

# Sustaining Honesty in Public Service: The Role of Selection\*

Sebastian Barfort<sup>†</sup>    Nikolaj A. Harmon<sup>‡</sup>    Frederik Hjorth<sup>§</sup>  
Asmus Leth Olsen<sup>¶</sup>

This version: July 2017

First version: September 2015

## Abstract

We study the role of self-selection into public service in sustaining honesty in the public sector. Focusing on the world's least corrupt country, Denmark, we use a survey experiment to document strong self-selection of more honest individuals into public service. This result differs sharply from existing findings from more corrupt settings. Differences in pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation appear central to the observed selection pattern. Dishonest individuals are more pecuniarily motivated and self-select out of public service and into higher-paying private sector jobs. Accordingly, we find that increasing public sector wages would attract more dishonest candidates to public service in Denmark.

---

\*This research was funded by grants from the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Copenhagen and from the Economic Policy Research Network. We thank Andreas Gotfredsen, Ray Fisman, Rema Hanna, Marco Piovesan, Søren Serritzlew, Peter Bjerre Mortensen, David Broockman, Robert Klemmensen, Alexander Sebald, Lene Holm Pedersen, Donald Green, Jon Fiva, Edward Miguel, Ritwik Banerjee, Frederico Finan, Ernesto Dal Bó and Alex Mas for helpful comments and discussions. We also thank seminar participants at the University of California Berkeley, the American Political Science Association Meetings 2015, Copenhagen Business School, the University of California Santa Barbara, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, University of Copenhagen, the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings 2015, the Public Management Research Conference 2015, Stockholm University SOFI, Aarhus University and the 2016 NGO conference at the Paris School of Economics. The paper was previously circulated under the title "Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service in Denmark: Who Runs the World's Least Corrupt Public Sector?".

<sup>†</sup>London School of Economics and Political Science, [s.barfort@lse.ac.uk](mailto:s.barfort@lse.ac.uk).

<sup>‡</sup>University of Copenhagen, [nikolaj.harmon@econ.ku.dk](mailto:nikolaj.harmon@econ.ku.dk) (corresponding author, mailing address: Nikolaj A. Harmon, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, building 26, 1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark).

<sup>§</sup>University of Copenhagen, [fh@ifs.ku.dk](mailto:fh@ifs.ku.dk).

<sup>¶</sup>University of Copenhagen, [ajlo@ifs.ku.dk](mailto:ajlo@ifs.ku.dk).

# 1 Introduction

Research on corruption has tended to emphasize formal differences in individual incentives for misuse of public office, emphasizing monitoring and punishment as deterrents from engaging in corrupt behavior. While this focus has been very fruitful (see Olken and Pande 2012 for a recent survey), recent evidence have suggested that individual attributes such as cultural values may also play a prominent role (Fisman et al. 2015; Fisman and Miguel 2007).

This paper explores the role of individual selection in generating an equilibrium of honesty and low corruption in public service. Using Denmark as a low-corruption case study, we ask whether potential candidates for public service jobs differ in their inherent propensity for dishonest behavior, and if so whether systematic self-selection of honest types into public service may be one channel that helps sustain a low level of corruption. To draw lessons for combatting corruption in other settings, we further ask how the observed selection pattern is related to other individual attributes, as well as the level of public sector wages.

Theory provides ambiguous predictions regarding the questions we pose. The inherent propensity for dishonesty could differ significantly across potential candidates for public service or could be relatively constant within a country. Moreover, even if dishonesty does vary across potential public service candidates, it is unclear how dishonesty should relate to preferences for entering public service. On the one hand, the relatively low level of public sector corruption in Denmark could discourage dishonest individuals from entering this sector. On the other hand, the Danish public sector is not immune to rent extraction (Amore and Bennedsen 2013), and the sheer size of public budgets in Denmark means that even small scale rent extraction in the public sector may be very lucrative for dishonest individuals. Finally, to the extent that dishonesty correlates with other individual attributes that shape job preferences, such as risk aversion or pro-social motivation, this may further complicate the observed selection pattern.

To provide empirical guidance on these questions, we conduct a survey experiment with students in the fields of law, economics, and political science at the University of

Copenhagen in Denmark. Given its consistent ranking as the least corrupt country in the world, Denmark is a useful benchmark for studying how countries can sustain low levels of corruption. For studying selection into public service, the particular population of students we focus on is very well suited. They face a very clear choice between public service and private sector careers and make up an important part of the public sector workforce.

We first examine the extent of heterogeneity in dishonesty and how this heterogeneity is related to preferences for entering public service. We adopt the experimental methodology of Hanna and Wang (2017) and subject students to a standard set of cheating tasks building on Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). In our implementation of the tasks, students can win money by correctly guessing the outcome of a series of dice rolls but are allowed to see the outcome of each roll before reporting their guess. Students therefore have the option of winning dishonestly by misreporting their guess, knowing that it can never be proven whether in fact they were dishonest. Comparing the distribution of successful guesses in the dice game to the expected distribution without lying, however, allows us to construct estimates of individual propensities for dishonesty.

The cheating tasks reveal extensive heterogeneity among potential candidates for public service. We estimate that 10% of respondents barely cheat at all, while 13% cheat practically all the time. The remaining 77% fall somewhere in between, resulting in a standard deviation of cheat rates across individuals of 0.39. Relating dishonesty to job preferences, we find clear evidence of positive self-selection into public service, as honest individuals in Denmark are systematically more likely to want to enter public service. Students ranking public administration as one of their top two job choices cheat 10 percentage points less than other students.

To shed some light on why this selection pattern exists, we next examine how dishonesty and job preferences correlate with other attributes. We find no evidence that ability or risk preferences correlate with dishonesty. Differences in pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation, however, turn out to be strong predictors of both dishonesty and job preferences. Pro-social individuals who donate more in a dictator game are both more honest and

more likely to prefer a public service career. Conversely, pecuniarily motivated individuals who view the wage level as a particularly important job characteristic are less honest and less likely to prefer a public service career. This can explain a significant part of the observed selection pattern; controlling for two simple measures of pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation reduces the relationship between dishonesty and preferences for public service by 30%.

Finally, we examine how the observed selection pattern is related to the level of public sector wages. Public sector jobs in Denmark are characterized by relatively low wages compared to the private sector. Combined with our findings regarding pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation, this suggests that the observed selection pattern may reflect that more pecuniarily motivated dishonest individuals self-select out of the Danish public sector due to its relatively low wage level. We provide evidence in favor of this hypothesis by analyzing a set of counterfactual job preference question that ask students to choose between a job in the public and the private sector given different counterfactual relative wage levels. These show that increases in the level of public sector wages would attract more dishonest candidates to public service.

The idea that individuals may differ in their inherent propensity for dishonesty has a long tradition in the theoretical literature on corruption (Lui 1986; Cadot 1987; Andvig and Moene 1990) and is supported empirically by the fact that personality traits predict corrupt behavior (Callen et al. 2015). The role of selection on the dishonesty dimension has also received theoretical attention (Caselli and Morelli 2004; Besley 2004; Bernheim and Kartik 2014). In particular, our finding that higher public sector wages attract more dishonest candidates mirror the theoretical predictions regarding the effect of politician salaries in the influential work of Besley (2004). Our result that the observed selection pattern is related to differences in pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation also directly relates to the literature on job choice and extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation (Benabou and Tirole 2003; Besley and Ghatak 2005; Delfgaauw and Dur 2007).

