Zeuthen Workshop 2004

November 13-14, 2004.
 

                              

Saturday

 
Coffee  9:15
   
9:30 - 10:15 Thomas Kittsteiner, Oxford University
“Efficient partnership dissolution under buy-sell clauses”, pdf
   
10:15 - 11:00 J. Phillip Reiss, Otto-von-Guericke-Universität, Magdeburg
“Bidding with outside options”, pdf
   
Coffee and Donuts  11:00 - 11:15
   
11:15 - 12:00 Sarah Parlane, University College Dublin
“Auctioning horizontally differentiated items”, pdf
   
12:00 - 12:45 Angel Hernando-Veciana, University of Alicante
“The insider’s curse”, pdf
   
Lunch  12:45 - 1:45
   
1:45 - 2:30 Marta Stryszowska, Tilburg University
“Late and multiple bidding in competing Internet auctions”, pdf
   
2:30 - 3:15 Dan Levin, Ohio State University
“Investment dynamics with common and private values”, pdf
   
Coffee and Donuts   3:15 - 3:45
   
3:45-4:30 Klaus Kultti, University of Helsinki
“Wage distribution with a two-sided job auction”, pdf
   
4:30 - 5:15 Günter Schamel, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
“An empirical analysis of online auction prices for Bordeaux wine”, pdf
   
Dinner at Restaurant Zeleste  7:30
   
   
   

Sunday

 
Coffee  9:15
   
9:30 - 10:15 Matthew Ryan, University of Auckland
“Auctions with options to re-auction”, pdf

   
10:15 - 11:00 Pieter Gautier, Tinbergen Institute
“Strategic wage setting and coordination frictions with multiple applications”, pdf
   
Coffee and Donuts  11:00 - 11:15
   
11:15 - 12:00 John Kennes, University of Copenhagen
“Simple Reputation Systems”, pdf
   
12:00 - 12:45 Neslihan Uler, New York University
“Behavioral differences between indirect and direct mechanisms”, pdf
   
Lunch  12:45 - 1:45
   
1:45 - 2:30 Per Baltzer Overgaard, University of Aarhus
“Buy-out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi-unit demand”, pdf
   
2:30 - 3:15 Andrés Romeu Santana, University of Alicante
“Identification in sequential first-price auctions: first-round bids suffice”, pdf
   
3:15 - 4:00 Susan L. Rose, Ohio State University
“An experimental investigation of the explosive effect in almost common value auctions”, pdf