Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

This paper addresses price transparency on the consumer side in markets with behavioral price
discrimination which feature welfare reducing brand switching. When long-term contracts are not
available, an increase in transparency intensifies competition, lowers prices and profits, reduces brand
switching and benefits consumers and welfare. With long-term contracts, an increase in transparency
reduces the use of long-term contracts, leading to more brand switching and a welfare loss. Otherwise,
the results are the same as without long-term contracts.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEconomics Letters
Vol/bind123
Sider (fra-til)266-269
Antal sider4
ISSN0165-1765
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2014

ID: 125163673