Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Standard

Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation. / Bennedsen, Morten; Huang, Sterling; Wagner, Hannes F.; Zeume, Stefan.

I: The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Bind 8, Nr. 2, 21.06.2019, s. 348-379.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Bennedsen, M, Huang, S, Wagner, HF & Zeume, S 2019, 'Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation', The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, bind 8, nr. 2, s. 348-379. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfz005

APA

Bennedsen, M., Huang, S., Wagner, H. F., & Zeume, S. (2019). Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 8(2), 348-379. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfz005

Vancouver

Bennedsen M, Huang S, Wagner HF, Zeume S. Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation. The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 2019 jun. 21;8(2):348-379. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfz005

Author

Bennedsen, Morten ; Huang, Sterling ; Wagner, Hannes F. ; Zeume, Stefan. / Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation. I: The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 2019 ; Bind 8, Nr. 2. s. 348-379.

Bibtex

@article{12032684b81e47369b1e326cc24640ac,
title = "Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation",
abstract = "In a panel across twenty-eight countries over 10 years, we show that family firms on average enjoy performance advantages over nonfamily firms only when labor markets are less regulated. We confirm this result in a matched firm sample using a survey-based instrument as a family control. Furthermore, family firms exhibit lower variation in employment levels in less-regulated labor markets, supporting the notion that labor relations drive family firms' performance advantages. Our results are consistent with the notion that both family ownership and labor market reforms provide employment protection and thus partly substitute as governance mechanisms.",
author = "Morten Bennedsen and Sterling Huang and Wagner, {Hannes F.} and Stefan Zeume",
year = "2019",
month = jun,
day = "21",
doi = "10.1093/rcfs/cfz005",
language = "English",
volume = "8",
pages = "348--379",
journal = "Review of Corporate Finance Studies",
issn = "2046-9128",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation

AU - Bennedsen, Morten

AU - Huang, Sterling

AU - Wagner, Hannes F.

AU - Zeume, Stefan

PY - 2019/6/21

Y1 - 2019/6/21

N2 - In a panel across twenty-eight countries over 10 years, we show that family firms on average enjoy performance advantages over nonfamily firms only when labor markets are less regulated. We confirm this result in a matched firm sample using a survey-based instrument as a family control. Furthermore, family firms exhibit lower variation in employment levels in less-regulated labor markets, supporting the notion that labor relations drive family firms' performance advantages. Our results are consistent with the notion that both family ownership and labor market reforms provide employment protection and thus partly substitute as governance mechanisms.

AB - In a panel across twenty-eight countries over 10 years, we show that family firms on average enjoy performance advantages over nonfamily firms only when labor markets are less regulated. We confirm this result in a matched firm sample using a survey-based instrument as a family control. Furthermore, family firms exhibit lower variation in employment levels in less-regulated labor markets, supporting the notion that labor relations drive family firms' performance advantages. Our results are consistent with the notion that both family ownership and labor market reforms provide employment protection and thus partly substitute as governance mechanisms.

U2 - 10.1093/rcfs/cfz005

DO - 10.1093/rcfs/cfz005

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85071494787

VL - 8

SP - 348

EP - 379

JO - Review of Corporate Finance Studies

JF - Review of Corporate Finance Studies

SN - 2046-9128

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 241594463