Empirically, a number of recent papers have examined selection into public service.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Dal Bó, Finan, and Rossi (2013), Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee (2016), and Deserranno (2016) use field experiments to examine how pecuniary incentives affect selection into public service jobs in Mexico,

However, only a handful of empirical papers have focused on dishonesty. Closest to the present paper are Hanna and Wang (2017), who use the same experimental methodology to show that dishonest university students are more likely to want to enter public service in India. Similarly, Banerjee, Baul, and Rosenblat (2015) run a corruption experiment at two different Indian universities and find more dishonest behavior at the university targeting public service careers. Finally, Alatas et al. (2009) find no correlation between preferences for working in the public sector and bribing behavior in an explicit corruption game among Indonesian students.

To our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine dishonesty and selection into public service in a low-corruption environment and is also the first to document a positive selection pattern where honest individuals systematically prefer public service. Additionally, our paper provides the first evidence that the level of public sector wages may impact the selection of honest and dishonest individuals into public service.

Besides the literature on corruption and selection into public service, our paper builds on a larger experimental literature exploring the nature and causes of dishonest behavior across societies (e.g. Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2009; Shalvi et al. 2011; Weisel and Shalvi 2015; Gächter and Schulz 2016; Houser et al. 2016). Besides Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and Hanna and Wang (2017), the design of our experimental dishonesty task draws particularly on Jiang (2013). Finally, by using experimental methods to study questions specifically related to corruption, our paper also relates to the experimental literature on corruption or bribery games (see Abbink and Serra 2012 for a recent survey).

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the context and aim of the study. In Section 3 we present the survey experiment used to construct the key variables of the study. In Section 4 we present the main results regarding dishonesty and selection into public service. In Section 5 we present additional results regarding the mechanisms behind the observed selection pattern. Section 6 concludes.

---

Zambia and Uganda in various dimensions, including ability and pro-social preferences. Combining survey and experimental data, Kolstad and Lindkvist (2013) and Serra, Serneels, and Barr (2011) examine how pro-social preferences correlate with wanting to work in the public sector in Tanzania and with working in the non-profit sector in Ethiopia. Buurman et al. (2012) examine whether public sector employees in the Netherlands differ in risk preference or their level of altruism. Finan, Olken, and Pande (2015) provides a broader survey.

## 2 Context and aim of the study

Most research on corruption focuses on high-corruption settings and aims to understand why corruption is so prevalent or how it is affected by policy changes. This paper takes the opposite approach. We focus on a benchmark country that has been successful in maintaining a consistently low level of corruption and try to shed light on how this low corruption equilibrium is being sustained.

Accordingly, the setting of the study is Denmark. For studying how to sustain honesty in public service, Denmark is a natural benchmark country given its consistent ranking among the very least corrupt countries in the world. Figure 1 shows the levels of corruption in different countries 1996-2014 as measured by the commonly used Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), with Denmark highlighted (Transparency International 2016). Since 2007 Denmark has ranked as the least corrupt country in the CPI every year but two, and in the history of the CPI Denmark has never ranked lower than fourth.<sup>2</sup>

The overall aim of our empirical exercise is to examine the potential role played by dishonesty and self-selection into public service in sustaining Denmark's low corruption level. The idea we examine is simple: Whether a public official engages in corrupt behavior will depend on many institutional features of the environment he faces such as monitoring and punishment schemes and the size of the potential gains. In addition to these factors, however, it may also be influenced by his own inherent propensity for engaging in dishonest behavior. For a given level of monitoring and other factors, a public sector that primarily attracts inherently honest employees will thus exhibit lower levels of fraudulent behavior than one that attracts more dishonest individuals. The main aim of our analysis is to examine whether there is any systematic self-selection of honest (or dishonest) individuals into public service in Denmark. Additionally, we aim to shed some light on possible mechanisms that explain the observed selection pattern.

---

<sup>2</sup>This pattern is not exclusive to the CPI. For example, the World Bank Governance Indicator "Control of Corruption", detailed in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010), has ranked Denmark as the least corrupt country in the world every year since 2007 and never ranked Denmark lower than second.

## 2.1 Study population

Within Denmark, the population we study consists of university students in the fields of law, economics, and political science. Higher education is highly specialized in Denmark and practically all university students complete both a bachelor and a master's degree in their chosen field of study, which in turn strongly influences the jobs available to them upon graduation. For the purpose of our study, students in law, economics, and political science are ideal for two reasons: First, these students face a very clear choice between entering the private sector or going into public service. For current employees with a background in economics, law, or political science, around 46% work in the public sector, mostly in public administration, and 54% in the private sector, typically in finance, law firms, and lobbying organizations. Second, this population is large and influential enough to actually affect the corruption level of the public sector. About 60% of all state-level employees in administrative functions have a background in one of the three fields we study or a closely related field. They are also dominant at the top level of the public sector: 100% of current deputy secretaries and about 40% of members of parliament hold a degree in one of the three fields.

As discussed above, corruption is by all accounts rare in Denmark. Given the motivation for our study, however, it is worth briefly considering what type of corrupt behavior our student population might in principle undertake in their public service careers. For those entering public administration at the local level, many of them will be engaged in direct administrative work that affect individual citizens and businesses and offers the opportunity of bribe-taking or other forms of misbehavior. Amore and Bennedsen (2013), for example, have documented rent extraction in the procurement of local public services in Denmark. In other instances, potential corruption could take a more indirect form. Many graduates from these fields work in offices which help develop and prepare legislative input to elected officials. These may be influenced into serving the interests of private companies or other organizations.

### 3 Data and experimental design

Our empirical analysis is based on an online survey experiment conducted at the University of Copenhagen during December 2014. The university administration provided us with complete lists of everyone who enrolled as undergraduates in law, economics, and political science, including student e-mail addresses. From these lists random samples of 1,000 students who enrolled over the years 2009-2011 and 2013-2014<sup>3</sup> were drawn from each of the three fields and were invited to participate in the survey experiment. The invitation to participate was sent as an e-mail with a link to the survey along with a username and password.<sup>4</sup> Participants were told that the survey dealt with their attitudes to various topics and “how they acted in situations characterized by uncertainty.” The latter referred to the various incentivized games which they would encounter in the survey and which will be outlined in detail below. Participants were also told that they would be paid to participate. In accordance with the actual outcomes, participants were informed that the average participant would earn no less than 50 DKK (8 USD), that the maximum payoff was above 300 DKK (50 USD), and that the survey would take approximately 20 minutes to complete.<sup>5</sup> For comparison, the student population in question would in a typical student job usually receive a union-defined hourly wage of about 110 DKK (18 USD), corresponding to 37 DKK (6 USD) per 20 minutes.

