

SUPPLEMENTARY ONLINE MATERIALS

This document provides supplementary online materials for the paper “Microfoundations of Social Capital” by C. Thöni, J.-R. Tyran and E. Wengström and can be downloaded from the authors’ webpages. The document describes the recruitment procedure and experimental design of the public good experiment carried out over the internet in May 2008 by the Center for Experimental Economics (CEE), University of Copenhagen.

1.1 RECRUITMENT OF SUBJECTS

The participants were recruited as follows:

- Statistics Denmark, the official statistics office in Denmark, randomly selected 40,000 individuals from the Danish population.¹
- Statistics Denmark prepared invitation letters and envelopes. See Figure 2 for a picture of the invitation letter. A translation of the invitation letter can be found in Section 3.
- In total, 22,027, letters were randomly selected out of the 40,000 and sent out to the respondents in two waves on May 15 and May 30, 2008.
- The letters invited subjects to log on to our webpage, www.econ.ku.dk/ilee, using a personal identification number printed in the letter. Subjects had one week to complete the experiment.
- In total, 3,584 subjects logged on to our web page and out of these, 2,291 completed the experiment. We had several treatments and in the current project, we use 1,488 observations. See Section 1.3 for details about treatments and how our sample was selected.

1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENT

In short, the participants were invited to log on to our web page twice, once during the period in which the experiment was open and once during a feedback period after the experiment was closed. The first time they logged in they participated in two public goods games and completed a series of other questionnaires and tests including the trust and fairness questions. After the experiment closed, participants were matched together in groups for the public good game and payments were calculated. Participants logged on to our web page again to see the results of their group and provide us with the banking details necessary for distributing the payments.

1.3 TREATMENTS AND PARTICIPATION

The experiment had six treatments that varied with respect to invitation letter type, incentives and framing. There were three types of invitation letters, namely Standard, Support, and Support Gift. The Standard letter informs subjects that they can make money in the experiment, whereas the Support letters instead tell subjects that they will be contributing to scientific research. See Figure 2 for a picture of the invitation letter and Section 3 for a translation of the text in the letters. The Support Gift letter also included a small gift (a foam puzzle with logos of the Internet laboratory of

¹ Note that this is not a completely random sample of Danish population because any inhabitant has the right to refuse to be contacted for research purposes (this rule applies to all research conducted in Denmark when sampling from the Central Person Register). Individuals who have claimed this right are not included in the population from which our sample of 40,000 was drawn. Around 20-25% of people in the age group 20-39 years have claimed this right, while the percentage is much lower in other age groups (5-12%). More information about the issue and the characteristics of people claiming this right is available at (http://www.dst.dk/upload/notat_om_forskerbeskyttelse_2008.pdf). Unfortunately, this material is only available in Danish.

experimental economics (iLEE) and University of Copenhagen logos printed on it). See Figure 1 for a picture of this gift.

Another variation concerned the actual incentives paid out to the subjects. In the Paid treatments, subjects actually received payment irrespective of which invitation letter they received. In the Hypothetical treatments, subjects faced the same instructions throughout the experiment, but the welcome screen included a paragraph making clear that subjects would not actually receive payment and directing them to simply make their decisions as if they would be paid according to the instructions. Of course, only subjects receiving invitation letter Support and Support Gift participated in the Hypothetical treatment.

The third and last variation concerned the framing of the public good game part of the experiment, which was either a Give or a Take frame. Only the instructions for the public good game differed between treatments.

Table 1 breaks down the complete target subject pool into treatments. Upon logging in a random number determined which treatment subjects were routed to. 2/3 of the subjects receiving the standard letter were assigned to the Give-Incentivized treatment and 1/3 to the Take-Incentivized treatment. For the other two letter types 1/2 of the subjects were routed to Give-Incentivized and 1/2 to the Give-Hypothetical.²

The current paper only uses data from the Give treatment. We have not been able to find any significant differences in behaviour, or subject pool composition, between letter types and we therefore use observations from all letter treatments (i.e. all observations from the Give-Incentive column of Table 1). In addition, we only use subjects who answered both the trust and the fairness question and therefore end up with 1,488 subjects. When including the additional controls, the sample is reduced to 904, because some participants did not answer all questions, or did it inconsistently (the risk task). Finally, for part of the analysis in Section 3.2, we restrict attention to subjects that are classified as conditional cooperators, which reduces the sample further (1029 for the basic specification and 636 for the specification including the additional controls).

TABLE 1. NUMBER OF LETTERS SENT OUT AND NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH TREATMENT

	Treatment			
	Letters	Give-Incentivized	Give-Hypothetical	Take-Incentivized
Standard	18,027	1,406 (2,027)	-	697 (1,080)
Support	2,000	50 (93)	71 (128)	-
Support Gift	2,000	87 (146)	54 (110)	-
Total	22,027	1,543 (2,266)	125 (238)	697 (1,080)

Note: Figures in the first column refer to the number of letters sent out. Figures in the other columns refer to the number of subjects completing the public good part of the experiment for each treatment. Numbers in parenthesis refers to number of subjects assigned to each experiment.

1.4 DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE CORE PART OF THE EXPERIMENT

This section describes the core part of the experiment in detail. Screenshots including translated instruction are available at the end of this appendix. Subjects had access to several forms of help in understanding the instructions. Throughout the public good game part of the experiment, subjects could go back and read the instructions again at any time. In

² It turned out that the random number generator we used failed to generate a perfectly uniform distribution, which explains why the numbers of observations do not exactly match our intended division between treatments.

addition, from each screen subjects could access a screen-specific help screen which provided further guidance about what to do. Subjects also had access to a profit calculator where they could see for themselves how the earnings of the four members of the group depended on the members' contributions (see Section 4.9 for a screenshot of the profit calculator). Finally, all help screens included a telephone number and an email address through which subjects could obtain further assistance.

