

Unemployment Fluctuations and Stabilization Policies: A New Keynesian Perspective

Lecture I: A Simple Model of Unemployment and Inflation Dynamics

Jordi Galí

CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE

Zeuthen Lectures, March 2010

The New Keynesian Approach to Monetary Policy Analysis

- Methodology
 - dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium frameworks
 - optimization by individual agents
 - rational expectations
- Keynesian ingredients
 - monopolistic competition \Rightarrow "demand constraints"
 - nominal rigidities \Rightarrow non-neutrality of monetary policy
- Resulting framework:
 - fits existing evidence on the effects of shocks
 - suitable for analysis of alternative monetary policy rules
 - yields new insights (e.g. management of expectations)
 - adopted by many central banks
- Shortcomings

Unemployment and the New Keynesian Model

- Standard NK model \Rightarrow no reference to unemployment (like RBC)
- Search and Matching models \Rightarrow no role for monetary policy (like RBC)
- Recent literature \Rightarrow labor market frictions + nominal rigidities

\Rightarrow unemployment + role for monetary policy

Positive analysis: Walsh, Trigari, Gertler-Sala-Trigari,...

Normative analysis: Blanchard-Galí, Thomas, Faia,...

- The approach here:
 - builds on Galí (2009)
 - reformulation of the *standard* NK model (Erceg et al. (2000))
 - no search frictions; central role of nominal wage rigidities

Outline of the Lectures

- Lecture I: A Simple Model of Unemployment and Inflation Dynamics

What are the implications of the NK model for unemployment?

What is the role of nominal wage rigidities in accounting for unemployment fluctuations?

- Lecture II: Unemployment, the Output Gap and the Welfare Costs of Fluctuations

How does the output gap vary over time?

How do fluctuations affect welfare?

- Lecture III: Unemployment and Monetary Policy Design in the NK Model

Can monetary policy be improved by using information on unemployment?

A Model of Unemployment and Inflation Fluctuations

Households

- Representative household with a continuum of members, indexed by $(i, j) \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$
- Continuum of differentiated labor services, indexed by $i \in [0, 1]$
- Disutility from (indivisible) labor: $\chi_t j^\varphi$, where $\varphi \geq 0$
- Full consumption risk sharing within the household
- Household utility: $E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t, \{N_t(i)\}, \chi_t)$

$$\begin{aligned} U_t(C_t, \{N_t(i)\}, \chi_t) &\equiv \log C_t - \chi_t \int_0^1 \int_0^{N_t(i)} j^\varphi dj di \\ &= \log C_t - \chi_t \int_0^1 \frac{N_t(i)^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} di \end{aligned}$$

where $C_t \equiv \left(\int_0^1 C_t(z)^{1-\frac{1}{\epsilon_p}} dz \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_p}{\epsilon_p-1}}$ and $\chi_t \equiv \exp\{\zeta_t\}$ is a preference shifter

- Budget constraint

$$\int_0^1 P_t(z) C_t(z) dz + Q_t B_t \leq B_{t-1} + \int_0^1 W_t(i) N_t(i) di + \Pi_t$$

- Two optimality conditions

$$C_t(z) = \left(\frac{P_t(z)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} C_t$$

where $P_t \equiv \left(\int_0^1 P_t(z)^{1-\epsilon_p} dz \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon_p}}$ and

$$Q_t = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{C_t}{C_{t+1}} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \right\}$$

Wage Setting

- Nominal wage for each labor type reset with probability $1 - \theta_w$ each period
- Average wage dynamics

$$w_t = \theta_w w_{t-1} + (1 - \theta_w) w_t^*$$

- Optimal wage setting rule

$$w_t^* = \mu^w + (1 - \beta\theta_w) \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta\theta_w)^k E_t \{ mrs_{t+k|t} + p_{t+k} \}$$

where $\mu^w \equiv \log \frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1}$ and $mrs_{t+k|t} \equiv c_{t+k} + \varphi n_{t+k|t} + \zeta_{t+k}$

- Wage inflation equation

$$\pi_t^w = \beta E_t \{ \pi_{t+1}^w \} - \lambda_w (\mu_t^w - \mu^w)$$

where $\pi_t^w \equiv w_t - w_{t-1}$, $\mu_t^w \equiv w_t - p_t - mrs_t$, and $\lambda_w \equiv \frac{(1-\theta_w)(1-\beta\theta_w)}{\theta_w(1+\epsilon_w\varphi)}$.

