Frédéric Koessler, Paris School of Economics – Københavns Universitet

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Frédéric Koessler, Paris School of Economics

"Competitive Information Design"


We study games between n information designers, each of whom can perform a statistical experiment about a piece of information, the pieces being independent. They aim at persuading a decision-maker to take  their most favorable (possible state-dependent) action. For such games with discontinuous payoffs, we show that there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium with either an infinite number of messages or randomization over finite statistical experiments. We  characterize the equilibrium distributions of actions for rectangular games in which the optimization problem  of the decision-maker is separable across designers. Rectangular games have a sub-game perfect equilibrium in pure strategies with a finite number of messages.

Contact person: Jesper Rüdiger