1.4.1 LOGIN AND INFORMATION SCREENS

The first screen of the experiment that subjects were taken to when they entered the URL from the invitation letter was a simple login screen where subjects had to enter the personal identification code printed in the invitation letter. Upon login, subjects saw a welcome screen providing information about the experiment. They were informed that their participation in the experiment would be valuable to research in economics and reminded of the importance that the person participating was the person named in the invitation letter. Moreover, they were informed that they could earn money in the experiment (within the range of 8 to 510 DKr., corresponding to approximately 1.6 to 102 USD) and that this is standard procedure in economic experiments. They were also cautioned that they had to complete the experiment to get their money by electronic transfer. All subjects were then informed that the experiment would last approximately 50 minutes. Finally, they were reassured that they would be anonymous.

After answering some questions on socioeconomic background (age, gender and highest completed education), subjects proceeded to the public good game part of the experiment.

1.4.2 THE PUBLIC GOOD GAMES

Subjects played two variants of the public good game. They first played a standard linear one-shot public good game involving one unconditional contribution choice (referred to as the Standard game). Afterwards they played a public goods game using the strategy method which involves an unconditional choice as well as a series of conditional choices (referred to as the Strategy game).

In both games, there were four members in each group, the endowment was 50 DKr. (approximately 10 USD), and the marginal per capita return was 0.5. Subjects were asked to contribute between 0-50 DKr. of the private endowment to a common pool. Everything in the pool was then doubled and shared equally between the four subjects in the group. There was no feedback during game play.

Subjects began by reading the instructions for the Standard game. In order to make the rules of the public good game easy to understand, the written instructions were complemented by a series of illustrations made by a professional illustrator.

After viewing the instructions, subjects were required to correctly complete four control questions testing their ability to calculate payoffs in the game. Subjects were allowed as many attempts as necessary but could not proceed without entering the correct answer to each question. Subjects then made their choice. On the next screen, their beliefs about the average contribution of the other members of their group were elicited. The belief elicitation was incentivised using the quadratic scoring rule. Participants' payments, expressed in DKr., were determined by $10 - 0.004 d^2 \geq 0$, where d is the difference between the belief and the true value.

Subjects then read the instructions for the strategy method version of the public good game. The strategy method was adapted to the context of the public good game by Fischbacher et al. (2001). The idea behind the strategy method is to have subjects report the complete strategy of actions they would like to take in the event of each possible combination of actions that others could take.

After reading the instructions for the Strategy game, subjects first had to make an unconditional choice. This unconditional choice was necessary to determine the outcome of the game. Subjects then had to fill out a conditional contribution table in which they had to decide how much they would like to contribute for each of the 11 average contribution levels of the other group members that are multiples of 5 (0, 5, 10... 45, 50). Our design differs from

Fischbacher et al. (2001) in this respect. In that paper, the endowment was 20 tokens and all 21 possible integer average contribution levels were included in the conditional contribution table.

The outcome of the Strategy game was determined as follows: One member of the group is randomly selected. For the other three subjects, the second unconditional choice counts as their contribution. The average of their choices is rounded to the nearest multiple of 5, and the contribution of the selected member is then determined by referencing the relevant row of his or her conditional contribution table.

1.4.3 RISK ELICITATION TASK

The next part of the experiment involved the elicitation of risk and loss preferences. The measures used were lottery tasks adapted from Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010). Subjects were presented with two tables of lotteries and on each row they had to make decisions between two lotteries, Left or Right, which each had two equally probable outcomes. The payoffs are constructed such that the lotteries of the Right column are riskier, but the expected value increases of the Right lotteries increase more rapidly as one moves down the table compared to the lotteries of the Left column. A risk (loss) neutral individual would start by choosing lotteries of the Left column and then switch to the Right as soon as the expected value exceeds that of the Left. The more risk (loss) averse the individual is, the later he or she would switch to the Right lottery. First subjects choose from a table with 10 lottery pairs with only positive outcomes and then they were routed to a second screen which contained 7 lottery pairs with mixed positive and negative outcomes. The second screen is designed in such a way that the switch points give very little information about their risk preferences (assuming a CRRA preferences). The measures were incentivised as follows: One row out of the total of 17 rows in both games was randomly selected, and the chosen game for that row was played. If the outcome was one in which the subject incurred a loss, then the amount in question was subtracted from their total earnings in the experiment. For the purpose of the current paper we only use data from the first screen designed to elicit risk preferences. Furthermore subjects that switched back and forth on the first screen are excluded from the sample.

1.4.4 COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a short three-question test aimed at capturing a specific dimension of cognitive ability. According to Frederick (2005) who introduced the test, it captures individuals' ability or disposition to reflect on a question and resist reporting the first response that comes to mind. The test is composed of the following three questions:

1. A bat and a ball cost \$1.10 in total. The bat costs \$1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? cents
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? minutes
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? days

The three CRT problems generate the incorrect "intuitive" answers (10, 100 and 24), but the correct ones are (5, 5, and 47). Test scores are calculated as the number of correct answers, i.e. 0, 1, 2, or 3.

1.4.5 QUESTIONNAIRE

After the public good games, subjects continued to a questionnaire which included the trust and fairness questions from the World Values Survey, as well as a range of other questions about workplace conditions, political attitudes, computer usage etc. In addition, subjects also performed a number of tasks to test for risk and loss aversion, cognitive ability and a personality test.

2 REFERENCES

Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., and Fehr, E. (2001): Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from Public Goods Experiment. *Economics Letters* 71: 397-404.

Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19: 25-42.

Tanaka, T. Camerer, C. and Nguyen, Q. (2010): Risk and Time Preferences: Linking Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam. *American Economic Review*, 100: 557-571

3 APPENDIX: FIGURES




FIGURE 1. THE GIFT INCLUDED IN CONDITION SUPPORT GIFT (SEE TABLE 1)




FIGURE 2. THE INVITATION LETTER

4 APPENDIX: TRANSLATION OF THE INVITATION LETTER

Dear [First name]

Statistics Denmark and the Internet Laboratory for Experimental Economy (iLEE) at the Institute of Economics, Copenhagen University, hereby invite you to partake in an experiment on economic decision making.

Experiments are a vital tool in economic research, since they help gain a better understanding of how people make economic decisions. This can ultimately help improve economic policy making. An economic experiment can assume many forms – e.g. the participants could be asked to buy and sell hypothetical goods or make investment decisions.