Introducing Unemployment

- Participation condition for an individual (i, j) :

$$\left(\frac{1}{C_t}\right) \left(\frac{W_t(i)}{P_t}\right) \geq \chi_t j^\varphi$$

- Marginal participant, $L_t(i)$, given by:

$$\frac{W_t(i)}{P_t} = \chi_t C_t L_t(i)^\varphi$$

- Taking logs and integrating over i ,

$$w_t - p_t = c_t + \varphi l_t + \zeta_t$$

where $l_t \equiv \int_0^1 l_t(i) di$ is the model's implied (log) aggregate participation

Introducing Unemployment

- Unemployment rate

$$u_t \equiv l_t - n_t$$

- Average wage markup and unemployment

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_t^w &= (w_t - p_t) - (c_t + \varphi n_t + \zeta_t) \\ &= (w_t - p_t) - (c_t + \varphi l_t + \zeta_t) + \varphi (l_t - n_t) \\ &= \varphi u_t\end{aligned}$$

- Under flexible wages:


$$\mu^w = \varphi u^n$$

$\Rightarrow u^n$: *natural* rate of unemployment

- The nature of unemployment and its fluctuations
- A New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve

$$\pi_t^w = \beta E_t \{ \pi_{t+1}^w \} - \lambda_w \varphi (u_t - u^n)$$

Figure 1. The Wage Markup and the Unemployment Rate



Firms and Price Setting

- Continuum of firms, $z \in [0, 1]$, each producing a differentiated good.
- Technology

$$Y_t(z) = A_t N_t(z)^{1-\alpha}$$

where $N_t(z) \equiv \left(\int_0^1 N_t(i, z)^{1-\frac{1}{\epsilon_w}} di \right)^{\frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w-1}}$

- The price of each good reset with a probability $1 - \theta_p$ each period
- Average price dynamics

$$p_t = \theta_p p_{t-1} + (1 - \theta_p) p_t^*$$

- Optimal price setting rule

$$p_t^* = \mu^p + (1 - \beta\theta_p) \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta\theta_p)^k E_t\{\psi_{t+k|t}\}$$

Firms and Price Setting

- Implied price inflation equation

$$\pi_t^p = \beta E_t \{ \pi_{t+1}^p \} - \lambda_p (\mu_t^p - \mu^p)$$

where

$$\mu_t^p \equiv p_t - \psi_t,$$

$$\psi_t \equiv w_t - (a_t - \alpha n_t + \log(1 - \alpha))$$

and

$$\lambda_p \equiv \frac{(1 - \theta_p)(1 - \beta\theta_p)}{\theta_p} \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \alpha + \alpha\epsilon_p}.$$

Equilibrium

- Non-Policy block

$$\tilde{y}_t = E_t\{\tilde{y}_{t+1}\} - (i_t - E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - r_t^n)$$

$$\pi_t^p = \beta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}^p\} + \kappa_p \tilde{y}_t + \lambda_p \tilde{\omega}_t$$

$$\pi_t^w = \beta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}^w\} + \kappa_w \tilde{y}_t - \lambda_w \tilde{\omega}_t$$

$$\tilde{\omega}_t = \tilde{\omega}_{t-1} + \pi_t^w - \pi_t^p - \Delta\omega_t^n$$

where $\tilde{y}_t \equiv y_t - y_t^n$, $\omega_t \equiv w_t - p_t$ and $\tilde{\omega}_t \equiv \omega_t - \omega_t^n$

- Policy block

$$i_t = \rho + \phi_\pi \pi_t^p + \phi_y y_t + v_t$$

- Natural equilibrium

$$\omega_t^n = a_t + \left(\frac{\alpha}{1 + \varphi} \right) \zeta_t$$

$$y_t^n = a_t - \left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{1 + \varphi} \right) \zeta_t$$

$$r_t^n = \rho + E_t\{\Delta a_{t+1}\} - \left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{1 + \varphi} \right) E_t\{\Delta \zeta_{t+1}\}$$