In total 863 students completed the survey. From these we drop one individual who experienced technical difficulties during the main dishonesty experiment in the survey, leaving us with a base sample of 862 participants. In terms of representativeness, our sampling scheme by definition implies that the pool of invitees is statistically representative within each field of study. At the end of Section 5 and in Appendix A.5, we examine potential issues related to selective non-participation by exploiting the availability of

---

<sup>3</sup>Students who enrolled prior to 2009 were not invited as many of them have graduated and therefore may no longer use their student e-mail. Pilot studies were run on students enrolling in 2012, so these were not invited so as to not contaminate the subject pool.

<sup>4</sup>The experiment was run using a software called “ILab” developed by Andreas Gotfredsen and Alexander Sebald.

<sup>5</sup>The realized maximum payoff for a participant was 315 DKK (53 USD) and the average payoff was 80 DKK (13 USD). The median time from opening the survey to completion was 25 minutes. At the time of the survey experiment 1 USD equaled about 6 DKK.



administrative university data for non-participants.

### 3.1 Measuring dishonesty

The first main purpose of our survey experiment is to measure respondents' inherent propensities for dishonesty. We follow Hanna and Wang (2017) and measure dishonesty using a repeated variation of the *dice-under-cup* game approach from Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Behavior in these types of games have become a widely used measure of dishonesty (see for example Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer 2012; Gneezy, Rockenbach, and Serra-Garcia 2013; Hilbig and Hessler 2013; Cohn, Fehr, and Maréchal 2014; Ariely et al. 2014) and has been shown to predict real-world dishonest behavior and rule breaking (Cohn, Maréchal, and Noll 2015; Cohn and Maréchal 2015). Given that the present paper is motivated by understanding public sector corruption, we note in particular that dishonesty in dice under cup games has been shown to predict actual fraudulent behavior among public sector employees (Hanna and Wang 2017).

For our specific implementation of the dice under cup approach, we build on the computer-based variation of Jiang (2013).<sup>6</sup> Our implementation works as follows:<sup>7</sup> At four different points in the survey experiment, participants were asked to play ten rounds of a dice guessing game. Students were told that the game was intended to test how they “guess in situations characterized by randomness” and that they could win money in the game by correctly guessing the outcome of a dice roll. In each round of the dice game respondents were first asked to think of a number between 1 and 6 that they expected the dice to show after the dice roll. Students then clicked “next” while keeping their guess in mind. A dice was rolled on screen and the outcome of the dice roll was reported. The participants were then asked to report their guess while the actual outcome of the dice roll was still displayed. On the following screen the payoff from the round was reported.

---

<sup>6</sup>Our motivation for using the computer-based implementation is that it can be conducted online. Using an online implementation allowed us to systematically sample and invite participations directly from the university e-mail database, while simultaneously keeping participation costs low and ensuring as high a participation rate as possible. Both of these features are important for dealing with the issue of sample representativeness, which is particularly critical given that our focus is on estimate the relationship between job preferences and dishonesty in the underlying population.

<sup>7</sup>Screen caps of the game as viewed by the respondents, including exact translations of all instructions for the game, are presented in Appendix A.8.

Reporting a correct guess yielded a gain of 2 DKK (0.33 USD) relative to an incorrect one.<sup>8</sup>

The point of the dice guessing game is that in each round, respondents have the option of winning dishonestly by reporting the actual outcome of the dice roll regardless of what their initial guess was. Moreover, a strength of the design is that respondents are not explicitly primed to think about dishonesty and respondents know in each round that it can never be revealed whether in fact they reported their guess honestly.<sup>9</sup> Because an honest individual always has a one-in-six chance of correctly guessing each dice roll, however, we can make statistical statements about individual dishonesty after observing more repetitions of the game. Letting  $Y_i$  denote the number of times individual  $i$  reports a correct guess, we can construct an unbiased estimate of the fraction of times individual  $i$  cheats in the dice game as follows:<sup>10</sup>

$$\widehat{CheatRate}_i = \frac{6}{5} \cdot \left( \frac{Y_i}{40} - \frac{1}{6} \right)$$

We refer to this as individual  $i$ 's *estimated cheat rate* and use this as our main measure of individuals' propensity for dishonesty.

Two properties of this measure are worth highlighting here. First, because our estimated cheat rate is a linear transformation of the total number of reported wins, alternative approaches that use the raw number of correct guesses (or total winnings) as measures of dishonesty would simply rescale the regression results we present later. Second, the inherent randomness in whether dice rolls match respondents' (honest) guesses implies that there is noise in the estimated cheat rate. In Section A.1 of the appendix we show how to characterize this noise by invoking simple assumptions on the time dependence of dishonest behavior. We find that the amount of noise is decreasing in the number of dice guessing rounds that each person plays and increasing in the true probability of a correct

---

<sup>8</sup>In our pilot studies, we explicitly tested whether behavior depended on the level of payoffs or gains and found no evidence of stakes-dependency in our setting.

<sup>9</sup>One may still worry that upon realizing that they can lie undetected in the game, students implicitly feel that being dishonest is the point of the game. In an attempt to mitigate this type of experimental demand, we concluded the introduction screen by stating that: "it is important that you are careful about remembering and reporting the exact number on which you guessed prior to rolling the die".

<sup>10</sup>Section A.1 in the appendix provides a formal econometric derivation of this estimator.

guess. This motivates our chosen implementation of the dice guessing game, which has many rounds and a low win probability in each round.

## 3.2 Measuring job preferences

The second key variable in the empirical analysis is the students' preferences for public service jobs. For our main measure of job preferences, we asked students to imagine that they have obtained their academic degree and are now free to choose between jobs. In this scenario they were then asked to rank eight categories based on the most common jobs held by graduates from our student population: public administration, private sector job in the financial sector, private sector job in a political party or lobby organization, private sector job within public relations, private sector job in a law firm, a job in the Danish Central Bank, other public sector job, or other private sector job. These particular categories were chosen to match the eight most common industry categories for our study population in the official Danish employment statistics. As noted, public administration is by far the most important public service career for our population. For our main measure of students' preferences for entering public service, we therefore focus on the rank given to public administration.

For robustness, we also elicited additional measures of job preferences. In one question, we asked students to report the likelihood of them ending up in each of the eight job categories described above.<sup>11</sup> In addition, we administered a standard 16-item questionnaire measuring Public Service Motivation (PSM), which is often used as an indication of respondents' dispositional preferences for working in the public sector (Perry and Wise 1990).

Finally, for examining the role played by the level of public sector wages, we subjected all respondents to nine different counterfactual wage scenarios. In each scenario respondents were asked to choose between their preferred job in the private sector and their preferred job in the public sector given a particular wage gap between the two jobs ranging from the private sector job paying 20,000 DKK (3,300 USD) more per month to the public

---

<sup>11</sup>To ease students' way through the survey, we did not require that the reported probabilities sum to a hundred. In the empirical analysis we rescale them appropriately.

sector job paying 20,000 DKK more per month.