In order to obtain a representative picture Statistics Denmark has selected a large number of persons from all of Denmark who are given the opportunity to participate in the experiment. You are among the randomly chosen. Your participation is of course voluntary but we sincerely hope that you will participate. No special knowledge of economics or computers is required to participate in the experiment and your decisions during the experiment will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous.

By participating in the experiment you will have an opportunity to earn money. We cannot guarantee that you will earn a specific amount since your earnings will depend on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. The specific rules are described on the web site.

To insure complete anonymity, all contestants log on with a randomly selected number. We conduct a range of different experiments and therefore all do not participate in the same experiment. To see the details of your experiment, including the task, duration and so forth, you are requested to log on to our web site at your earliest convenience:

www.econ.ku.dk/ilee with your log in number: [ID number]

If you experience problems logging in or have any further questions, you are welcome to contact us either via email at **ilee@econ.ku.dk** or by phone on 35 32 44 09.

Thanks in advance, with kind regards.

Isak Isaksen


Kontorchef, Statistics Denmark

Jean-Robert Tyran

Professor, Institute of Economics

5 APPENDIX: SELECTED SCREENSHOTS

5.1 SCREENSHOT: LOGIN SCREEN



5.2 TRANSLATION: LOGIN SCREEN

iLEE Internet Laboratory for experimental economics

-Help (this header appeared on all consecutive screens)

Welcome

Welcome to this economic experiment which is conducted by scientists from the University of Copenhagen in cooperation with Statistics Denmark.

To get more information about this experiment and to begin the experiment, please type in your **log in number** stated in the letter you have received from Statistics Denmark, and then press continue.

Continue

5.3 SCREENSHOT: INFORMATION SCREEN

iLEE Internet Laboratoriet for Eksperimentel Økonomi Hjælp

Information om eksperimentet



Du er nu logget ind. Tak for din interesse i eksperimentet.

Din deltagelse vil være værdifuld, da du ved at gennemføre eksperimentet bidrager til dansk samfundsvidenskabelig forskning. **Din invitation til at deltage er personlig.** Det er afgørende for eksperimentets videnskabelighed, at det er personen nævnt i brevet fra Danmarks Statistik, der deltager i eksperimentet, og ingen andre. Mange tusinde danskere er blevet tilfældigt udvalgt til at deltage i forskellige udgaver af eksperimentet.

I eksperimentet tjener du penge. Dette er standard i økonomiske eksperimenter for at sikre, at beslutningerne har konsekvenser. Beløbet, du kan tjene, afhænger af både dine egne og andre deltageres beslutninger og varierer fra 8 til 510 kroner. Beløbet udbetales via en bankoverførsel, efter du har gennemført hele eksperimentet.

Det er afgørende for eksperimentets videnskabelighed, at du gennemfører hele eksperimentet. Eksperimentet varer cirka 50 minutter. Du kan undervejs i eksperimentet logge ud og indtil den vende tilbage senere.

Du vil forblive anonym over for de andre deltagere samt over for forskerne bag eksperimentet. Af hensyn til din anonymitet kender vi ikke dit login nummer og har derfor ikke mulighed for at oplyse det, hvis du mister det.

Tryk på **Hjælp** når som helst for at få uddybende vejledning til den aktuelle skærm. For yderligere hjælp kan du ringe på telefon  **35 32 44 09**  mandag til fredag eller sende en email til: ILee@econ.ku.dk

Eksperimentet har tre dele. Når du trykker **Fortsæt**, kommer du til nogle indledende spørgsmål og herefter starter første del.

Fortsæt

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5.4 TRANSLATION: INFORMATION SCREEN

Information about the experiment

You are now logged in. Thank you for your interest in the experiment.

Your participation will be valuable, as you contribute to Danish research in social science by completing the experiment. **Your invitation for participation is personal.** It is crucial for the scientific purpose of the experiment that it is the person mentioned in the letter from Statistic Denmark who takes part in the experiment and not anyone else. Many thousand Danes have been randomly selected to take part in various versions of the experiment.

In the experiment, you earn money. This is standard in economics experiments to insure that actions have consequences. The amount you will earn depends both on your own decisions and other participants' decisions and is in the range from 8 to 510 kroner. The amount will be paid via a bank transfer after you have completed the entire experiment.

It is crucial for the scientific purpose of the experiment that you complete the entire experiment. The experiment takes approximately 50 minutes. During the experiment, it is possible for you to log out and return later.

You will remain anonymous to the other participants as well as to the scientists running the experiment. For the sake of your anonymity, we do not know your login number and therefore have no means to inform you of it, should you lose it.

Press Help anytime to receive detailed guidance for the current screen. For further help, please call 35 32 44 09 from Monday to Friday or send an email to: [iLee@econ.ku.dk](mailto:ILee@econ.ku.dk)

The experiment consists of three parts. When you press Continue, you will continue to some preliminary questions and thereafter, the first part of the experiment. Continue

5.5 SCREENSHOT: INSTRUCTIONS STANDARD GAME 1

(The header and footer of this screen are cut out to improve readability)

Instruktioner - Del 1


Dette er eksperimentets første del. Du bedes læse følgende instruktioner grundigt.

Du er i en gruppe med tre andre personer, som ligesom dig er blevet udvalgt til at deltage i eksperimentet. Da I alle er sikret anonymitet, vil ingen af jer nogensinde vide, hvem de andre er.

Hvert gruppe-medlem modtager et startbeløb på **50 kroner** fra os. **Du og de andre skal hver især træffe en beslutning om enten at beholde pengene eller at lægge nogle af eller alle pengene i en fællespulje.** Hvert gruppe-medlem står over for den samme beslutning.

De penge, du vælger at beholde, får du ganske enkelt lov til at beholde. **Det beløb, som I tilsammen lægger i fællespuljen, vil først blive fordoblet af os og dernæst delt ligeligt mellem alle fire gruppe-medlemmer.** Hvert gruppe-medlem får sin ligelige andel, uanset hvor meget vedkommende selv har lagt i fællespuljen.

