Political ownership

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Political ownership. / Bennedsen, Morten.

I: Journal of Public Economics, Bind 76, Nr. 3, 01.01.2000, s. 559-581.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Bennedsen, M 2000, 'Political ownership', Journal of Public Economics, bind 76, nr. 3, s. 559-581. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00096-1

APA

Bennedsen, M. (2000). Political ownership. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 559-581. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00096-1

Vancouver

Bennedsen M. Political ownership. Journal of Public Economics. 2000 jan. 1;76(3):559-581. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00096-1

Author

Bennedsen, Morten. / Political ownership. I: Journal of Public Economics. 2000 ; Bind 76, Nr. 3. s. 559-581.

Bibtex

@article{4841421b40174d98a2ef3141f1fed63c,
title = "Political ownership",
abstract = "Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized insiders and the disorganized taxpayers. I investigate how insiders' lobby activities distort resource allocation in a state owned enterprise. Then I show that efficiency in labour allocation is improved when cash flow is transferred to private owners. Finally, I analyze how transferring control rights affects efficiency in resource allocation when there are restrictions on side payments between the interest groups.",
keywords = "D21, D23, D78, H11, Influence externality, L33, Ownership structure, Resource allocation, Side payments",
author = "Morten Bennedsen",
year = "2000",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00096-1",
language = "English",
volume = "76",
pages = "559--581",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Political ownership

AU - Bennedsen, Morten

PY - 2000/1/1

Y1 - 2000/1/1

N2 - Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized insiders and the disorganized taxpayers. I investigate how insiders' lobby activities distort resource allocation in a state owned enterprise. Then I show that efficiency in labour allocation is improved when cash flow is transferred to private owners. Finally, I analyze how transferring control rights affects efficiency in resource allocation when there are restrictions on side payments between the interest groups.

AB - Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized insiders and the disorganized taxpayers. I investigate how insiders' lobby activities distort resource allocation in a state owned enterprise. Then I show that efficiency in labour allocation is improved when cash flow is transferred to private owners. Finally, I analyze how transferring control rights affects efficiency in resource allocation when there are restrictions on side payments between the interest groups.

KW - D21

KW - D23

KW - D78

KW - H11

KW - Influence externality

KW - L33

KW - Ownership structure

KW - Resource allocation

KW - Side payments

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0038170423&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00096-1

DO - 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00096-1

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:0038170423

VL - 76

SP - 559

EP - 581

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 215134511