### 3.3 Additional measures

To examine how dishonesty and self-selection into public service are related to other student attributes, we included a range of other standard experimental tasks and questions in the survey experiment. At the beginning of the survey experiment, we asked respondents to play a simple dictator game. Respondents were given a gift of 15 DKK (2.5 USD).<sup>12</sup> They were then offered to get the money transferred to their account when the survey was finished or donate some or all of the money to one of five charities of their choice. Furthermore, as they increased their own donation we matched their donation amount with up to 4 DKK (0.75 USD) using a concave matching schedule.

We also included an incentivized measure of risk aversion at the beginning of the survey. Students were told that one in ten of them would be randomly selected to enter into a coin flip lottery at the end of the survey. They were then asked to choose between five different such lotteries with varying risk profiles.<sup>13</sup>

As a proxy of ability, we asked students to report their high school GPA. High school exams are standardized nationally in Denmark and provide a good measure of ability for the population we study. In the empirical analysis, we standardize GPAs across field to avoid mechanical correlations stemming from the admissions cut-offs for the different fields.<sup>14</sup>

To get direct measures of students' preferences regarding job characteristics, we asked them to rank the following five job characteristics in order of importance: wage level, work hours and other terms of work, importance, entertainment value, and job security.

Finally, we use data on the students' gender. Table 1 provides summary statistics. As

---

<sup>12</sup>In pilot studies we experimented with the placement of the dictator game but found no evidence that the timing of the dictator game mattered for dishonesty behavior or public sector preferences.

<sup>13</sup>The lotteries were designed based on the range of constant relative risk aversion coefficients reported for the Danish population in Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2007). The most risky coin lottery involved a gain of 200 DKK (33 USD) in case of heads and 0 DKK for tails. The least risky lottery involved a gain of 80 DKK (16 USD) regardless of the coin flip.

<sup>14</sup>Admission to different fields in Danish higher education is based high school GPA, with the necessary GPA varying widely across different fields. This introduces strong mechanical differences in student GPAs across fields, which are unrelated to their own career preferences.

the table shows, a few of the observations lack information about some variables. These are caused by erroneous reporting and a few students experiencing technical issues during parts of the survey experiment.

## 4 Main results: Dishonesty and self-selection

We start our empirical investigation by examining the variation in dishonest behavior in our dice guessing experiment. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the observed number of correct guesses across students in our dice guessing experiment, along with the distribution of correct guesses that would be expected if students report their guesses completely honestly. Comparing the two distribution, we see evidence of extensive dishonest behavior. For example, the probability of an honest respondent having 10 or more correct guesses is about 12%, yet 73% of respondents report 10 or more correct guesses in our sample.

The figure also suggest that the amount of dishonest behavior differs very significantly across individuals. While many students' report a number of correct guesses well above the 99th percentile of the honest distribution, other students actually report fewer correct guesses than what would be expected under full honesty.<sup>15</sup> In appendix A.1, we show how the data in Figure 2 can be used to construct estimators of the full distribution of dishonesty across individuals if one imposes simple assumptions on the time dependence of dishonesty. Applying such an estimator we find that about 10% of individual in our data are practically completely honest and cheat less than 1% of the time, while 13% are practically completely dishonest and cheat more than 99% of the time. The remaining 77% are spread fairly evenly in-between, and the standard deviation of cheat rates across individuals is 0.39.<sup>16</sup> Despite facing the same opportunities and incentives to behave

---

<sup>15</sup>Under full honesty the 99th percentile is 13 correct guesses, while the expected number of correct guesses is 6.7.

<sup>16</sup>This is relative to a mean of 0.42. The result that many respondents cheat a little bit but not the full

dishonestly in the survey experiment, we thus see extensive heterogeneity in dishonesty within our pool of potential candidates for public service.

## 4.1 Dishonesty and self-selection into public service

Next we turn to the main focus of the paper and examine whether the observed differences in the propensity for dishonesty are correlated with preferences for a public service career. We do this in the context of a simple regression that relates individual  $i$ 's estimated cheat rate to an indicator for whether individual  $i$  prefers a public service career,  $PublicService_i$ :

$$\widehat{CheatRate}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PublicService_i + \varepsilon_i$$

The estimate of  $\beta_1$  in this regression estimates the average gap in individual cheat rates between individuals that have a preference for a public service career and those who do not.<sup>17</sup>

Table 2 shows estimates of this regression using different measures of job preferences. Column 1 focuses on our main measure of job preferences: whether students rank public administration in the top two of the eight job categories described in Section 3. The estimated coefficient on the indicator for job preferences is -0.10 and is highly significant, suggesting that more honest individuals are systematically more likely to prefer a public service career.

Columns 2 to 5 examine the robustness of this result to using other measures of job preferences. In Column 2 we replace the indicator variable from Column 1 with the flipped

---

amount is a standard finding in these types of dice games (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013; Hilbig and Hessler 2013; Shalvi, Handgraaf, and De Dreu 2011).

<sup>17</sup>Note that since  $\widehat{CheatRate}_i$  is an unbiased estimator of individual  $i$ 's true cheat rate, we can ignore the fact that we are using the estimated cheat rate instead of the actual cheat rate on the left hand side of the regression.

actual rank given to public administration (so a higher value means a stronger preference for public service). In Column 3 we use the measured PSM score. In Column 4 we use data from our counterfactual wage question, focusing on whether the student would choose the public sector over the private sector if faced with a sectoral wage gap of 5,000 DKK (833 USD) per month, corresponding to the typical gap in starting wages between the two sectors. Finally, in Column 5 we include the students' reported probability of entering public administration. Across all these measures we see a negative and highly significant correlation between cheat rates and expressing a preference for entering public service. At the end of Section 5 and in the appendix, we show that the observed correlation is robust to a wide range of other checks on the specification.

In sum, we find a clear pattern of positive self-selection into public service in Denmark, as more honest individuals systematically tend to prefer public service jobs. The estimate in Column 1 implies that students ranking public administration in the top two cheat 10 percentage points less than other students. Relative to the mean cheat rate of 0.42 this represents a 24% relative gap in cheat rates.

## 5 Additional results: Mechanism and robustness

In the previous section, we saw that there is systematic self-selection of more honest individuals into public service in Denmark. Next, we try to shed light on why this selection pattern exists.

Many different factors could contribute to the observed selection pattern. If more honest individuals tend to stand out in terms of other attributes or preferences, the particular job characteristics offered in public service may systematically attract these individuals. Alternatively, if dishonest individuals are attracted by the opportunity to

profit from corrupt behavior, the currently perceived scope for public sector dishonesty may influence selection patterns.<sup>18</sup> This could imply that negative or positive selection patterns may be self-reinforcing. It could also imply that the observed selection patterns respond to the level of monitoring and punishment in the public sector as dishonest individuals opt out of public service when the opportunities for public sector corruption diminishes.

Given that our survey experiment does not yield any variation in the perceived corruption level or the level of monitoring and punishment, we are unable to explore the role played by these factors. Since our survey experiment measured a range of additional attributes, we can however examine whether honest individuals stand out in terms of other attributes and whether this appears to play a role in shaping job preferences. We can also examine the role played by public sector wages using the counterfactual wage questions.

## 5.1 Correlates of dishonesty and job preferences

We start our investigation by asking whether dishonest individuals and/or individuals preferring public service careers stand out in terms of other attributes. In doing so, we focus on four key attributes which ex ante appear plausible drivers of the relationship between dishonesty and job preferences: ability, risk aversion, pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation, and gender.