- Exogenous processes for $\{a_t\}$, $\{\zeta_t\}$, and $\{v_t\}$
- Unemployment

$$\begin{aligned} u_t - u^n &= \frac{1}{\varphi} (\mu_t^w - \mu^w) \\ &= \frac{1}{\varphi} \tilde{\omega}_t - \left(\frac{1}{\varphi} + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \right) \tilde{y}_t \end{aligned}$$

Nominal Wage Rigidities and Unemployment Fluctuations: Simulations

Baseline calibration

	<i>Description</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Target</i>
φ	Curvature of labor disutility	5	Frisch elasticity 0.2
α	Index of decreasing returns to labor	1/4	
ϵ_w	Elasticity of substitution (labor)	4.52	$u^n = 0.05$
ϵ_p	Elasticity of substitution (goods)	9	$S = \frac{1-\alpha}{\epsilon_p/(\epsilon_p-1)} = 2/3$
θ_p	Calvo index of price rigidities	3/4	avg. duration = 4
θ_p	Calvo index of price rigidities	3/4	avg. duration = 4
ϕ_p	Inflation coefficient in policy rule	1.5	Taylor (1993)
ϕ_y	Output coefficient in policy rule	0.125	Taylor (1993)
β	Discount factor	0.99	
ρ_i	Persistence exogenous processes	0.9	

Nominal Wage Rigidities and Unemployment Fluctuations: Simulations

- Impulse responses and conditional second moments
- The role of wage rigidities as a source of unemployment volatility and persistence

Figure 1a. Dynamic Responses to a Technology Shock




Figure 1b. Dynamic Responses to a Monetary Shock




Figure 1c. Dynamic Responses to a Labor Supply Shock








Table 2. Second Moments: Model vs. Data (HP-Filtered)

	<i>U.S. Data</i>		<i>Euro Data</i>		<i>Technology</i>		<i>Monetary</i>		<i>Labor Supply</i>	
	$\frac{\sigma(x)}{\sigma(y)}$	$\rho(x, y)$	$\frac{\sigma(x)}{\sigma(y)}$	$\rho(x, y)$	$\frac{\sigma(x)}{\sigma(y)}$	$\rho(x, y)$	$\frac{\sigma(x)}{\sigma(y)}$	$\rho(x, y)$	$\frac{\sigma(x)}{\sigma(y)}$	$\rho(x, y)$
<i>Unemployment</i>	0.46	-0.89	0.37	-0.81	1.30	0.96	1.68	-0.99	4.42	0.95
<i>Employment</i>	0.60	0.82	0.63	0.78	1.44	-0.98	1.49	0.99	1.49	0.99
<i>Labor force</i>	0.23	0.26	0.32	0.54	0.17	-0.92	0.17	-0.98	5.87	0.97
<i>Real Wage</i>	0.59	0.16	0.69	0.27	0.38	0.53	0.15	0.57	0.87	-0.75
<i>Inflation</i>	0.34	0.36	0.39	0.36	0.40	-0.99	0.20	0.99	0.31	-0.99

Table 3. Wage Rigidities and Unemployment Fluctuations

	Volatility			Persistence			Cyclicality		
$\theta_w :$	0.1	0.5	0.75	0.1	0.5	0.75	0.1	0.5	0.75
$\rho_v = 0.0$	0.18	0.22	0.23	-0.16	-0.08	-0.07	-0.99	-1.0	-1.0
$\rho_v = 0.5$	0.24	0.39	0.42	0.20	0.34	0.37	-0.98	-0.99	-1.0
$\rho_v = 0.9$	0.15	0.54	1.0	0.40	0.62	0.68	-0.92	-0.99	-1.0

Summary and Conclusions

- Reformulation of the standard New Keynesian model, with an explicit introduction of unemployment
- Nominal wage rigidities \Rightarrow source of unemployment fluctuations
- Simulations: realistic nominal wage rigidities may, *in themselves*, be a significant source of unemployment fluctuations, of size and persistence comparable to those found in postwar U.S. data.
- Further research: need to understand the role of additional factors
 - real wage rigidities
 - search frictions
 - variations in the natural rate (Galí-Smets-Wouters)