Billederne nedenfor viser et eksempel:



Alle træffer deres egen beslutning uden at vide, hvad de andre har besluttet. Først efter gennemførelse af eksperimentet vil du blive informeret om de andres beslutninger.

5.6 TRANSLATION: INSTRUCTIONS STANDARD GAME 1

Instructions – Part 1

This is the first part of the experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully.

You are a part of a group together with three other people who were selected like you to take part in this experiment. As each of you is guaranteed anonymity, none of you will ever know who the others are.

Each group member receives **50 kroner** from us. **You and the others have to make a decision about either keeping this amount or putting some or all of the money in a common pool.** Each group member faces the same decision.

The amount of money you choose to keep is simply yours to keep. **The sum which all group members together put in the common pool will be doubled by us and then split evenly amongst all four group members.** Each group member gets an even share no matter how much they each put into the common pool.

The pictures below illustrate an example:

1) Each participant begins with 50 kroner	2) Each participant puts an amount between 0-50 kroner in the common pool.
3) The accumulated amount in the common pool is doubled.	4) The total amount in the common pool is split in 4 equal parts.
5) Each participant receives their share of the common pool.	6) Each participant's total earnings are shown here.

All participants make their own decisions without knowing what the others have decided. You will be informed about the others' decision only upon the completion of the experiment.

Continue

5.7 SCREENSHOT: INSTRUCTIONS STANDARD GAME 2

iLEE Internet Laboratoriet for Eksperimentel Økonomi

[Instruktioner](#) [Lommeregner](#) [Hjælp](#)

Instruktioner - Del 1 (Fortsat)

Din samlede indtjening vil altså bestå af to dele:

1. De penge, du vælger at beholde.
2. Din andel af fællespuljen.

Her følger nogle eksempler:

Eksempel 1
Forestil dig, at du og de andre gruppe­med­lem­mer hver lægger alle de 50 kr. i fællespuljen. I beholder altså hver 0 kr. Fællespuljen indeholder dermed 200 kr., som fordobles til 400 kr. og derefter deles i 4 lige store dele, så du og de andre gruppe­med­lem­mer hver får en samlet indtjening på 0 kr. + 100 kr. = **100** kr.

Eksempel 2
Forestil dig, at du og de andre gruppe­med­lem­mer hver lægger 0 kr. i fællespuljen. I beholder altså hver 50 kr. Fællespuljen indeholder dermed 0 kr., hvorved ingen modtager noget fra fællespuljen. Du og de andre gruppe­med­lem­mer får hver en samlet indtjening på 50 kr. + 0 kr. = **50** kr.

Eksempel 3
Forestil dig nu, at du lægger 30 kr. i fællespuljen, mens de andre gruppe­med­lem­mer lægger 50 kr. hver. Du beholder altså 20 kr. mens de tre andre, hver beholder 0 kr. Fællespuljen indeholder dermed 180 kr., som fordobles til 360 kr. og deles, så I hver modtager 90 kr. fra fællespuljen. Din samlede indtjening bliver dermed 20 kr. + 90 kr. = **110** kr., mens hver af de andre gruppe­med­lem­mers indtjening bliver 0 kr. + 90 kr. = 90 kr.

Hvis du gerne vil udregne flere eksempler på, hvordan din indtjening afhænger af, hvad du vælger at lægge i fællespuljen, og hvad de andre lægger i fællespuljen, kan du på denne og de følgende skærme trykke på **Lommeregner** i øverste højre hjørne.

Hvis du vil se instruktionerne på et senere tidspunkt, kan du blot trykke på **Instruktioner**, som du finder i øverste højre hjørne.

[Tilbage](#) [Fortsæt](#)

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5.8 TRANSLATION: INSTRUCTIONS STANDARD GAME 2

iLEE Internet Laboratory for experimental economics

-Instructions –Calculator- Help

(Header now contains links to the first screens of the instructions and a profit calculator)

Instruction – Part 1 (continued)

Your total earnings will thus consist of two parts:

1. The amount of money you choose to keep.
2. Your share of the common pool.

Below are some examples.

Example 1:

Imagine you and the other group members each put Dkr. 50 in the common pool. This means, you each keep Dkr.0. The common pool thus contains Dkr.200, which is doubled to Dkr. 400 and split into 4 equally big parts afterwards, so you and the other group members each receive an accumulated earning of Dkr. 0 + Dkr. 100 = Dkr. 100.

Example 2:

Imagine you and the other group members each put Dkr. 0 in the common pool. This means, you each keep Dkr. 50. The common pool thus contains Dkr. 0, and therefore nobody receives anything from the common pool. You and the other group members each receive an accumulated earning of $\text{Dkr. } 0 + \text{Dkr. } 50 = \text{Dkr. } 50$.

Example 3:

Imagine you put Dkr. 30 in the common pool, while the other group members put Dkr. 50. This means, you keep Dkr. 20, while the three others each keep Dkr. 0. The common pool thus contains Dkr. 180, which is doubled to Dkr. 360 and split, so you each receive Dkr. 90 from the common pool. Your accumulated earning will then be $\text{Dkr. } 20 + \text{Dkr. } 90 = \text{Dkr. } 110$, while each of the other group members' earnings will be $\text{Dkr. } 0 + \text{Dkr. } 90 = \text{Dkr. } 90$.

If you want to calculate more examples on how your earnings depend on what you choose to put in the common pool, and what the others choose to put in the common pool, just click on '**Calculator**' in the top right hand corner in this and the following screens.

If you at a later point in time wish to look at the instructions again, just click on '**Instructions**', which you find in the top right hand corner.

Back – Continue

5.9 POP-UP SCREEN: PROFIT CALCULATOR (ACCESSIBLE THROUGH A BUTTON ON THE TOP OF THE SCREEN DURING THE GAME)

Lommeregner

Her kan du beregne, hvordan din indtjening afhænger af, hvad du og de andre gruppemedlemmer vælger at lægge i fællespuljen. Udfyld felterne for at beregne din indtjening. Når du har udfyldt alle fire felter, tryk da Beregn. Lommeregneren viser derefter, hvor meget du og de andre gruppemedlemmer hver især tjener. Du kan ændre et eller flere af beløbene i felterne og trykke Beregn igen, for at se hvordan indtjeningerne ændrer sig. Når du er færdig, tryk Luk.

