Economic Darwinism

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Standard

Economic Darwinism. / Sloth, Birgitte; Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen.

I: Theory and Decision, Bind 70, Nr. 3, 04.2011, s. 385-398.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Sloth, B & Whitta-Jacobsen, HJ 2011, 'Economic Darwinism', Theory and Decision, bind 70, nr. 3, s. 385-398. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9165-z

APA

Sloth, B., & Whitta-Jacobsen, H. J. (2011). Economic Darwinism. Theory and Decision, 70(3), 385-398. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9165-z

Vancouver

Sloth B, Whitta-Jacobsen HJ. Economic Darwinism. Theory and Decision. 2011 apr.;70(3):385-398. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9165-z

Author

Sloth, Birgitte ; Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen. / Economic Darwinism. I: Theory and Decision. 2011 ; Bind 70, Nr. 3. s. 385-398.

Bibtex

@article{2184255009a011df825d000ea68e967b,
title = "Economic Darwinism",
abstract = "We define an evolutionary process of {"}economic Darwinism{"} for playing the field, symmetric games. The process captures two forces. One is {"}economic selection{"}: if current behavior leads to payoff differences, behavior yielding lowest payoff has strictly positive probability of being replaced by an arbitrary behavior. The other is {"}mutation{"}: any behavior has at any point in time a strictly positive, very small probability of shifting to an arbitrary behavior. We show that behavior observed frequently is in accordance with {"}evolutionary equilibrium{"}, a static equilibrium concept suggested in the literature. Using this result, we demonstrate that generally under positive (negative) externalities, economic Darwinism implies even more under- (over-)activity than does Nash equilibrium.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, evolutionary game theory, Darwinian evolution, economic selection, mutation, evolutionary equilibrium, stochastic stability ",
author = "Birgitte Sloth and Whitta-Jacobsen, {Hans J{\o}rgen}",
year = "2011",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1007/s11238-009-9165-z",
language = "English",
volume = "70",
pages = "385--398",
journal = "Theory and Decision",
issn = "0040-5833",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Economic Darwinism

AU - Sloth, Birgitte

AU - Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen

PY - 2011/4

Y1 - 2011/4

N2 - We define an evolutionary process of "economic Darwinism" for playing the field, symmetric games. The process captures two forces. One is "economic selection": if current behavior leads to payoff differences, behavior yielding lowest payoff has strictly positive probability of being replaced by an arbitrary behavior. The other is "mutation": any behavior has at any point in time a strictly positive, very small probability of shifting to an arbitrary behavior. We show that behavior observed frequently is in accordance with "evolutionary equilibrium", a static equilibrium concept suggested in the literature. Using this result, we demonstrate that generally under positive (negative) externalities, economic Darwinism implies even more under- (over-)activity than does Nash equilibrium.

AB - We define an evolutionary process of "economic Darwinism" for playing the field, symmetric games. The process captures two forces. One is "economic selection": if current behavior leads to payoff differences, behavior yielding lowest payoff has strictly positive probability of being replaced by an arbitrary behavior. The other is "mutation": any behavior has at any point in time a strictly positive, very small probability of shifting to an arbitrary behavior. We show that behavior observed frequently is in accordance with "evolutionary equilibrium", a static equilibrium concept suggested in the literature. Using this result, we demonstrate that generally under positive (negative) externalities, economic Darwinism implies even more under- (over-)activity than does Nash equilibrium.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - evolutionary game theory

KW - Darwinian evolution

KW - economic selection

KW - mutation

KW - evolutionary equilibrium

KW - stochastic stability

U2 - 10.1007/s11238-009-9165-z

DO - 10.1007/s11238-009-9165-z

M3 - Journal article

VL - 70

SP - 385

EP - 398

JO - Theory and Decision

JF - Theory and Decision

SN - 0040-5833

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 17214741