The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information. / Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen; Jensen, Mogens; Sloth, Birgitte.

Barcelona : Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2000.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Whitta-Jacobsen, HJ, Jensen, M & Sloth, B 2000 'The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information' Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. <http://www.econ.upf.es/en/research/onepaper.php?id=475>

APA

Whitta-Jacobsen, H. J., Jensen, M., & Sloth, B. (2000). The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information. Universitat Pompeu Fabra. http://www.econ.upf.es/en/research/onepaper.php?id=475

Vancouver

Whitta-Jacobsen HJ, Jensen M, Sloth B. The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information. Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra. 2000.

Author

Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen ; Jensen, Mogens ; Sloth, Birgitte. / The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information. Barcelona : Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2000.

Bibtex

@techreport{6b8b5d8074c011dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information",
abstract = "We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit of Young (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi- strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest we characterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incomplete information of Nash's demand game, or a simple version of the so-called sealed bid double auction. For both games selection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesian equilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient",
author = "Whitta-Jacobsen, {Hans J{\o}rgen} and Mogens Jensen and Birgitte Sloth",
note = "JEL Classification: C72",
year = "2000",
language = "English",
publisher = "Universitat Pompeu Fabra",
address = "Spain",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Universitat Pompeu Fabra",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information

AU - Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen

AU - Jensen, Mogens

AU - Sloth, Birgitte

N1 - JEL Classification: C72

PY - 2000

Y1 - 2000

N2 - We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit of Young (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi- strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest we characterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incomplete information of Nash's demand game, or a simple version of the so-called sealed bid double auction. For both games selection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesian equilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient

AB - We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit of Young (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi- strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest we characterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incomplete information of Nash's demand game, or a simple version of the so-called sealed bid double auction. For both games selection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesian equilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient

M3 - Working paper

BT - The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information

PB - Universitat Pompeu Fabra

CY - Barcelona

ER -

ID: 45369