Du lægger:
 kroner i fællespuljen

Gruppemedlem 2 lægger:
 kroner i fællespuljen

Gruppemedlem 3 lægger:
 kroner i fællespuljen.

Gruppemedlem 4 lægger:
 kroner i fællespuljen

Beregn **Nulstil**

Luk

5.10 TRANSLATION: PROFIT CALCULATOR.

Calculator

You can calculate here how your own earnings depend on what you and the other group members chose to put into the common pool. To do so, fill out all four fields and click “Calculate”. The calculator will then show how much you and the other group members earn each. You can change one or more of the fields and press “Calculate” again to see how your earnings change. When you are done, press “Close”.

You put: 0 kroner into the common pool		Group member 3 puts: 0 kroner into the common pool
Group member 2 puts: 0 kroner into the common pool		Group member 4 puts: 0 kroner into the common pool
	Calculate - Reset	
	Close	

5.11 SCREENSHOT: CHOICE SCREEN – STANDARD GAME

iLEE Internet Laboratoriet for Eksperimentel Økonomi	Instruktioner	Lommeregner	Hjælp
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Din beslutning

Du og de andre gruppe­med­lem­mer har besvaret alle spørgsmålene korrekt.

Du skal nu beslutte, hvor mange penge du vil lægge i fællespuljen.

Bemærk, at dette er din faktiske beslutning.

Du kan indtaste et helt beløb mellem 0 og 50 kroner.

Jeg vælger at lægge kroner i fællespuljen.

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København­sv­er­si­te­ten, Økonomisk Institut

5.12 TRANSLATION: CHOICE SCREEN – STANDARD GAME

Your decision

You and the other group members have answered all the questions correctly.

You now have to decide how much money you want to put in the common pool.

Note that this is your actual decision.

Choose an integer amount between 0 and 50 kroner

I choose to put _____ kroner in the common pool.

Confirm your decision

5.13 SCREENSHOT: BELIEF ELICITATION

iLEE Internet Laboratoriet for Eksperimentel Økonomi	Instruktioner	Lommeregner	Hjælp
---	----------------------	--------------------	--------------

Hvad tror du, at de andre lagde i fællespuljen?

Du bedes angive, hvor meget du tror, at de tre andre gruppe-medlemmer i gennemsnit lagde i fællespuljen. Du kan indtaste et helt beløb mellem 0 og 50 kroner.

Afhængigt af, hvor tæt du kommer på det rigtige gennemsnit, kan du tjene mellem 0 og 10 kroner ekstra. Jo tættere du kommer på det rigtige gennemsnit, des mere tjener du. Du kan se, hvordan denne ekstra betaling beregnes ved at klikke på Hjælp i øverste højre hjørne.

Jeg tror, at de tre andre gruppe-medlemmer i gennemsnit lagde kroner i fællespuljen.

Bekræft

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5.14 TRANSLATION: BELIEF ELICITATION

How much do you think the others put in the common pool?

Please type how much you think the three other group members put in the common pool on average. Type an integer amount between 0 and 50 kroner.

Depending on how close you got to the actual average, you can earn between 0 and 10 kroner extra. The closer you got to the actual average, the more you can earn. You can see how this extra payment is calculated by clicking Help in the top right hand corner.

I think the average of what the other three group members put in the common pool is _____ kroner

Confirm

5.15 SCREENSHOT: INSTRUCTIONS STRATEGY GAME

Instruktioner - Del 2

Du er i en **ny gruppe** i del 2. Du og hvert gruppe medlem får igen **et startbeløb på 50 kroner fra os**. Du bliver imidlertid sat i to forskellige situationer.

Situation 1 svarer til første del af eksperimentet. Du skal beslutte, hvor meget du vil give til fællespuljen, **uden at vide** hvor meget de andre giver.

I **Situation 2** skal du beslutte, hvor meget du vil give, **hvis du ved**, hvad de andre gruppe medlemmer i gennemsnit giver til fællespuljen. Du skal udfylde en beslutningstabel, som den du ser her.

Eksempel - Situation 2:

Hvis de andre i gennemsnit lægger ... kroner i fællespuljen	vil jeg lægge ... kroner i fællespuljen
0	<input type="text"/>
5	<input type="text"/>
.	.
.	.
.	.
45	<input type="text"/>
50	<input type="text"/>

Når alle i gruppen har besluttet sig i både Situation 1 og Situation 2, udvælges et af de fire gruppe medlemmer tilfældigt.

For det udvalgte gruppe medlem vil beslutningstabellen fra Situation 2 gælde. For de tre andre gruppe medlemmer, der ikke er blevet udvalgt, vil beslutningen fra Situation 1 gælde. Når du træffer dine beslutninger i Situation 1 og Situation 2, vil du naturligvis ikke vide, om det er dig, der bliver udvalgt. **Du bedes derfor tænke grundigt over alle beslutningerne, da de alle kan blive relevante for dig.**

Eksempel 1:

Antag, at det er dig, der er blevet udvalgt. Det betyder, at det bliver din beslutningstabel, der gælder. For de tre andre gruppe medlemmer er det beslutningen fra Situation 1, der gælder. Antag, at de har valgt at lægge 0, 10 og 20 kr. i fællespuljen, det vil sige i gennemsnit 10 kr. Hvis du i din beslutningstabel har angivet at lægge 8 kr., hvis de andre i gennemsnit har lagt 10 kr., er det samlede beløb i fællespuljen 38 kr. Dette beløb fordobles til 76 kr. og fordeles ligeligt, hvorved alle gruppe medlemmer får 19 kr. hver fra fællespuljen, samt det de har valgt at beholde.

