Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
We define an evolutionary process of “economic Darwinism” for playing the field, symmetric games. The process captures two forces. One is “economic selection”: if current behavior leads to payoff differences, behavior yielding lowest payoff has strictly positive probability of being replaced by an arbitrary behavior. The other is “mutation”: any behavior has at any point in time a strictly positive, very small probability of shifting to an arbitrary behavior. We show that behavior observed frequently is in accordance with “evolutionary equilibrium”, a static equilibrium concept suggested in the literature. Using this result, we demonstrate that generally under positive (negative) externalities, economic Darwinism implies even more under- (over-)activity than does Nash equilibrium.
|Tidsskrift||Theory and Decision|
|Status||Udgivet - apr. 2011|
- Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet - evolutionary game theory, Darwinian evolution, economic selection, mutation, evolutionary equilibrium, stochastic stability