We again use a simple regression framework to examine the correlation between dishonesty, job preferences, and these additional attributes. For each attribute, we regress the individual estimated cheat rate and the indicator for preferring a public service career

---

<sup>18</sup>Corbacho et al. (2016) have shown that such a self-reinforcing effect is present when individuals are deciding whether to engage in corruption.



on a measure of the attribute in question,  $Attribute_i$ :

$$\widehat{CheatRate}_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Attribute_i + e_i$$

$$PublicService_i = \eta_0 + \eta_1 Attribute_i + u_i$$

In these regressions,  $\gamma_1$  shows how the attribute correlates with dishonesty, while  $\eta_1$  shows how it correlates with job preferences. Table 3 shows the results. Panel A of the tables shows the regressions using cheat rate as the outcome variable, while Panel B shows the regressions using the indicator for preferring a public service career as the outcome variable.

Column 1 of the table examines how dishonesty and job preferences correlate with ability, as measured by GPA. We see no evidence that ability correlates with dishonesty or job preferences in our data. In both panels, the estimated coefficient on GPA is close to zero and statistically insignificant.

In Column 2 and 3, we examine risk aversion. In Column 2 we focus on our incentivized risk aversion measure and include an indicator for whether the student chose one of the two most risky lotteries offered.<sup>19</sup> In Column 3 we instead include an indicator for whether the student ranked job security among the two most important job characteristics. Panel A shows no statistically significant correlation between dishonesty and either of the two risk preference measures. In Panel B, there is some indications that risk averse individuals prefer public service. In Column 2, we see that individuals who chose one of the risky lotteries are 5.9 percentage points less likely to prefer public service and this difference is

---

<sup>19</sup>50% of students in our sample chose one of the two most risky lotteries so the simple indicator measure summarizes most of the variation in risk aversion in our sample. We get similar results if we use the risk rank of the chosen lottery, the implied coefficient of relative risk aversion or dummies for each of the lotteries.

marginally significant ( $p = 0.09$ ), however the estimated coefficient on valuing job security in Column 3 points in the opposite direction and is insignificant.<sup>20</sup>

Columns 4 and 5 look at differences in pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation, as measured by donations in the dictator game and whether individuals ranked wage among the two most important job characteristics. These turn out to be strong predictors for both dishonesty and job preferences. In Column 4, we see that each additional DKK donated in the dictator game is associated with a 1.6 percentage decrease in the cheat rate and a 0.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of preferring public service.<sup>21</sup> Conversely, in Column 5, we see that individuals who rank the wage as an important job characteristics cheat 8.3 percentage points more and are 20 percentage points less likely to prefer public service. All of these differences are highly statistically significant.

Column 6 looks at gender. We see that men cheat 6.1 percentage points more than women and are 13 percentage points less likely to prefer public service. Both differences are statistically significant.

Finally in Column 7 we include all six measures in the regressions simultaneously. In Panel B, dictator game donation, gender, and the importance of the wage level remain statistically significant predictors of job preferences, and the estimates are very similar to those reported in the previous columns. In Panel A, dictator game donation continues to show up as a strong predictor of dishonesty, while the coefficient on ranking wage among the two most important job characteristics drops a bit and becomes only marginally significant ( $p = 0.10$ ). The coefficient on gender drops even more, however, and becomes

---

<sup>20</sup>If risk averse individuals rank job security as important and prefer public service we would expect the coefficient in Column 3 to show a *positive* association between preferences for public service and ranking job security as important.

<sup>21</sup>The highest possible donation was 15 DKK so the estimates imply that an individual who donates the maximum amounts cheats 24 percentage points less and is 14 percentage points more likely to prefer public service than an individual who donates nothing. 33% of students choose the maximum possible donation of 15 DKK, while 40% choose to donate nothing.

insignificant. We interpret this as evidence that the relationship between gender and dishonesty is working mostly through gender differences in pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation.

## 5.2 Self-selection conditional on attributes

The results in the preceding section suggest that systematic selection of honest individuals into public service may in part reflect differences in pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation. Pro-social individuals who make large donations in the dictator game are systematically more honest and more likely to prefer a public service career. Conversely, pecuniarily motivated individuals that rank the wage level as an important job characteristic are systematically less honest and less likely to prefer a public service career.

As a simple way to further explore this idea we can examine selection into public service conditional on the different attributes in our data. In particular, we include the different measures from Table 3 as controls in the regression of estimated cheat rate on job preferences:

$$\widehat{CheatRate}_i = \pi_0 + \pi_1 PublicService_i + \pi_2 X_i + \nu_i$$

In this regression,  $\pi_1$  captures the relationship between job preferences and dishonesty after conditioning on the attribute  $X_i$ . To the extent that the observed self-selection of honest individuals into public service is driven by one or more other attributes, the estimate of  $\pi_1$  should decrease when the attribute(s) are added as controls.

Table 4 shows the results. Across Columns 1 to 3 we add the different measures for ability and risk aversion as controls. As would be expected given the results in Table 3, none of these controls affect the estimated relationship between dishonesty and preferences

for public service. As in in the specification without controls in Table 2, the coefficient on the indicator for ranking public service among the two most attractive jobs is -0.10 in all three columns.

Columns 4 and 5 add the measures for pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation to the regression. This reduces the estimated coefficient on the indicator for preferring a public service career. Controlling for donations in the dictator game lowers the estimated coefficient on job preferences to -0.08, while controlling for whether individuals ranked wage as an important job characteristic reduces the coefficient to -0.09. As shown at the bottom of the table these differences in the estimated coefficients are statistically significant. Column 6 adds gender as a control. This also lowers the estimated coefficient on job preferences slightly, although this differences is only marginally significant ( $p = 0.10$ ).

Finally in Column 7, we control for all the different measures simultaneously. After conditioning on all the measures, the coefficient on job preferences is -0.07. As shown in Column 8, this change is driven entirely by controlling for dictator game donations and the indicator for ranking wage as an important job characteristic.

Overall, we conclude that systematic differences in pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation can explain a significant part of the observed selection pattern. Conditioning only on our two simple measures of pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation reduces the cheat rate gap between students with a preference for public service and other students by 30%.<sup>22</sup> Conversely, none of the other attributes we examine appear important for the observed selection pattern.

---

<sup>22</sup>The fact that there is still a significant cheat rate gap after conditioning on these measures is suggestive that other factors also play a role in shaping the observed selection pattern. It could however also reflect the simplicity of our measures of pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation. Our measures are based on behavior in a single dictator game and a single question regarding the ranking of job preferences, which may not perfectly capture all underlying differences in pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation.

### 5.3 The role of public sector wages

We now turn our attention to the role played by the level of public sector wages in shaping selection into public service. The results in the preceding sections have interesting implications for the effect of public sector wages on selection. If dishonest individuals tend to be motivated by pecuniary incentives while honest individuals tend to be motivated more by pro-social concerns, we might expect high public sector wages to affect selection by systematically attracting more dishonest individuals to public service.

