decreases with primary earnings and converges to zero asymptotically. We present calibrated microsimulations for the United Kingdom showing that decreasing tax rates on secondary earnings is quantitatively significant and consistent with actual income tax and transfer programs.

AB - This paper analyzes the general nonlinear optimal income tax for couples, a multidimensional screening problem. Each couple consists of a primary earner who always participates in the labor market, but makes an hours-of-work choice, and a secondary earner who chooses whether or not to work. If second-earner participation is a signal of the couple being better (worse) off, we prove that optimal tax schemes display a positive tax (subsidy) on secondary earnings and that the tax (subsidy) on secondary earnings decreases with primary earnings and converges to zero asymptotically. We present calibrated microsimulations for the United Kingdom showing that decreasing tax rates on secondary earnings is quantitatively significant and consistent with actual income tax and transfer programs.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - multidimensional screening

U2 - 10.3982/ECTA7343

DO - 10.3982/ECTA7343

M3 - Journal article

VL - 77

SP - 537

EP - 560

JO - Econometrica

JF - Econometrica

SN - 0012-9682

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 11201244