Copenhagen Workshop on
Endogenous Institutions in Social Dilemmas

Venue:
Room 35.3.13, Building 35 (third floor), CSS, Øster Farimagsgade 5, 1353 Copenhagen K

Program:

June 27th
8.30-9.00  Registration and welcome

9.00-10.00  Keynote 1
Arno Riedl: Neighborhood Choice in Coordination and Cooperation Games

10.00-10.30  Coffee break

10.30-12.00  Session 2: Delegation
Luca Corazzini: Endogenous Delegation and Coordination with Multiple Public Goods
Björn Vollan: Democratic Chiefs and Nepotistic Democrats: Evidence from Rural Namibia
Ernesto Reuben: Policy Capture by Special Interests in Democracies: The Role of Revolving Doors and Post-Office Employment

12.00-13.30  Lunch

13.30-15.00  Session 3: Choice of Institutions
Ramon Cobo-Reyes: The Effect of Endogenous Group Formation on Sanctioning Institutions: Experimental Evidence
Tony Williams: Creating an Efficient Culture of Cooperation
Özgür Güerk: Culture and Prevalence of Sanctioning Institutions
15.00-15.30 Coffee break

15.30-17.00 Session 4: Information and accountability
Christian Thöni: Information sensitive Leviathans
Andreas Nicklisch: Self-governance in Noisy Social Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence on Punishment with Costly Monitoring
Ingrid Hoem Sjursen: Accountability and taxation: Experimental evidence

June 28th

9.00-10.00 Keynote 2
Louis Putterman: Collective Action and Democracy: Substitutes or Complements?

10.00-10.30 Coffee break

10.30-12.00 Session 6: Group Decision Making and Social Capital
Melis Kartal: Subjective beliefs and information (mis)aggregation
Martin Benedikt Busch: Measuring Social Capital in the Lab

12.00-13.00 Lunch

13.00-14.30 Session 7: Dividends of Democracy
Axel Sonntag: Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy
Kenju Kamei: Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma: Experimental Evidence
Mikhail Ananyev: Endogenous Leadership in an Asymmetric Public Goods Game.

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