Two features of our institutional setting lend support to this idea: First, public sector wages in Denmark tend to be systematically lower than private sector wages. For the population we study, entry level wages in the private sector are typically around 5,000 DKK (833 USD) higher per month. This stands in stark contrast to the considerable public sector wage premiums that are typical in many developing countries struggling with corruption (Finan, Olken, and Pande 2015). Second, in Section A.3 in the appendix we analyze the job preferences of dishonest individuals in our sample and document that dishonest individuals are particularly likely to want a job in the financial sector, which for our student population stand out as by far the best paid job category. This is indicative that the positive selection pattern we observe is driven in part by dishonest individuals being more pecuniarily motivated and self-selecting out of public service jobs and into higher-paid private sector jobs.

To provide a more direct test of how public sector wages relate to the observed selection pattern, we use data from our set of counterfactual wage gap questions. As described in Section 3, these questions ask students to choose between their preferred private and public sector jobs conditional on the two jobs having different wage gaps. From the answers to these questions and the individuals' estimated cheat rates, we can estimate how

changes in the public-private wage gap would affect the selection of honest and dishonest individuals into public service.

Figure 3 shows the results of this exercise. Each pair of lines in the figure correspond to a different hypothetical wage gap between the public and private sector, ranging from the private sector paying 20,000 DKK more per month (3,333 USD) to the private sector paying 20,000 DKK less. For each wage gap, the height of the lines shows the average estimated cheat rate among those who would prefer the public and private sector at the given wage gap.

Furthest to the left, in the scenario where the private sector job pays 20,000 DKK more, the average estimated cheat rate among students preferring the private sector is 0.43 as opposed to only 0.31 among students preferring the public sector, a gap of 12 percentage points. Moving right to scenarios where the public sector wage is relatively higher, the average cheat rates in the two groups begin to converge. In the scenario where the private sector pays 5,000 DKK, roughly the current level of the public-private wage gap for our student population, the gap in cheat rates is down to 9.0 percentage points. Moving further right, the pattern continues. As the relative public sector wage is increased, the average cheat rate increases among public sector candidates and the public-private gap in dishonesty narrows. It eventually flips in scenarios where the public sector wage is 10,000 DKK or more above the private sector wage.

To the extent that students' answers in the hypothetical wage scenarios reflect actual preferences, these results suggest that higher public sector wages would lead to a more dishonest pool of candidates for public service jobs. This supports the notion that the relatively low level of public sector wages in Denmark is important for the observed selection pattern.

## 5.4 Robustness checks

We finish this section of the paper by summarizing some additional results and robustness checks that are presented at length in the appendix.

Our experimental measure of dishonesty has been widely used in the literature and has been validated to predict fraudulent behavior among public sector employees by Hanna and Wang (2017). As always however, differences in the exact experimental implementation may be a concern when comparing results to existing papers or relying on past validations. In Section A.4 in the appendix we compare the data from our survey experiment with data from the closely related experiment of Hanna and Wang (2017). We see remarkably similar correlations between dishonesty and other inherent attributes across the two data sets, suggesting that the specifics of our experimental implementation do not affect our results.

In Section A.5 of the appendix, we also conduct a series of robustness checks to shore up various concerns with our empirical analysis: To assess concerns that the many repetitions in our dice game have made respondents fatigued or otherwise affected their behavior, we try using data from only the first dice roll for each respondent.<sup>23</sup> To assess concerns that some respondents may be affected by knowledge of the existing academic literature on dishonesty and its relation to our experimental tasks, we try dropping respondents that indicate awareness of experimental dishonesty games. To assess concerns that our results are driven only by extreme cheaters, we try excluding respondents who guess correctly in every round of our dice guessing game. Our results are robust to all the above mentioned alternative sample restrictions.

---

<sup>23</sup>Our estimated cheat rate remains an unbiased (although quite noisy) estimate of the true cheat rate even when we only use data on a single roll for each respondent. As a result, we can still use it to estimate differences in dishonesty between different groups of respondents (Houser, Vetter, and Winter 2012).

Finally, as usual when analyzing survey or experimental data, representativeness and selective non-participation is a concern. In Section A.6 in the appendix, we examine issues of non-participation by exploiting that the administrative university data contains information on enrollment year, field, completed classes, and gender for everyone invited to our survey experiment. Although our participation rate of 29% is reasonably high, our participant population does differ somewhat from invited non-participants. Participants are a bit younger, more likely to study economics, and slightly more likely to be male. Applying a reweighting procedure to correct our regression estimates for non-participation, however, shows no evidence that selective non-response affects our results.

## 6 Conclusion

We study the role of self-selection into public service in sustaining an equilibrium of low corruption and low public sector dishonesty. Focusing on the world's least corrupt country, Denmark, we conduct a survey experiment among a relevant student population to obtain individual measures of dishonesty, preferences for entering public service, and other relevant attributes.

We document extensive heterogeneity in dishonesty among potential candidates for public service and a clear pattern of positive self-selection: Students expressing a preference for entering public service cheat 10 percentage point less in a standard experimental dishonesty task. This result stands in sharp contrast to previous results from more corrupt countries.

To shed some light on the mechanisms behind the observed selection pattern, we examine whether dishonesty and job preferences correlate systematically with other attributes. Differences in pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation turn out to be strong



predictors of both dishonesty and job preferences. Pro-socially motivated students who make large donations in a dictator game are systematically more honest and more likely to prefer a public service career. On the other hand, pecuniarily motivated students that rank the wage level as an important job characteristic are systematically less honest and less likely to express a preference for a public service career. We find that this pattern can explain a significant part of the association between honesty and preferences for public service.

Finally, we examine the role of public sector wages in shaping the observed selection pattern based on a set of counterfactual job preference question that vary the wage gap between the public and private sector. Consistent with the results regarding pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation, we find that higher public sector wages would attract more dishonest candidates to public service in Denmark.

Overall, our results confirm that systematic selection of honest individuals into public service may be part of the reason that Denmark is able to maintain its low levels of corruption and public sector dishonesty. To the extent that current levels of public sector dishonesty affect the future career choices of honest and dishonest individuals, this suggests that Denmark may be benefitting from a virtuous cycle where low levels of corruption and the self-selection of honest individuals into public service are mutually reinforcing. Such virtuous cycles can explain why some countries are consistently able to sustain an honest public sector, while many other countries struggle with high levels of corruption.

At the same time however, our results regarding public sector wages suggest that it is possible to change the observed selection pattern by changing policy. In fact, our results suggest that that the standard policy recommendation of combatting corruption by increasing public sector wages may have unintended negative effects on selection. The

implication of this is not that countries struggling with high levels of corruption should simply start lowering public sector wages; the effect of changes in public sector wages is not necessarily the same across high and low corruption settings, and high public sector wages may still have large beneficial effects on the incentives for corruption if they raise the cost of being fired for corruption or if they are necessary to keep public employees' incomes above subsistence levels. At the same time, however, our results do suggest that high public sector wages is *not* the reason Denmark has been and continues to be among the world's least corrupt countries. Understanding the factors and policy choices that affect selection into public service should thus be a key objective for future research.

