Standard
Stochastic Learning and the Intuitive Criterion in Simple Signaling Games. / Sloth, Birgitte; Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen.
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1996.
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
Harvard
Sloth, B & Whitta-Jacobsen, HJ 1996 'Stochastic Learning and the Intuitive Criterion in Simple Signaling Games' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
APA
Sloth, B., & Whitta-Jacobsen, H. J. (1996). Stochastic Learning and the Intuitive Criterion in Simple Signaling Games. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
Vancouver
Sloth B, Whitta-Jacobsen HJ. Stochastic Learning and the Intuitive Criterion in Simple Signaling Games. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 1996.
Author
Sloth, Birgitte ; Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen. / Stochastic Learning and the Intuitive Criterion in Simple Signaling Games. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1996.
Bibtex
@techreport{8440d430e93211dcbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Stochastic Learning and the Intuitive Criterion in Simple Signaling Games",
abstract = "A stochastic learning process for signaling games with two types, two signals, and two responses gives rise to equilibrium selection which is in remarkable accordance with the selection obtained by the intuitive criterion",
author = "Birgitte Sloth and Whitta-Jacobsen, {Hans J{\o}rgen}",
year = "1996",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
T1 - Stochastic Learning and the Intuitive Criterion in Simple Signaling Games
AU - Sloth, Birgitte
AU - Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen
PY - 1996
Y1 - 1996
N2 - A stochastic learning process for signaling games with two types, two signals, and two responses gives rise to equilibrium selection which is in remarkable accordance with the selection obtained by the intuitive criterion
AB - A stochastic learning process for signaling games with two types, two signals, and two responses gives rise to equilibrium selection which is in remarkable accordance with the selection obtained by the intuitive criterion
M3 - Working paper
BT - Stochastic Learning and the Intuitive Criterion in Simple Signaling Games
PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
ER -