Eksempel 2:

Antag, at det ikke er dig, der er blevet udvalgt. Det betyder, at for dig og to andre gruppe medlemmer er det beslutningen i Situation 1, der gælder. Antag, at din beslutning i Situation 1 var 40 kr., og de to andres var henholdsvis 20 og 30 kr. I gennemsnit lægger du og de to andre gruppe medlemmer altså 30 kr. Hvis det udvalgte gruppe medlem vælger at lægge 10 kr., når de andre i gennemsnit lægger 30 kr. i fællespuljen, da vil det samlede beløb i fællespuljen være $40+20+30+10=100$ kr. Dette beløb fordobles til 200 kr. og fordeles ligeligt, hvorved alle gruppe medlemmer får 50 kr. hver fra fællespuljen, samt det de har valgt at beholde.

Bemærk, at gennemsnit afrundes til nærmeste 5 kroner. Eksempelvis vil et gennemsnit på 13,5 blive rundet op til 15.

Fortsæt

5.16 TRANSLATION: INSTRUCTIONS STRATEGY GAME

Instructions - part 2

You are put into a **new group** in part 2. Again, you and each group member begin with a **starting amount of 50 kroner from us**. You are placed in two different situations though.

Situation 1 corresponds to the first part of the experiment. You have to decide how much you want to put in the common pool **without knowing** how much the others put.

In Situation 2, you have to decide how much to put in **knowing** the average of what the other group members put in the common pool. You have to complete a decision table like the one you see here.

Example – Situation 2:

-If the average of what the others put in the common pool is ... kroner

-then I will put ... kroner in the common pool...

When everybody in the group has decided in both Situation 1 and Situation 2, one of the other four group members is randomly selected.

The decision table will count for the selected group member. For the three other group members, the decision from Situation 1 will count. Naturally, when you are making your decisions in Situation 1 and Situation 2, you will not know if you will be selected. **Therefore please think thoroughly about all the decisions as they all might become relevant for you.**

Example 1:

Assume you have been selected. This means that it is your decision table which counts. For the three other group members, it is their decisions in situation 1 which counts. Assume they chose to put Dkr. 0, 10, and 20 in the common pool, which is Dkr. 10 on the average. If you in your decision table have stated that you want put in Dkr. 8 if the others take out Dkr. 10 on the average, then the accumulated amount in the common pool is Dkr. 38. This amount is doubled to Dkr. 76, and distributed evenly, such that all group members each get Dkr. 19 from the common pool in addition to the amount they chose to keep.

Example 2:

Assume that you have not been selected. This means that for you and two other group members your decisions in Situation 1 count. Assume that your decision in Situation 1 was Dkr. 40, and the decisions of the others was Dkr. 20 and Dkr. 30, respectively. This means that on average you and the two other group member put Dkr. 30 in the common pool. If the selected group member decides to put in Dkr. 10 when the others on the average put Dkr. 30, then the sum of the accumulated amount in the common pool will be $40 + 20 + 30 + 10 = \text{Dkr. } 100$. This amount is doubled to Dkr. 200 and distributed evenly, such that each group member gets Dkr. 50 kr. from the common pool in addition to the amount they chose to keep.

Note that the average is rounded to the nearest 5 kroner. For example, an average of Dkr. 13.5 will be rounded up to Dkr. 15 kr.

Continue

5.17 SCREENSHOT: UNCONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION STRATEGY GAME

The screenshot shows the iLEE (Internet Laboratoriet for Eksperimentel Økonomi) interface. At the top, there is a red navigation bar with three buttons: "Instruktioner", "Lommeregner", and "Hjælp". Below this, the "Situation 1" section is displayed. It contains the following text: "Du skal igen beslutte, hvor mange penge du vil lægge i fællespuljen." and "Du kan indtaste hele tal mellem 0 og 50." Below the text is a form field with the label "Jeg vælger at lægge" followed by a text input box and the text "kroner i fællespuljen". To the right of the input box is a button labeled "Bekræft din beslutning". At the bottom of the page, there is a dark grey footer bar with the text "(C) 2007 Centre for Experimental Economics København's Universitet, Økonomisk Institut".

5.18 TRANSLATION: UNCONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION STRATEGY GAME

Situation 1

Again, you have to decide how much money you want to put in the common pool.

You have to enter an integer number between 0 and 50.

- I choose to put ... kroner in the common pool.

Confirm your decision

5.19 SCREENSHOT: CONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION STRATEGY GAME.

iLEE Internet Laboratoriet for Eksperimentel Økonomi

[Instruktioner](#) [Lommeregner](#) [Hjælp](#)

Situation 2

Angiv venligst, hvor mange kroner du ville lægge i fællespuljen, hvis du vidste, hvad de andre gav til fællespuljen. Du bedes udfylde alle 11 felter i beslutningstabellen. I hvert af felterne kan du indtaste hele tal mellem 0 og 50.

Hvis de andre i gennemsnit lægger ... kroner i fællespuljen	vil jeg lægge ... kroner i fællespuljen
0	<input type="text"/>
5	<input type="text"/>
10	<input type="text"/>
15	<input type="text"/>
20	<input type="text"/>
25	<input type="text"/>
30	<input type="text"/>
35	<input type="text"/>
40	<input type="text"/>
45	<input type="text"/>
50	<input type="text"/>

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5.20 TRANSLATION: CONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION STRATEGY GAME

Situation 2

Please state the amount of kroner you put in the common pool knowing how much the others put in the common pool on average. Please complete all 11 fields in the decision table. Use integer numbers between Dkr. 0 and Dkr. 50.

-If the others on average put ... kroner in the common pool

-I put... kroner in the common pool.

...

Confirm your decision

5.22 SCREENSHOT: RISK PREFERENCE ELICITATION TASK, SCREEN 1

iLEE Internet Laboratoriet for Eksperimentel Økonomi
Hjælp

Instruktioner - Plat eller krone spillet

På de næste to skærme bedes du gentagne gange vælge mellem to spil.

Du bedes angive, om du foretrækker spillet til VENSTRE eller til HØJRE. Hvert spil har to mulige udfald: PLAT eller KRONE. Chancen for begge udfald er lige stor, dvs. at der i hvert spil er 50% chance for, at udfaldet er PLAT og 50% chance for, at udfaldet er KRONE. Hvis udfaldet bliver plat, får du PLAT-udfaldet af det spil, du har valgt, og hvis det bliver krone, får du KRONE-udfaldet. **Der er ikke nogen rigtige eller forkerte svar. Væg blot det spil, du foretrækker.**

Eksempel:

	SPIL VENSTRE		Jeg foretrækker		SPIL HØJRE	
	PLAT	KRONE	Spillet til venstre	Spillet til højre	PLAT	KRONE
Beslutning 1	Vinder 30 kr.	Vinder 50 kr.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Taber 10 kr.	Vinder 80 kr.

Hvis du vælger spillet til VENSTRE i eksemplet ovenfor, *vinder* du 30 kroner, hvis mønten lander på PLAT, og du *vinder* 50 kroner, hvis den lander på KRONE. Hvis du vælger spillet til HØJRE, *taber* du 10 kroner, hvis mønten lander på PLAT, hvorimod du *vinder* 80 kroner, hvis den lander på KRONE.

På de følgende to skærme kommer to tabeller, hvor du i hver række bedes vælge mellem spil, der ligner dem i eksemplet. Du skal i alt foretage 17 valg.

Når du har truffet alle valg, vil én af de 17 rækker i de to tabeller tilfældigt blive udvalgt. Alle rækker har samme chance for at blive udvalgt. I den udvalgte række vil det spil, du har valgt, blive spillet – det vil sige, at der vil blive slået plat eller krone om det pågældende spils udfald. Herefter bliver din gevinst føjet til din indtjening. Nogle af rækkerne kan imidlertid medføre tab. Hvis den udvalgte række medfører et tab, vil det tabte beløb blive trukket fra din totale indtjening i eksperimentet.

Fortsæt

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5.23 TRANSLATION: RISK PREFERENCE ELICITATION TASK

Instructions - The heads or tails game.

In the two following screens, please choose between two lotteries.

Please state, whether you prefer the lottery to the LEFT or to the RIGHT. Each lottery has two possible outcomes: HEADS or TAILS. The chances of getting either one are equally big, i.e. each lottery has a probability of 50 % for HEADS and a probability of 50 % for TAILS. If the outcome is HEADS, you will receive the HEADS outcome of your chosen lottery. If the outcome is TAILS, you will receive the TAILS outcome of your chosen lottery. **There is no right or wrong answer. Just choose the lottery, you prefer.**

For example:

I prefer						
LEFT LOTTERY			RIGHT LOTTERY			
	HEADS	TAILS	The Left Lottery	The Right Lottery	HEADS	TAILS
Decision 1	Win 30 kr.	Win 50 kr.			Loose 10 kr.	Win 80 kr.

If you choose the lottery to the left in the example above, you will *win* 30 kroner, if the coins shows HEADS, and you will *win* 50 kroner if the coin shows TAILS. If you choose the lottery to the right, you will *lose* 10 kroner, if the coins shows HEADS, where as you will *win* 80 kroner, if it shows TAILS.

In the following two screens, there will be two tables, and in each row, please choose between lotteries, like the ones in the example. In total, you have to make 17 choices.

When you have made all you choices, one of the 17 rows will be randomly selected. All the rows have the same probability for being chosen. In the selected row, the lottery you have chosen, will be played out – which means, a coin will be flipped to determine the outcome of the lottery. Next, your earnings will be added to your income. However, some of the rows can bring losses. If the selected row induces a loss, that will be deducted from your total income in the experiment.

Continue

5.24 SCREENSHOT: RISK PREFERENCE ELICITATION TASK, SCREEN 2

Plat eller krone spillet - Tabel 1

Angiv venligst for hver række, om du foretrækker SPIL VENSTRE eller SPIL HØJRE.

	SPIL VENSTRE		Jeg foretrækker		SPIL HØJRE	
	PLAT	KRONE	Spillet til venstre	Spillet til højre	PLAT	KRONE
Beslutning 1	Vinder 30 kr.	Vinder 50 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Vinder 5 kr.	Vinder 60 kr.
Beslutning 2	Vinder 30 kr.	Vinder 50 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Vinder 5 kr.	Vinder 70 kr.
Beslutning 3	Vinder 30 kr.	Vinder 50 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Vinder 5 kr.	Vinder 80 kr.
Beslutning 4	Vinder 30 kr.	Vinder 50 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Vinder 5 kr.	Vinder 90 kr.
Beslutning 5	Vinder 30 kr.	Vinder 50 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Vinder 5 kr.	Vinder 100 kr.
Beslutning 6	Vinder 30 kr.	Vinder 50 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Vinder 5 kr.	Vinder 110 kr.
Beslutning 7	Vinder 30 kr.	Vinder 50 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Vinder 5 kr.	Vinder 120 kr.
Beslutning 8	Vinder 30 kr.	Vinder 50 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Vinder 5 kr.	Vinder 140 kr.
Beslutning 9	Vinder 30 kr.	Vinder 50 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Vinder 5 kr.	Vinder 170 kr.
Beslutning 10	Vinder 30 kr.	Vinder 50 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Vinder 5 kr.	Vinder 220 kr.

Bekræft dine beslutninger

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5.25 TRANSLATION: RISK PREFERENCE ELICITATION TASK, SCREEN 2

The Head or Tails game – part 1

For each row, please state if you prefer the LEFT LOTTERY or the RIGHT LOTTERY.

	LEFT LOTTERY				RIGHT GAME	
	HEADS	TAILS	The left lottery	The right lottery	HEADS	TAILS
Decision 1	Win 30 kr.	Win 50 kr.			Win 5 kr.	Win 60 kr.
Decision 2	Win 30 kr.	Win 50 kr.			Win 5 kr.	Win 70 kr.
Decision 3	Win 30 kr.	Win 50 kr.			Win 5 kr.	Win 80 kr.
Decision 4	Win 30 kr.	Win 50 kr.			Win 5 kr.	Win 90 kr.
Decision 5	Win 30 kr.	Win 50 kr.			Win 5 kr.	Win 100 kr.
Decision 6	Win 30 kr.	Win 50 kr.			Win 5 kr.	Win 110 kr.
Decision 7	Win 30 kr.	Win 50 kr.			Win 5 kr.	Win 120 kr.
Decision 8	Win 30 kr.	Win 50 kr.			Win 5 kr.	Win 140 kr.
Decision 9	Win 30 kr.	Win 50 kr.			Win 5 kr.	Win 170 kr.
Decision 10	Win 30 kr.	Win 50 kr.			Win 5 kr.	Win 220 kr.

Confirm your decisions

5.26 SCREENSHOT: RISK PREFERENCE ELICITATION TASK, SCREEN 3

Plat eller krone spillet - Tabel 2

I denne tabel bedes du igen angive for hver række, om du foretrækker spillet til VENSTRE eller spillet til HØJRE.

Nogle af rækkerne kan medføre tab. Hvis den valgte række medfører et tab, vil det tabte beløb blive trukket fra din totale indtjening i eksperimentet.

	SPIL VENSTRE		Jeg foretrækker		SPIL HØJRE	
	PLAT	KRONE	Spillet til venstre	Spillet til højre	KRONE	PLAT
Beslutning 1	Taber 8 kr.	Vinder 50 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Taber 42 kr.	Vinder 60 kr.
Beslutning 2	Taber 8 kr.	Vinder 8 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Taber 42 kr.	Vinder 60 kr.
Beslutning 3	Taber 8 kr.	Vinder 2 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Taber 42 kr.	Vinder 60 kr.
Beslutning 4	Taber 8 kr.	Vinder 2 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Taber 32 kr.	Vinder 60 kr.
Beslutning 5	Taber 16 kr.	Vinder 2 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Taber 32 kr.	Vinder 60 kr.
Beslutning 6	Taber 16 kr.	Vinder 2 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Taber 28 kr.	Vinder 60 kr.
Beslutning 7	Taber 16 kr.	Vinder 2 kr.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Taber 22 kr.	Vinder 60 kr.

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5.27 TRANSLATION: RISK PREFERENCE ELICITATION TASK, SCREEN 3

In this table, please state again if you prefer the LEFT LOTTERY or the RIGHT LOTTERY.

Some of the rows can bring losses. If the selected row, induces a loss, that will be deducted from your total income in the experiment.

I prefer

	LEFT LOTTERY		The Left Lottery	The Right Lottery	RIGHT LOTTERY	
	HEADS	TAILS			HEADS	TAILS
Decision 1	Loose 8 kr.	Win 50 kr.			Loose 42 kr.	Win 60 kr.
Decision 2	Loose 8 kr.	Win 8 kr.			Loose 42 kr.	Win 60 kr.
Decision 3	Loose 8 kr.	Win 2 kr.			Loose 42 kr.	Win 60 kr.
Decision 4	Loose 8 kr.	Win 2 kr.			Loose 32 kr.	Win 60 kr.
Decision 5	Loose 16 kr.	Win 2 kr.			Loose 32 kr.	Win 60 kr.
Decision 6	Loose 16 kr.	Win 2 kr.			Loose 28 kr.	Win 60 kr.
Decision 7	Loose 16 kr.	Win 2 kr.			Loose 22 kr.	Win 60 kr.

Confirm your decision

5.28 SCREENSHOT: COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST, SCREEN 1

iLEE Internet Laboratoriet for Eksperimentel Økonomi Hjælp

Tre små spørgsmål

Du får nu tre korte spørgsmål. Du vil se et spørgsmål ad gangen. Det første spørgsmål er nedenfor. De næste to vises på hver deres skærm. Hvert spørgsmål har ét korrekt svar.

En bold og et bat koster 110 kr. Battet koster 100 kr. mere end bolden. Hvad koster bolden?

kroner

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5.29 TRANSLATION: COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST, SCREEN 1

Three short questions

You are now posed three short questions. You will see the questions one at a time. The first question is shown below. The following two are shown on their own screens. Each question has one correct answer.

A ball and a bat cost 110 kr. The bat costs 100 kr. more than the ball. What does the ball cost?

____ kroner

Continue

5.30 SCREENSHOT: COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST, SCREEN 2

iLEE Internet Laboratoriet for Eksperimentel Økonomi Hjælp

Tre små spørgsmål

Hvis det tager 5 maskiner 5 minutter at lave 5 dimser, hvor lang tid ville det så tage 100 maskiner at lave 100 dimser?

minutter

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5.31 TRANSLATION: COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST, SCREEN 2

Three short questions

If it takes 5 machines, 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?

_____ minutes

Continue

5.32 SCREENSHOT: COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST, SCREEN 3

5.33 TRANSLATION: COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST, SCREEN 3

Three short questions

In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size

If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? _____ days

Continue

5.34 SCREENSHOT: TRUST AND FAIRNESS QUESTIONS

iLEE Internet Laboratoriet for Eksperimentel Økonomi Hjælp

Hvad er din holdning?

Alt i alt - mener du, at folk er til at stole på eller mener du, at man ikke kan være for forsigtig, når man har med mennesker at gøre?

De fleste er til at stole på
 Man kan ikke være for forsigtig
 Ved ikke / Ønsker ikke at svare

Tror du at folk i almindelighed ville prøve at udnytte dig, hvis de fik lejlighed til det, eller ville de behandle dig ordentligt?

De fleste ville prøve at udnytte mig 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 De fleste ville behandle mig ordentligt
 Ved ikke / Ønsker ikke at svare

Alt taget i betragtning - hvor tilfreds eller utilfreds er du for tiden med livet?

Meget utilfreds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Meget tilfreds
 Ved ikke / Ønsker ikke at svare

Fortsæt

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5.35 TRANSLATION: TRUST AND FAIRNESS QUESTIONS

What is your opinion?

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

Most people can be trusted
You can't be too careful

Do not know / do not wish to answer

Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?

People would try take advantage of you 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 People would try to be fair

Do not know / do not wish to answer

All things considered – how satisfied are you with life as a whole at the moment?

Very unsatisfied 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 Very satisfied

Do not know / do not wish to answer

Continue