## References

Abblink, Klaus, and Danila Serra. 2012. "Anticorruption Policies: Lessons from the Lab." *Working Paper*, 77–115.

Alatas, Vivi, Lisa Cameron, Ananish Chaudhuri, Nisvan Erkal, and Lata Gangadharan. 2009. "Subject Pool Effects in a Corruption Experiment: A Comparison of Indonesian Public Servants and Indonesian Students." *Experimental Economics* 12 (1): 113–32.

Amore, Mario Daniele, and Morten Bennedsen. 2013. "The Value of Local Political Connections in a Low-Corruption Environment." *Journal of Financial Economics* 110 (2): 387–402.

Andvig, Jens Chr, and Karl Ove Moene. 1990. "How Corruption May Corrupt." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 13 (1): 63–76.

Ariely, Dan, Ximena Garcia-Rada, Lars Hornuf, and Heather Mann. 2014. "The (True) Legacy of Two Really Existing Economic Systems." *Munich Discussion Paper*.

Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, and Scott S Lee. 2016. *Do-Gooders and Go-Getters: Career Incentives, Selection, and Performance in Public Service Delivery*. Working paper.

Banerjee, Ritwik, Tushi Baul, and Tanya Rosenblat. 2015. "On Self Selection of the Corrupt into the Public Sector." *Economics Letters* 127: 43–46.

Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation." *The Review of Economic Studies* 70 (3): 489–520.

Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Navin Kartik. 2014. "Candidates, Character, and Corruption." *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics* 5 (2): 205–46.

Besley, Timothy. 2004. "Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2: 193–215.

Besley, Timothy, and Maitreesh Ghatak. 2005. "Competition and Incentives with

Motivated Agents.” *The American Economic Review* 95 (3): 616–36.

Buurman, Margaretha, Josse Delfgaauw, Robert Dur, and Seth Van den Bossche. 2012. “Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic?” *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 83 (3): 279–91.

Cadot, Olivier. 1987. “Corruption as a Gamble.” *Journal of Public Economics* 33 (2): 223–44.

Callen, Michael, Saad Gulzar, Ali Hasanain, Yasir Khan, and Arman Rezaee. 2015. *Personalities and Public Sector Performance: Evidence from a Health Experiment in Pakistan*. HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series.

Caselli, Francesco, and Massimo Morelli. 2004. “Bad Politicians.” *Journal of Public Economics* 88 (3): 759–82.

Cohn, Alain, and Michel André Maréchal. 2015. *Laboratory Measure of Cheating Predicts Misbehavior at School*. University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper Series.

Cohn, Alain, Ernst Fehr, and Michel André Maréchal. 2014. “Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry.” *Nature* 516 (7529): 86–89.

Cohn, Alain, Michel André Maréchal, and Thomas Noll. 2015. “Bad Boys: How Criminal Identity Salience Affects Rule Violation.” *The Review of Economic Studies* 82 (4): 1289–1308.

Corbacho, Ana, Daniel W Gingerich, Virginia Oliveros, and Mauricio Ruiz-Vega. 2016. “Corruption as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Costa Rica.” *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (4): 1077–92.

Dal Bó, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, and Martín A Rossi. 2013. “Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service.” *The Quarterly*

*Journal of Economics* 128 (3): 1169–1218.

Delfgaauw, Josse, and Robert Dur. 2007. “Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector\*.” *The Economic Journal* 118 (525): 171–91.

Deserranno, Erika. 2016. *Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Health Promoters in Uganda*. Working paper.

Finan, Frederico, Benjamin A Olken, and Rohini Pande. 2015. “The Personnel Economics of the State.” *NBER Working Paper*.

Fischbacher, Urs, and Franziska Föllmi-Heusi. 2013. “Lies in Disguise: An Experimental Study on Cheating.” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11 (3): 525–47.

Fisman, Raymond, and Edward Miguel. 2007. “Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets.” *Journal of Political Economy* 115 (6): 1020–48.

Fisman, Raymond, Nikolaj A Harmon, Emir Kamenica, and Inger Munk. 2015. “Labor Supply of Politicians.” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 13 (5): 871–905.

Gächter, Simon, and Jonathan F Schulz. 2016. “Intrinsic Honesty and the Prevalence of Rule Violations Across Societies.” *Nature* 531: 496–9.

Gino, Francesca, Shahar Ayal, and Dan Ariely. 2009. “Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior the Effect of One Bad Apple on the Barrel.” *Psychological Science* 20 (3): 393–98.

Gneezy, Uri, Bettina Rockenbach, and Marta Serra-Garcia. 2013. “Measuring Lying Aversion.” *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 93: 293–300.

Hanna, Rema, and Shing-Yi Wang. 2017. “Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India.” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*.

Harrison, Glenn W, Morten I Lau, and E Elisabet Rutström. 2007. “Estimating Risk Attitudes in Denmark: A Field Experiment.” *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 109 (2): 341–68.

Hilbig, Benjamin E, and Corinna M Hessler. 2013. “What Lies Beneath: How the Distance Between Truth and Lie Drives Dishonesty.” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 49 (2): 263–66.

Houser, Daniel, John A List, Marco Piovesan, Anya Samek, and Joachim Winter. 2016. “Dishonesty: From parents to children.” *European Economic Review* 82: 242–54.

Houser, Daniel, Stefan Vetter, and Joachim Winter. 2012. “Fairness and Cheating.” *European Economic Review* 56 (8): 1645–55.

Jiang, Ting. 2013. “Cheating in Mind Games: The Subtlety of Rules Matters.” *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 93: 328–36.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2010. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: A Summary of Methodology.” *Data and Analytical Issues, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, no. 5430.

Kolstad, Julie Riise, and Ida Lindkvist. 2013. “Pro-Social Preferences and Self-Selection into the Public Health Sector: Evidence from an Economic Experiment.” *Health Policy and Planning* 28 (3): 320–27.

Lui, Francis T. 1986. “A Dynamic Model of Corruption Deterrence.” *Journal of Public Economics* 31 (2): 215–36.

Olken, Benjamin A, and Rohini Pande. 2012. “Corruption in Developing Countries.” *Annu. Rev. Econ.* 4 (1): 479–509.

Perry, James L, and Lois Recascino Wise. 1990. “The Motivational Bases of Public Service.” *Public Administration Review* 50 (3): 367–73.

Serra, Danila, Pieter Serneels, and Abigail Barr. 2011. "Intrinsic Motivations and the Non-Profit Health Sector: Evidence from Ethiopia." *Personality and Individual Differences* 51 (3): 309–14.

Shalvi, Shaul, Jason Dana, Michel JJ Handgraaf, and Carsten KW De Dreu. 2011. "Justified Ethicality: Observing Desired Counterfactuals Modifies Ethical Perceptions and Behavior." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 115 (2): 181–90.


Shalvi, Shaul, Ori Eldar, and Yoella Bereby-Meyer. 2012. "Honesty Requires Time (and Lack of Justifications)." *Psychological Science* 23 (10): 1264–70.

Shalvi, Shaul, Michel JJ Handgraaf, and Carsten KW De Dreu. 2011. "Ethical Manoeuvring: Why People Avoid Both Major and Minor Lies." *British Journal of Management* 22 (s1): S16–27.

Transparency International. 2016. *Corruption Perceptions Index 2015*. Transparency International. Retrieved from: <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/results>.

Weisel, Ori, and Shaul Shalvi. 2015. "The Collaborative Roots of Corruption." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 112 (34): 10651–56.


Figure 1: Corruption across countries 1996-2014



The figure shows the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 1996-2014 for all available countries. The highlighted red line is Denmark, while the grey lines show the series for other countries.




Figure 2: Distribution of correct guesses and predicted distribution under full honesty



The histogram shows the observed number of correct guesses across students in our dice experiment (solid bars) and the predicted distribution under full honesty (outlined bars).

Figure 3: Average cheat rate for those preferring public and private sector by size of public-private wage gap



The figure shows the averages estimated cheat rate among students preferring public and private sector in different counterfactual wage scenarios that vary the private sector wage premium. Each pair of one black and one grey line correspond to a different wage scenario. Black lines show the estimated cheat rates of those choosing the private sector sector in the wage scenario. Grey lines shows the estimated cheat rates for those choosing the public sector.

Table 1: Summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Number of correct guesses	862	20.724	13.186	0	40
estimated cheat rates	862	0.422	0.396	-0.200	1
Public administration rank $\leq 2$	862	0.422	0.494	0	1
Higher ranking of public administration	862	-3.414	2.079	-8	-1
Public service motivation score	860	2.440	0.521	0.250	3.950
Public sector picked at current wage	862	0.281	0.450	0	1
Probability of public administration	858	0.207	0.130	0	0.900
GPA (standardized)	861	-0.002	0.998	-5.914	2.332
Picks risky lottery	862	0.501	0.500	0	1
Job security rank $\leq 2$	862	0.119	0.325	0	1
Donation	862	6.798	6.521	0	15
Wage rank $\leq 2$	862	0.288	0.453	0	1
Male	862	0.536	0.499	0	1

The table shows summary statistics for the participants in the survey experiment. The variables are the number of reported correct guesses across the 40 dice games, the estimated cheat rate, an indicator for whether public administration was ranked in the top two of the eight job categories, the flipped actual rank given to public administration (so that a higher value means a stronger preference for public administration), the public service motivation score, an indicator for whether the public sector was picked in the wage scenario corresponding to the current wage gap, the subjective probability of ending up in public administration, GPA standardized by field (the non-zero mean is due to the one excluded participant), an indicator for choosing one of the two most risky lotteries, the amount donated in the dictator game, the student's gender and indicators for whether job security and wage was ranked in the top two of the five job characteristics

Table 2: Dishonesty and public service job preferences

	Estimated cheat rate				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Public administration rank $\leq 2$	-0.102** (0.027)				
Higher ranking of public administration		-0.022** (0.006)			
Public service motivation score			-0.152** (0.026)		
Public sector picked at current wage				-0.090** (0.029)	
Probability of public administration					-0.285** (0.105)
Constant	0.465** (0.018)	0.345** (0.025)	0.793** (0.066)	0.447** (0.016)	0.481** (0.026)
<i>N</i>	862	862	860	862	858

The table shows regressions of students' estimated cheat rates on various measures of public service job preferences. The job preference measures are an indicator for whether public administration was ranked in the top two of the eight job categories, the flipped actual rank given to public administration (so that a higher value means a stronger preference for public administration), the public service motivation score, an indicator for whether the public sector was picked in the wage scenario corresponding to the current wage gap and the subjective probability of ending up in public administration. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table 3: Correlates of dishonesty and job preferences

<i>Panel A:</i>							
	Estimated cheat rate						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GPA (standardized)	0.007 (0.014)						0.014 (0.014)
Picks risky lottery		0.035 (0.027)					0.036 (0.027)
Job security rank $\leq 2$			0.002 (0.039)				-0.002 (0.038)
Donation				-0.016** (0.002)			-0.016** (0.002)
Wage rank $\leq 2$					0.083** (0.029)		0.048 (0.029)
Male						0.061* (0.027)	0.034 (0.027)
Constant	0.422** (0.013)	0.404** (0.019)	0.422** (0.014)	0.533** (0.019)	0.398** (0.016)	0.389** (0.019)	0.481** (0.028)
<i>Panel B:</i>							
	Public administration rank $\leq 2$						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
GPA (standardized)	0.001 (0.017)						-0.002 (0.017)
Picks risky lottery		-0.058 (0.034)					-0.042 (0.034)
Job security rank $\leq 2$			-0.072 (0.051)				-0.093 (0.049)
Donation				0.009** (0.003)			0.006* (0.003)
Wage rank $\leq 2$					-0.202** (0.035)		-0.184** (0.036)
Male						-0.126** (0.034)	-0.092** (0.035)
Constant	0.423** (0.017)	0.451** (0.024)	0.431** (0.018)	0.364** (0.024)	0.480** (0.020)	0.490** (0.025)	0.513** (0.036)
<i>N</i>	861	862	862	862	862	862	861

Panel A of the table shows regressions of students' estimated cheat rates on various measures of other student attributes. Panel B of the table shows the same regressions but replacing the outcome variable with an indicator for whether students ranked public administration in the top two of the eight job categories. The measures of other attributes are GPA standardized by field, an indicator for choosing the one of the two most risky lotteries, the amount donated in the dictator game, an indicator for being male and indicators for whether job security and wage was ranked in the top two of the five job characteristics. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table 4: Dishonesty and job preferences conditional on other attributes

	Estimated cheat rate							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Public administration rank $\leq 2$	-0.103** (0.027)	-0.100** (0.027)	-0.102** (0.027)	-0.078** (0.026)	-0.091** (0.027)	-0.095** (0.027)	-0.068** (0.027)	-0.072** (0.026)
GPA (standardized)	0.007 (0.014)						0.014 (0.014)	
Picks risky lottery		0.030 (0.027)					0.033 (0.027)	
Job security ranked $\leq 2$			-0.005 (0.039)				-0.008 (0.037)	
Donation				-0.016** (0.002)			-0.016** (0.002)	-0.015** (0.002)
Wage ranked $\leq 2$					0.064* (0.029)		0.036 (0.029)	0.041 (0.029)
Male						0.048 (0.027)	0.027 (0.027)	
Constant	0.466** (0.018)	0.449** (0.023)	0.465** (0.019)	0.561** (0.021)	0.441** (0.021)	0.436** (0.023)	0.516** (0.032)	
<i>N</i>	861	862	862	862	862	862	861	861
<i>p</i> -value, test of whether the estimate in the first row is the same as in Table 2	0.85	0.35	0.89	<0.01**	0.04*	0.10	<0.01**	<0.01**

The table shows regressions of students' estimated cheat rates on preference for public service, while controlling for various measures of other student attributes. The job preference measure is an indicator for whether public administration was ranked in the top two of the eight job categories. The measures of other attributes are GPA standardized by field, an indicator for choosing the most risky lottery, the amount donated in the dictator game, an indicator for being male and indicators for whether job security and wage was ranked in the top two of the five job characteristics. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ .